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Abstract 
 This thesis seeks to examine if the conservative victory in the 1964 Republican 
presidential primaries was inevitable. Based on archival research, primary source 
materials, and secondary source materials, it is concluded that conservative candidate 
Barry Goldwater faced numerous instances when his campaign could have been defeated 
by Republican challengers, campaign blunders, and internal party factions. This thesis 
focuses on liberal Republican Nelson Rockefeller’s campaign with the intention of 
articulating the fracturing of the Republican Party in the early 1960s. Rockefeller’s quest 
for the nomination is emblematic of the changing nature of presidential politics in the 
post-World War II era leading to changes in voter preferences, campaign tactics, and 
ultimately the path to the White House. 
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Introduction 
 Nelson Rockefeller waited in anticipation. Louis XV-style furniture dotted the 
forty-seven foot living room, touched off by cutting-edge furnishings and art, gilded 
consoles, ivory tables, and large Picasso paintings. Occupying most of the twelfth floor 
with a view of Central Park, Rockefeller’s residence consisted of a living room, a formal 
dining room, a library, a massive two-bedroom master suite complete with a spacious 
master bath, a staff bedroom with its own bathroom, and a large family room off the 
kitchen.1 It was Friday night, July 22, 1960, three days before the opening of the 
Republican National Convention in Chicago. Rockefeller prepared himself for the arrival 
of Richard Nixon to his apartment at 810 Fifth Avenue in New York City. 
 Days earlier, Citizens for Rockefeller, a political action group spearheading the 
draft Rockefeller campaign, made a newspaper and television appeal to voters that 
brought in over a million pieces of mail and telegrams to the Chicago convention along 
with a flood of telephone calls overwhelming the mail delivery services around the city.2 
People demanded that Rockefeller be placed on the ballot for president. Throughout the 
election cycle, Rockefeller remained coy about the nomination, never fading too far out 
of focus. By May of 1960, when disarmament talks with had Russia broken down and 
American interests abroad suffered, Rockefeller sensed a troubling future ahead for the 
                                                          
1 Kay, Andrew, “Rockefeller Rich on Fifth Avenue,” http://iconsofnewyork.com/?p=599 (accessed 
Dec. 15, 2016). 
2 Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960, New York: Harper Perennial, 2010, 215. 
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country. These factors all reinvigorated his drive for the presidency. Like Taft in 1952, 
Rockefeller’s supporters envisioned themselves streaming towards the convention hall 
singing the praises of their nominee. To Governor Rockefeller, it seemed like a grand 
possibility.  
Nelson’s grandfather, John D. Rockefeller, was once the richest man in the world, 
after having built the family fortune through the merciless business practices of Standard 
Oil. Estimates of the Rockefeller fortune ranged from three to six billion dollars.3 A sum 
so large that the Rockefeller family saw fit to re-envision the skyline of New York City, 
build the Lincoln Center of the Performing Arts and the Museum of Modern Art, and 
give rise to the Rockefeller plaza and the Rockefeller Center. The name “Rockefeller” 
became an institution unto itself, not confined to New York or even the Northeast, but all 
across the country. Money poured into an array of projects ranging from medical research 
and education to real estate and missile development. Despite this immense power, John 
D. Rockefeller closed himself off from the public. He taught his children and 
grandchildren to avoid bringing bad publicity on the family name by staying out of the 
newspapers. He, a titan of nineteenth-century finance, tried to avoid the press. 
Rockefellers were not to have their picture in any publication nor were they to publically 
participate in politics aside from discreet donations to the Republican Party. Nelson 
Rockefeller changed all of that by accepting Franklin Roosevelt’s offer to become 
Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs in 1940. He then served as a special advisor on 
international affairs in the Truman administration followed by a position as a diplomat 
                                                          
3 White, Making of the President 1960, 210. 
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under Dwight Eisenhower before becoming the governor of New York, the most 
populous state in the country. Rockefeller, in the words of a friend, “felt he had to run for 
elective office, because nobody really paid any attention to someone who was only an 
appointee.”4 He was an egalitarian extrovert who succeeded by using his charm and 
persuasion, prompting his defeated opponents to marvel at his political magic.5 By 1960, 
Nelson Rockefeller appeared as the liberal Republicans’ golden boy, the New York 
governor with the potential to swing the presidential election and Richard Nixon took 
notice. 
Nixon arrived at the Fifth Avenue apartment under unusual circumstances. 
Rockefeller had requested a secret meeting with Nixon and wanted there to be an 
announcement afterwards that the meeting had taken place at the vice president’s request. 
He also wanted a “joint” agreement over changes to the party platform ahead of the 
convention.6 Accompanied by an aide and a Secret Service agent, Nixon took the elevator 
up to the twelfth floor at 7:30 that evening. Rockefeller’s shift from not seeking the 
candidacy in December 1959 to announcing that he would not campaign but make 
himself available for a party draft at the convention had kept him on the cusp of the 
nomination, at least in the public’s eye. He spent that time advocating liberal Republican 
ideals that threatened not only party unity but Nixon’s chance at winning the election. 
Nixon, toeing the line between being shrewd and pragmatic, was trying to have it both 
                                                          
4 “The Rocky Roll,” Time, Oct. 5, 1958, 18. 
5 Manchester, William, “Nelson Rockefeller’s Moral Heritage,” Harper’s Magazine, May. 1959, 26. 
6 Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American 
Consensus, New York: Nation, 2009, 116. 
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ways. He appealed to the conservatives while repeatedly seeking liberal Republican 
support, sending mixed signals to both factions. Republicans like Barry Goldwater 
pushed Nixon to take a strong stand on conservative issues like reducing spending, 
balancing the budget, and ending bureaucratic growth.  Nixon agreed to their points and 
even promised to advocate for a right-to-work plank in the Republican Party platform.7 
To ease the worries of conservatives, Nixon told Goldwater that he had no intention of 
meeting with Rockefeller until after the convention. But, Rockefeller’s sudden surge, 
bolstered by the Citizens for Rockefeller, changed the political calculus. Nixon believed 
that if he did not meet with Rockefeller he would risk losing New York and potentially 
the support of northeastern Republicans.  
After exchanging greetings, Nixon and Rockefeller ate together in the opulent 
dining room of the Rockefeller residence while discussing their experiences in 
Washington. An hour or so later, they retired to the next room to focus on more pressing 
matters. Nixon wanted to discuss the vice presidency. In the aftermath of John F. 
Kennedy’s selection of Texas senator Lyndon Johnson there appeared to be a growing 
weakness in the South for the GOP. By choosing Johnson as his running mate, Kennedy 
increased the pressure on Nixon to hold the northern industrial states including New 
York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio. Nixon’s campaign data suggested that 
Rockefeller could add as much as two points to the final tally. Knowing how close 
pollsters projected the election to be, Nixon offered the vice presidency to Rockefeller. 
Nixon promised Rockefeller control over the party platform, foreign policy, and New 
                                                          
7 Gary Donaldson, Liberalism's Last Hurrah: The Presidential Campaign of 1964, Skyhorse Pub Co 
Inc., 2016, 28. 
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York state patronage.8 To Nixon’s dismay, Rockefeller refused the offer, saying that he 
was not interested in standing by while someone else took the lead.9              
 Sometime around ten o’clock the pair began to work on Rockefeller’s desired 
changes to the party platform. Thinking that he could still change Rockefeller’s mind on 
the vice presidency, Nixon prepared to give ground to the governor. Rockefeller gave 
Nixon a draft of fourteen points that he wanted to see in the platform and the two began 
their work long into the night. At midnight, a four way phone call between platform 
committee chairman Charles Percy in his Chicago hotel room and Rockefeller’s 
command center was established. They went over the defense budget, the issue of 
funding a federal program of medical care for elderly Americans, the rate of economic 
growth, and the proposal for the Atlantic confederation. Nixon did not stand in the way of 
Rockefeller’s civil rights plank that praised the actions of demonstrators protesting at 
southern lunch counters reserved for whites.10 At 3:30 a.m., it was all over. With Nixon 
on his way to catch a flight at La Guardia destined for Chicago, Rockefeller telephoned 
his staff to tell them what had happened. At 5:00 a.m. a press release went out from the 
Rockefeller people: “The Vice-President and I met today at my home in New York City. 
The meeting took place at the Vice-President’s request. The purpose of the meeting was 
                                                          
8 Niall Ferguson, Kissinger: Volume I: 1923-1968: The Idealist, New York: Penguin Press, 2015, 
455. 
9 Richard Norton Smith, On His Own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller, New York: Random 
House, 2014, 344-345. 
10 Richard Norton Smith, On His Own Terms, 345. 
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to discuss the platform of the Republican Party.”11 Members of the press the next day 
called the meeting “the Truce of Fifth Avenue.”12  
      It was a big story: reaction to the meeting was explosive but neither side came 
away looking good. President Eisenhower accosted Nixon for “repudiating” the 
administration’s record and Rockefeller for “personal treachery.”13 Goldwater could not 
believe that Nixon had given in to Rockefeller. He was outraged, calling the meeting the 
“Munich of the Republican Party,” a “surrender” that spelled defeat in November.14  
Nixon had been summoned by the conservatives’ arch-rival within the party, had crawled 
his way into his apartment in New York City, and had signed on to the liberals’ platform. 
Party regulars long believed that there had been an eastern liberal conspiracy against 
them, working behind the scenes to impose its will on the rest of the party. Nixon’s 
meeting with Rockefeller confirmed their suspicions, giving the leverage not to the vice-
president and likely nominee, but to a northeastern liberal from New York. Rockefeller’s 
naked grab for power was too much for the right wing of the party. They looked like 
fools, having worked to write and rewrite the platform in Chicago while the real platform 
was being made in a luxury apartment on Fifth Avenue.    
 When Nixon arrived at the convention just before noon on Monday the 25th, he 
was caught in a precarious situation. Over the weekend, Eisenhower had formed a third 
                                                          
11 “The Platform Statements by Rockefeller and Nixon,” New York Times, July 21, 1960. 
12 James Reston, “The Truce of Fifth Avenue, or Morningside Revisited,” New York Times, July 24, 
1960. 
13 Ferguson, Kissinger, 455. 
14 Russel Baker, “Goldwater Hits Platform Accord,” New York Times, July 24, 1960. 
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faction working independently of and, more often than not, against Rockefeller, but he 
still in supported Nixon’s nomination. On the far right of the party, conservatives bristled 
with contempt for Nixon’s appeasement of the liberal wing. Not only had Nixon not even 
bothered to tell Goldwater about his meeting with Rockefeller, which he could have done 
so during the pair’s telephone call Friday morning, but he also refused to budge on the 
issue of civil rights. Before Nixon’s meeting with Rockefeller, members of the platform 
committee had worked to write an acceptable civil rights plank. South Carolinian’s Roger 
Milliken and A. Dabney Barnes sought to counter the Democrat’s liberalism with a more 
conservative approach. During the writing session, liberal Republicans protested that 
Nixon would not support the language put in by Barnes, to which she countered by 
quoting lines from Nixon’s book on the topic. With that, the committee adopted the civil 
rights plank. Much to the dismay of Barnes and other conservatives at the convention, 
when Nixon arrived from New York he insisted that the original plank be substituted for 
the one directed by Rockefeller.15 Meanwhile, Milliken inserted conservative ideology 
into the business and labor sections that came closer to Goldwater’s brand of politics. A 
delegate from the Virgin Islands commented to a Texan, “If they had a couple more 
people like that red-headed fellow over there (Milliken), they could turn this party inside 
out.”16 
Many Republicans and Democrats alike foresaw a looming shift in the electorate 
from the South that could hinge on how each party would approach the concerns of the 
                                                          
15 Newspaper clipping, John A. Montgomery, “It Started Here,” Columbia Record, July 12, 1963, in 
James Duffy Papers , MSS 69, box 3, folder 24, Clemson University Archives, Clemson, South Carolina. 
16 Ibid. 
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people. There existed an opportunity for Republicans to change the mindset of southern 
voters when they went to the ballot box thus giving Republicans an opening to take the 
region away from their opponents. One line of reasoning, put forward by Rockefeller, 
held that due to the demographic changes, stemming from the northern migration of 
African-Americans to the cities, Republicans needed to make progress towards stopping 
the loss of African-American votes by outflanking the Democrats on civil rights. Another 
view, predominantly held by Southern Republicans, focused on the issue from a states’ 
rights perspective that wanted to limit the power of the federal government including the 
enforcement of civil rights. If African-Americans, who were already voting in large 
numbers for Democrats, were going north, then Republicans would have free rein over 
the South. A middle ground, proposed by the Platform Committee, avoided outright 
support of the sit-ins across the South, but refused any federal intervention to secure 
equality for African-Americans. Both points stood in opposition to the Democratic 
platform. Nixon chose to favor Rockefeller’s position to garner votes from African-
Americans in the North because he believed in it on principle. Those on the far right 
would later cite this decision for Nixon’s defeat in the general election.17           
 On the opening day of the convention, Goldwater had his own decision to make. 
Arizona and South Carolina Republicans agreed to pledge their thirteen delegates to the 
Arizona Senator on the basis that if Goldwater’s name were nominated then conservatism 
would be represented at the convention. Amid cheers from supporters, Governor Paul 
                                                          
17 White, Making of the President 1960, 233-234. 
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Fannin of Arizona trumpeted Goldwater’s authenticity, “He is not a ‘me too’ person.”18 
Goldwater shared their philosophical sentiments but, in light of recent events, he was 
compelled to respond as a force for the conservatives rather than act as a mere symbol. In 
doing so, he withdrew his name from the nomination. Inside the convention hall 
Goldwater gave a stirring speech to his supporters. He withdrew his candidacy then 
called on conservatives to “grow up” and support Nixon. In a boisterous tone he appealed 
to their sense of reason, demanding that they cast their ballots for the party against the 
tide of liberalism. Then in a moment that would change the direction of the party, he 
appealed to their sense of frustration, “If we want to take this party back, and I think we 
can some day, let’s get to work.”19 In an instant, Goldwater became a conservative icon 
for having stood up to eastern liberals while supporting the Republican Party at large.   
Nixon won the nomination on the first ballot, and he then selected Henry Cabot 
Lodge as his running mate. Lodge was a part of the eastern internationalist wing of the 
party, a moderate hailing from Massachusetts like the Democratic nominee. Kennedy, in 
fact, had defeated Lodge in the latter’s bid for reelection to the Senate in 1952.  
Conservatives viewed Lodge as one more attempt at winning over the liberal East, but 
come election time, he was unable to turn the tide against Kennedy in the region. 
Goldwater refused to allow himself to be a victim of defeat; instead, his principled image 
gave supporters hope that conservatism would have its day.   
                                                          
18 “Unity is Stressed,” New York Times, July 28, 1960.  
19 Donaldson, Liberalism’s Last Hurrah, 29-30. 
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 Rockefeller endorsed Nixon, pledging all ninety-six votes of the New York 
delegation to him. “We want to be the first state to put the key in the lock and open it for 
you,” Rockefeller told Nixon.20 Flashbulb explosions captured the two of them with their 
arms around each other, grinning as members of the convention and national television 
audience looked on. An undercurrent of anger and resentment festered over Rockefeller’s 
heavy-handed attempt to make changes to the platform after it had been agreed upon by 
the Committee members. Unable to sense the blunder, Nixon announced that Rockefeller 
would be campaigning for him throughout the election cycle. Henry Kissinger later 
revealed Rockefeller’s view of the vice-president, saying, “He loathes Nixon.”21  
South Carolina party chairman Greg Shorey foresaw a vicious battle on the 
horizon, “Senator Goldwater is the man the liberals will have to climb over to get what 
they want.”22 In the months that followed, John F. Kennedy defeated Nixon in one of the 
closest elections in American history. As with any major political defeat, the party 
faithful were left to ponder what went wrong. For conservatives, the answer was clear. 
The Republican Party embrace conservatism, distinguish itself from liberal Democrats, 
and give the electorate a clear ideological choice. On the other hand, Rockefeller and 
liberal Republicans concluded that aside from Nixon’s tactical errors, the party appealed 
to a broad base of Americans who, by nature, were drawn to moderate left-leaning 
                                                          
20 “Unity is Stressed,” New York Times. 
21 Ferguson, Kissinger, 456. 
22 Newspaper clipping, John A. Montgomery, “It Started Here,” The Columbia Record, July 12, 
1963, in James Duffy Papers, MSS 69, box 3, folder 24, Clemson University Archives. 
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politics. When the final ballots were counted in 1960, the race was on for control of a 
contentious Republican Party in 1964. 
 
Chapter 1: Rockefeller Decides to Run 
A Brief History of Liberal Republicans  
“I’m feeling like a bull moose,” Theodore Roosevelt declared to reporters in 1912 
shortly after forming the Progressive Party.23 Political writers and cartoonists seized on 
the mental image of a bull moose pushing the Democrat’s donkey and Republican’s 
elephant to the side with an imposing physique, boundless energy, and sharpened antlers. 
Roosevelt’s progressive ideals careened into his opponents forcing a political battle 
unlike any other in American history that would divide Republicans, and, as a result, 
elevate the Democrats with consequences that reverberated into the middle of the 
twentieth century. This ideological split serves as a crucial moment for understanding the 
dynamic between party factions up to and during the 1960s. 
When Republican leaders showed a preference for keeping the party in the hands 
of President William Howard Taft for the election of 1912 instead of Theodore 
Roosevelt, the party split in two. Conservatives kept their allegiance to their president, a 
level-headed if uncharismatic politician who longed to be in the courts instead of the 
White House. Taft’s pragmatism and deft legal work instituted a number of progressive 
changes to the law which were not politically feasible under Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s 
                                                          
23 Edmund Morris, Colonel Roosevelt, New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2011, 245. 
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supporters loved their candidate’s energy, his sense of adventure, vigorous spirit, and the 
romantic image that he had crafted for himself since his days as a Rough Rider in Cuba. 
Taft and Roosevelt’s fight for the nomination sparked the states to adopt a primary 
system. In order to get Roosevelt to the top of the ticket, his Republican supporters 
reasoned that they needed to bypass party regulars at the convention. They strategized 
that Roosevelt had to demonstrate his popularity in order to sway the political bosses to 
give their support to the candidate. To do this, backers convinced five states to join the 
already existing primary states to create a larger series of primary elections.24  
 Initial opposition to Taft had come from Robert LaFollette in Wisconsin, George 
Norris in Nebraska, and Hiram Johnson in California. They represented a form of 
progressive militancy that was growing in western and farm states and was aimed at 
railroad companies and other business influences that controlled the party structure. 
Leaders within the movement found support among farmers and small business owners 
who raised concern among eastern progressives because of their attacks on eastern 
corporations and intellectuals. Eastern progressives shared the radicals’ desire to curb big 
business and were equally upset with Taft’s decision to raise tariff rates after he had 
promised to reduce them when he got elected in 1908, but progressives feared a growing 
movement. Sensing trouble, progressives urged Roosevelt to run. Reading the situation, 
                                                          
24 Jody C. Baumgartner and Peter L. Francia, Conventional Wisdom and American Elections: 
Exploding Myths, Exploring Misunderstanding, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007, 160. 
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Roosevelt made overtures towards the radicals by ratcheting up his rhetoric, thus 
placating their concerns.25   
In the primaries, Roosevelt crushed Lafollette and Taft only to be denied the 
nomination. Taft had managed to keep control of the Republican National Committee by 
wielding his presidential patronage powers in the South. Since the end of Reconstruction, 
southern delegates could be coerced into either delivering votes to a candidate or not 
giving votes or support if patronage could be had. Republicans in the South essentially 
held little power except during national functions. Their influence exceeded the electorate 
value that each state possessed.26 Roosevelt, a towering political figure, was convinced 
that the Republican Party had gone astray so when he walked out of the Chicago 
convention millions fled the party with him. Swept up in election fever, Roosevelt 
maintained that only he had the experience and political acumen to advance his brand of 
progressive conservatism into a new era. Woodrow Wilson exploited the Republican 
Party’s dysfunction and won the presidency in an Electoral College landslide.  
During the election of 1916, Roosevelt urged his fellow progressives to make 
amends with conservatives. Four years later, Warren G. Harding returned the Republican 
Party to the White House by signaling the end of the sweeping changes of the Progressive 
Era, thus making way for a “return to normalcy.” Throughout the 1920s Republicans in 
the West and Midwest quarreled with the eastern wing of the party over the issues of 
farming and agriculture and the evils of corporate capitalism. Many were strong 
                                                          
25 Nicol C. Rae, The Decline and Fall of Liberal Republicanism, Oxford University Press, 1989, 20-
21. 
26 Ibid, 22. 
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advocates of isolation stemming from their German ancestry. They accused easterners of 
being internationalists who brought America into an unnecessary war in Europe that 
damaged the country’s image in front of the world.27 When Democrats nominated a 
Catholic in Al Smith in 1928, Herbert Hoover rallied Protestant support in these areas by 
running as a businessman whose strong organizational skills could keep the country’s 
economy booming. But when the stock market crashed in 1929, ushering in the Great 
Depression, the Hoover administration was overwhelmed by bank failures, property 
foreclosures, falling wages, a dramatic increase in hunger, and rising unemployment.  
During his inaugural address, Franklin Delano Roosevelt condemned the business 
practices propagated under the years of Republican rule, “Yes, the money changers have 
fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that 
temple to the ancient truths. The measure of that restoration lies in the extent to which we 
apply social values more noble than mere monetary profit.”28 Roosevelt and his 
administration passed numerous liberal policies to jump start the nation’s economy. In 
light of the financial crisis, conservatives initially sided with Roosevelt until another bad 
year at the polls triggered them to act by equating the New Deal’s centralization of 
economic power with fascism and communism. This tactic failed miserably in 1936 
because Democrats tarred the Republicans with the image of uncontrolled capitalism that 
put the American democracy at risk; they were the ones at fault and the Democrats 
wanted to save the country rather than destroy it. During the 1930s, the Republican Party 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 23. 
28 Michael E. Eidenmuller, "American Rhetoric: Franklin Delano Roosevelt - First Inaugural 
Address," American Rhetoric: Franklin Delano Roosevelt - First Inaugural Address, accessed January 3, 
2017, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrfirstinaugural.html. 
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saw its support and influence plummet. Faced with such adversity and the real threat that 
the party might never again regain the White House, many Republicans moved to adopt 
liberal policies.  
Conservatives found their opening in the 1938 mid-term elections when the 
Republicans won eighty seats in the House and six seats in the Senate. Among the 
freshman class was Robert Taft of Ohio, the son of President William Howard Taft. His 
midwestern politics placed him at odds with eastern Republicans who represented 
corporate interests and Wall Street. Taft vehemently argued against the New Deal and the 
Republican penchant for making concessions rather than presenting viable alternatives. 
He called Republicans weak and confused; he believed that many of them did not 
understand that the New Deal had been stopped. The returns in 1938 proved that when 
Roosevelt attempted to pack the courts, he had reached the limits of his powers under the 
Constitution and voters had had enough. The Republicans’ victory offered them a 
glimmer of hope that they could avoid the fate of the Whigs and Federalists from 
generations past.29 As Senator, Taft formed a coalition with conservative northern 
Republicans and southern conservative Democrats to block civil rights legislation, lower 
taxes, restrict unions, and limit spending on social programs.30  
Taft’s isolationist stance amid escalating tension in Europe coupled with his anti-
internationalist views made easterners consider a nominee who, up until 1938, was an 
                                                          
29 Russell Kirk and James McClellan, The Political Principles of Robert A. Taft, New Brunswick NJ: 
Transaction Publ., 2010, 41-43. 
30 Geoffrey M.. Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of 
the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 5. 
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active Democrat known for his speeches against the New Deal and support of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. Emboldened by his progress in Congress, Taft set his sights 
on the Republican nomination in 1940, only to be beaten out by Wendell Willkie of 
Indiana. Willkie’s nomination came as a surprise to many but it was also emblematic of a 
progressive resurgence in the works. Wilkie sold himself as an Indianan, but he was a 
part of the eastern, Wall Street establishment. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes 
called Willkie “a simple, barefoot Wall Street lawyer.”31 He had earned his spot at the top 
of the ticket only a week after the fall of France, which raised doubts about isolationism 
moving forward. Even then, he was nominated on the fifth ballot.32 In a fierce and bitter 
campaign, he kept Republicans closer to the center on domestic and international issues 
which, in turn, angered the likes of “Mr. Conservative,” Robert Taft. Wilkie received 6 
million more votes than the more conservative Landon and cut dramatically into FDR’s 
margin of victory, leading eastern liberal Republicans to conclude that their ideological 
stance offered the party a better path to victory. 
Republicans nominated New York governor Thomas Dewey in both 1944 and 
1948, maintaining the grip of the eastern wing of the party. Dewey represented a valuable 
piece of the puzzle for Republicans. He was a moderate from the nation’s largest state, 
and he had proven vote getting ability in traditional Democrat strongholds like urban 
areas. Winning New York had been an essential part of the electoral math in presidential 
politics since the Antebellum era. The winner of the national election carried New York 
                                                          
31 Lewis L. Gould, The Republicans: A History of the Grand Old Party, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014, 286. 
32 Rae, Decline and Fall, 31. 
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state in 28 out of 32 elections between 1832 and 1964, and a New Yorker was on the 
ticket for president or vice-president for at least one party from 1868 thru 1948. Based on 
this historical trend, Republicans became convinced that they would need a New Yorker 
to win the White House. Dewey’s candidacy appealed to middle-class professionals who 
agreed with many of the Democrats’ positions on social issues but were alienated by 
racist Southern Democrats, ethnic urban machines, and the anti-business attitude of the 
New Deal and Fair Deal.33 Critics charged that Dewey’s liberal stance on social reform 
and internationalism was “me-too” politics that did nothing to advance the Republican 
cause. From his base of operations in New York, he organized a far-flung network of 
support for his candidacy, demonstrating that the party was indeed moving in the right 
direction. His loss to Roosevelt was expected but his loss to Harry Truman sent 
shockwaves. Stunned, Republicans convinced themselves that Dewey’s ineptitude and 
Truman’s searing attacks that accounted for the loss. He had missed an opportunity to 
strike at the Democrats vulnerability on communism, opting instead to show support for 
internationalist programs like the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO when 
he instead could have focused on two crises between the United States and communism: 
the Soviet-backed Czech coup and the Berlin airlift.34 
A series of events followed that inflamed anti-communist feelings. In 1949, Mao 
Zedong’s communist army defeated the U.S.-backed nationalist army led by Chiang Kai-
Shek. State Department documents show that there was debate as to whether the U.S. 
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properly armed Chiang’s army or if the regime simply disintegrated.35 The question 
became, “Who lost China?” While U.S. intelligence reeled from the emergence of Red 
China, Russian scientists detonated a nuclear device. In response, Truman ordered the 
hydrogen bomb to be built and established the Office of Civil Defense. Adding to the 
hysteria, Alger Hiss came before the House of Un-American Activities Committee pitting 
New Dealers against their detractors. Grabbing headlines and basking in the spotlight of 
television was California Congressman Richard Nixon. To ensure a conviction, J. Edgar 
Hoover supplied him with FBI files that exposed Hiss as a Soviet spy in an effort to put a 
stop to secret communist activities.36 Hiss’s trials and conviction became the tipping 
point for the McCarthy era. When North Korean forces poured across the South Korean 
border in 1950, soon followed by U.S. and Chinese troops engaging in combat, 
communism came to the forefront of national politics. Wisconsin senator Joseph 
McCarthy spearheaded a political movement that targeted communists in all levels of 
government and society, including Hollywood and, fatally for him, the military. 
Republicans did not unite in their support of the Senator. Taft at times showed reluctance 
and characterized McCarthy as reckless, yet he said McCarthy should “keep talking and 
if one case doesn’t work he should proceed with another.”37 Moderates noticed that 
McCarthy’s obsessive anti-communist rhetoric seemed to be targeting the East. Maine 
Senator Margaret Chase Smith, from the moderate wing of the party, was one of his 
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sharpest critics. Still, Taft saw McCarthy as a useful political tool and coveted his 
grassroots support for the 1952 nomination.38    
Standing in his way was retired general Dwight D. Eisenhower. The eastern wing 
of the party was determined not to let an isolationist like Taft represent the party, and 
Eisenhower had more than enough credentials to make the case for commander-in-chief. 
He was not taken in by “the false doctrine of isolationism,” nor was he keen on 
McCarthy’s red-baiting.39 Sweetening the deal, Eisenhower could not be blamed for the 
Republican defeat in 1948. He was a centrist candidate acceptable to moderate 
Democrats. In fact, Truman offered to not run if Eisenhower would accept the 
Democratic nomination.40 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts was dispatched 
to gauge the general’s interest and convinced him of the dangers that lay ahead if an 
isolationist were permitted to lead the Republican Party. At the convention in Chicago, 
moderates and conservatives clashed in a particularly wild scene. Dewey convinced 
Republican governors to adopt a “fair play” amendment barring delegates from voting in 
contests concerning their own credentials. In other words, Southern delegates could not 
vote for their own right to be seated at the convention thus undercutting Taft’s support in 
the South.41 Furious over such strong-arm tactics, Illinois Senator Everett Dirksen 
screeched at Dewey, “We followed you before and you took us down the path to 
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defeat!”42 Taft handled his third unsuccessful run at the nomination, like a professional 
but his followers harbored deep resentment towards the eastern liberal faction made up of 
Dewey, Lodge, and New Hampshire governor Sherman Adams. Eisenhower selected 
Nixon as the vice-presidential nominee to try heal the fractious party after the convention 
and quell conservatives’ resentment. He did not take part in any pre-convention attacks 
on Taft, and he was a compromise choice between liberals and conservatives.43 
Eisenhower’s victory ended the two decade long drought for Republicans seeking the 
presidency.  
Eisenhower’s “modern Republicanism” meant to balance the federal budget and 
reduce the size of the federal government while, at the same time, acknowledging public 
support for social welfare programs like Social Security. Conservatives wanted to 
overturn major components of the New Deal but Eisenhower pushed back on the issue 
over concern that voters would not look kindly on the administration come re-election. 
Again, Eisenhower faced criticism from within the party when he aimed to cut defense 
spending. During the Second World War, he was the Supreme Allied Commander yet 
rank-and-file Republicans cried out that Eisenhower was leaving the country vulnerable 
to attack from the Soviet Union. Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater insinuated that Ike had 
been lured by “the siren song of socialism” then moved to increase defense 
appropriations.44  
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On October 4, 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik, the first satellite to be placed 
in orbit. Nelson Rockefeller issued a report that instilled national paranoia over a 
nonexistent missile gap.45 His own foreign policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, wrote in an 
editorial for the New York Herald Tribune, “The Soviets have outstripped us. We’re 
really in trouble now. We’ve been pushed back gradually, position by position…The 
basic trend is against us.”46 Unbeknownst to them, the American military had been flying 
over Soviet airspace since July and U-2 photographs gave evidence that there was no 
missile gap. John Foster Dulles urged Eisenhower to make the information public but he 
refused, preferring to maintain the extant strategic advantage over the Soviets.47 A few 
years earlier at the behest of Eisenhower, Rockefeller assembled a group of experts at 
Quantico, Virginia and produced a concept known as “open skies” that called for mutual 
aerial inspection by both the Soviets and the Americans.48 Rockefeller would go on to use 
Kissinger’s theories on “limited nuclear war” as a basis for his foreign policy that ran 
contrary to Dulles’s strategy of massive retaliation.49 Eisenhower became increasingly 
irritated with Rockefeller’s persistent opposition to the Oval Office. Ike would not soon 
forget Kissinger’s and Rockefeller’s criticisms of his foreign policy. Goldwater took a 
similar position, though philosophically different from Rockefeller, and he worked with 
Rockefeller to make changes to military policy. 
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When the Republican nomination came open again in 1960, Nixon received 
Eisenhower’s tepid support. By the same token, when Rockefeller sought Eisenhower’s 
opinion on his potential candidacy, Ike waited two days to reply and then brought up the 
subject of foreign policy before chastising Rockefeller’s indecisiveness during the 
campaign.50 After Soviet aircraft shot down a U-2 spy plane in May, leading to the failure 
of the Paris summit to implement a nuclear test ban treaty that same month, Rockefeller 
increased his profile in the hopes of being drafted at the convention. Hoping to make a 
splash by creating the Republican equivalent of the Kennedy-Johnson ticket, Nixon met 
with Rockefeller in his Fifth Avenue apartment just before the convention to offer him 
the vice-presidency which he refused. Disappointed but not devastated, Nixon 
rationalized that Rockefeller’s independent temperament might have been a detriment in 
the long run and chose Henry Cabot Lodge in his place.51 At the convention, both 
Goldwater and Rockefeller spoke, with Rockefeller introducing Nixon before his 
acceptance speech. Nixon hoped for a display of party unity that night, but when the 
Republicans were once again defeated on Election Day, conservatives could no longer 
hold back their frustration with the direction of the party.  
For liberal Republicans, Wendell Willkie was a transformational figure that 
moved the Party to Dewey, then to Eisenhower, and finally to the nomination of Nixon. 
However, conservatives believed that the election of John F. Kennedy ended the liberal’s 
run of success. Rockefeller’s critique of Eisenhower and Nixon stifled party unity, and 
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the last minute changes he forced into the party platform drew the ire of conservatives. 
Over the years, they had seen their best and brightest falter at the finish line. After 
Kennedy’s inauguration, the party was once again scrambling to put the pieces back 
together.  For all of his political posturing and free-wheeling personality, Nelson 
Rockefeller would be the liberals’ best chance to win back the White House if he could 
stay out in front of a growing wave of conservative momentum. 
 
Rockefeller as Governor and the South’s Discontent 
 As governor of the most populous state, Rockefeller enjoyed considerable 
political privilege. Upon his election to the governorship of New York he was viewed as 
a rising star within the party at a time when returns from around the country indicated 
that the party was slipping. He then ran a national campaign for president that earned 
enough attention for his “liberal Republican” philosophy that even Kennedy thought 
would be enough to beat him had he stayed in the race.52 Barring any major changes to 
the field, his path to the nomination was relatively clear. 
 New York has a long and distinguished history of producing national candidates 
for president from both parties: Martin Van Buren, Grover Cleveland, Theodore 
Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt not to mention almost presidents like Al Smith and 
Thomas Dewey. New York City was older than the Puritan colonies in Massachusetts. 
During World War I, as Europe destroyed its economic and monetary supremacy, New 
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York City became the center of global finance, and during the interwar years, it kept the 
entire system of international debt afloat. After World War II, hundreds of millions of 
dollars’ worth of federal grants and loans poured into the state, some of the best 
universities in the world were located within its borders, and for thousands of 
immigrants, it was the first place they saw when they came across the Atlantic.  
Nelson Rockefeller was at the helm of a powerful instrument. On his way to his 
seat in Albany, Dewey and his circle of friends played a key role in Rockefeller’s 
campaign. In return, the people of New York gained a governor with years of business, 
philanthropic, and governmental experience and who had some of the world’s leading 
experts at his fingertips; a treasure trove of facts, charts, and reports could be had with a 
single phone call, and, above all, he was a man of action.53 He was a rich man, but he was 
not a rich man who merely wanted to survive, he wanted to build, he wanted to lead. 
Rockefeller surrounded himself with experts, while his dyslexia (undiagnosed at the time) 
prevented him from reading their reports; instead, he insisted that they use visual aids 
when they talked face to face with him. This could have been interpreted as self-
indulgence or as evidence that he lacked the intellectual capacity to do the job, but, given 
the circumstances that he was running a massive and complex state while remaining 
active in national politics and dealing with a reading disorder, this was the best course of 
action. His dyslexia hindered him in his formative years, but he persevered to find a 
workable solution. The impact of the disorder on him and how others around him 
perceived his character cannot be overstated, it was a significant part of his persona. It 
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influenced not only how others viewed him, but how he came to view himself. In spite of 
it all, he possessed a talent for sifting through mountains of information from a verbal 
presentation and ability to focus on their best ideas. His expert panels produced findings 
and studies that resonated with the intelligence world and with presidents.  
Conservatives in the Empire State loathed his internationalist views and 
seemingly perpetual centralization of power within the governor’s office. Rockefeller 
advocated the construction of better highways, ports, and federal offices. He had grand 
ambitions for improving healthcare, education, and social programs. He saw himself as 
an architect with an artist’s touch, but conservatives heard what sounded like the New 
Deal all over again. Rockefeller wanted all of these things at the expense of the taxpayer 
as evidenced by his tax hikes during his early years as governor. During the 1960 
convention, members of the media crowded around him and referred to his ideology as 
“progressive” to indicate its origins with Teddy Roosevelt.54 Easterners argued that 
Rockefeller was the one who could remove the stigma of vested interests attached to the 
party, citing a 1959 Gallup Poll that showed that independents preferred him to Nixon.55 
Conventional wisdom suggested that Nixon represented the Old Guard, and that he would 
not be able to swing voters in the North. Simply put, conservatism would not lead to 
victory. All of his finagling and ideologically soft visions of the future made Rockefeller 
anathema to conservatives. They could not help but be reminded of another New York 
governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt.  
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By the mid-twentieth century, choosing a governor as a candidate seemed more 
likely than choosing someone from the legislative branch. Only two previous twentieth-
century presidents had served in Congress prior to becoming president: Warren G. 
Harding and Harry S. Truman. Harding was the beneficiary of a powerful political 
machine and Truman ascended to the presidency after the death of FDR before winning 
in his own right in 1948. As history would prove, this was not a trend that would 
continue. In his article “Why the Odds are Against a Governor Becoming President,” 
pollster Louis Harris concluded that governors were no longer on a clear path to the Oval 
Office. Writing in the autumn of 1959, he noted the conventional wisdom of desirable 
traits for a president: governors share many of the same basic responsibilities as a 
president, governors also have a legislative and judicial branch that they must learn to 
work with, and, if need be, they can stay out of any polarizing national issues on which 
members of the House or Senate must take a stand. All of this seemed like a reasonable 
way to conclude that governors were a fixture of national politics, but he concluded that a 
shift was taking place. Amid the vastness of both domestic and foreign policy, governors 
who had traveled abroad struggled to build a national image, and their actions were 
dwarfed by a vice-president. Following World War II, America grew at an exponential 
rate thus the governorship became so complex that it was nearly impossible to emerge 
under the spotlight unscathed from negative press in a governor’s home state. No doubt, 
opponents would seize on a particular controversial issue and exploit it to their 
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advantage. His analysis proved prescient when both parties selected nominees who were 
not governors.56    
 Looking back on Harris’s findings ten years later, Joseph A. Schlesinger wrote 
that a governor’s powers and responsibilities were similar to those of a president, and 
they did make a governor a likely option. However, these similarities were by no means 
an accurate predictor of getting the nomination. Schlesinger argued that regional 
distributions of strength within the party system were a greater factor in the nominating 
process. Selecting a governor was a strategic choice made by the minority party in a 
specific region of the country. For a party to win, it needed to poach voters from its 
opponent’s region of strength and any governor the minority party would elect in that 
area was of significant value. Majority parties tended not to nominate governors, rather, it 
tended to be the “out-party” that was also the minority party who chose governors. For 
example, Republicans in 1944 and 1948 enjoyed relative strength in the Midwest and 
West but were not strong in the East, so they nominated New York governor Thomas 
Dewey.57 Of course, this strategy is predicated on the assumption that the party makes a 
correct assessment of its own strength and has a strong pool of candidates from which to 
choose, which is not always the case.58 
 During Governor Rockefeller’s first bid for the presidency, Jack Platten of J.A. 
Ward, Inc. advised him that his best chances to win were in 1960 and 1964. Above all, 
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Rockefeller had to demonstrate that he could carry New York. Party members must be 
convinced that he had voter appeal, and that he could entice independents and disgruntled 
Democrats to pull the lever for the GOP. If Rockefeller chose to accept Nixon’s offer of 
the vice-presidential nomination, which Platten advised against, he would have to carry 
his state or lose influence within the national party. Agreeing to run on the ticket would 
put him in the precarious situation of wanting to do well, but not too well. Rockefeller’s 
chances for 1964 rested on Nixon getting the nomination in ’60 and then losing. No 
matter if he agreed to be the vice-presidential nominee or not, Rockefeller needed to 
exude strength and a desire for party unity to maintain his golden boy status. He could 
achieve this by agreeing to campaign for Nixon but allowing Nixon’s strategists to dictate 
how he should help. Thus, if Nixon were defeated then Rockefeller could show that he 
was not to blame for the loss.59  
Kennedy carried New York by five percentage points over Nixon, a drop of 
nearly fourteen percent from Eisenhower’s margin of victory in the state in 1956. 
Rockefeller was unable to deliver Albany for Nixon and Kennedy’s overall victory in 
New York City won the day for Democrats. It was a disheartening blow for the party and 
for Rockefeller’s chances in 1964. Nixon did well in the West, winning California by the 
narrowest of margins, he also performed admirably in the Midwest by taking Ohio and 
Indiana but losing in tight races in Illinois and Missouri. Reflecting on the bitterness of 
the campaign, Nixon believed that members of the media had used their “substantial and 
influential power” to shape how the public heard and saw the campaign. He believed that 
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the media had slanted coverage towards Kennedy. He found it disconcerting and clever 
that the Kennedy campaign made the religious issue “a referendum on tolerance versus 
bigotry.” Most resentful of all, “Kennedy’s organization approached campaign dirty 
tricks with a roguish relish and carried them off with an insouciance that captivated many 
politicians and overcame the critical faculties of many reporters.”60 Rockefeller had little 
sympathy for Nixon, blaming the loss on Nixon’s efforts in the South when he should 
have been concentrating on voters in the Northeast and African Americans. Goldwater 
reached the opposite conclusion, believing Nixon had spent too much time in the North 
and not enough time picking off electoral votes in the South.61 
Republicans found that conservatives within the Democratic Party, especially 
Southerners, were no fans of the Kennedys either. Voter turnout throughout the South 
was much lower than in the North and in places like South Carolina conservatives of all 
stripes were wary of a northeastern liberal running the country. In Alabama, arch 
segregationist Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia received six Electoral College votes. At the 
Republican convention, both South Carolina and Arizona pledged their delegates to Barry 
Goldwater. Race relations during the Eisenhower administration were a hot-button issue, 
it was a concern for southerners that a liberal president would continue to side with 
proponents of civil rights. Even Nixon was known to make different comments on the 
issue depending on which side of the Mason-Dixon Line he was on. In Asheville, North 
Carolina he was quoted as saying “I must emphasize that there are drawbacks to efforts to 
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achieve racial progress by way of law…They (laws) tend to provoke the extremists on 
both sides. They can even have the effect of silencing moderate and constructive 
elements that have been trying for years to bring justice and harmony into our racial 
picture.” A month later a congressman from Connecticut commented, “(Vice-President 
Nixon) is determined to do all he can to get the Civil Rights Bill passed, no matter how 
long it may take.”62 Most southerners were averse to any kind of federal intervention to 
enforce Supreme Court rulings like the Brown decision, and they did not take Nixon’s 
comments on the subject lightly.  
Southerners felt this issue, among others, was not being addressed in the proper 
way by their fellow party members. Democrats took the South for granted. It had 
virtually been a one-party system since Reconstruction, but pairing Texas Senator 
Lyndon Johnson with Kennedy came across as a cynical ploy to get the southern vote. 
James Jackson Kilpatrick, a leading segregationist spokesman and editor of the Richmond 
News-Leader, captured the sentiment, “In putting this Counterfeit Confederate on the 
ticket, Mr. Kennedy and his advisors have blundered. If Mr. Kennedy sweeps the South, 
it will not be because of Lyndon, but in spite of him; for the Senator from Texas, 
however he may be respected on the Senate floor, is neither liked nor admired below the 
Potomac. In the South of 1960, as in the South of 1870, a carpetbagger may be bad, but a 
scalawag is worse… bit by the Presidential bug… Lyndon turned his back upon the 
South.”63 Republicans ascertained that there were cracks in the “solid South” that merely 
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adding a southerner to the ballot would not fix but they also needed to be careful that 
their own nominee struck the right tone with voters.    
Rockefeller took a clear stance on civil rights: he was strongly in favor of it. The 
Rockefeller family had been supportive of African-Americans since the antebellum era, 
when they sought to prevent slave owning missionaries from speaking at their northern 
Baptist church. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, John D. Rockefeller 
funded foundations provided crucial support for black churches and black education.64 
On this issue, Nelson Rockefeller could not understand how the party of Lincoln could 
bring racist elements under its tent, but that was what was happening. Republicans in the 
West and Midwest were looking to unite with conservative Democrats from the South 
and bring down their liberal opponents with the issue of government intervention in civil 
rights as the fulcrum for success. Rockefeller’s response to the subject might swing the 
1964 nomination one way or the other. 
 
Chapter 2: Picking Up the Pieces 
Ideology and Factions 
At the start of 1961, three names swirled around to lead the party for the next 
election: Nelson Rockefeller, Barry Goldwater, and Richard Nixon. What exactly the 
party was going to look like by the time the next campaign season was underway was a 
matter of speculation. In broader terms, there was a debate among academics on the left 
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and right in the 1950s and early 1960s over what was termed “the end of ideology.” 
American sociologists Daniel Bell and Edward Shils, and French sociologist Raymond 
Aron were chief among the intellectuals popularizing the idea that the achievements of 
postwar Europe’s partially managed, mixed economies made it possible for an end to the 
ideological politics of class conflict and polarization between left and right.65 Shils cited 
the decline of marxism, national socialism, and fascism. Aron contributed to this with a 
chapter in his 1955 book, called “The End of the Ideological Age?”, which pointed out 
the disappearance of social-structural conditions in the advanced nations of the West 
created by the failures of nationalism, classical liberalism, and marxism.66 By 1960, 
Daniel Bell had concluded in his collection of essays, The End of Ideology: On the 
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, that while the welfare state that was created in 
the wake of the political and economic turmoil of the 1930s, was ripe for criticism, it had 
resolved the ideological crisis between bourgeois capitalism and socialism by eliciting 
concessions from both.67 This was a historical precedent on which liberals within the 
Republican Party could base their actions.  
Aron’s works on moderation would serve as an influence for Charles De Gaulle 
and Rockefeller advisor Henry Kissinger. Aron occupied a space in the political 
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discourse that brought him attacks from both sides. Moderation was not an easy stance to 
take considering its paradoxes, inconsistencies, charges of pusillanimity, and the question 
of whether it is possible to be a passionate moderate. Aron’s view of moderation rested 
on reason, prudence, an understanding of the nuances of political action, the rejection of 
the political prophecy that Marxists claimed existed, and the distrust of moral posturing.68 
When combining the “end of ideology” argument with Aron’s moderation, the context 
within which liberal Republicans were operating in at the start of the decade becomes 
clearer. There was indeed a widening gyre between operatives on the far-right and far-
left, but moderates had reason and philosophical support to believe that they were a 
valuable piece of the American democracy that was necessary for the advancement of 
modern politics.      
Liberals saw their stock rise when Earl Warren became governor of California in 
1942. Warren’s policies managed to fuse Democratic ideology with Republican 
principles to support responsible government spending and taxes, bolster free enterprise, 
and build up social and educational programs.69 Warren would go on to be considered a 
dark horse for the presidency in 1948 but it was his appointment to the Supreme Court 
and subsequent rulings that made him a favorite target for liberal opponents. Liberal 
stalwart, friend of Nelson Rockefeller, and New York Senator, Jacob Javits was a fixture 
of the party as well. He was representative of the liberals who emerged in the Northeast 
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in the late 1930s and who accepted and defended the New Deal.70 Javits was a key player 
in the redirection of the Republican Party in the aftermath of the Roosevelt presidency. In 
1950, he joined Republican Advance, a political group that served as a counterbalance to 
the liberal ideology, centered-around the political organization Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA), espoused by Reinhold Niebuhr, Joseph P. Lash, and Arthur Schlesinger Jr 
among others. While members of the ADA held the idea that liberalism would succeed 
over time through passivity and reason, Advance sought a consensual approach to solving 
domestic and international problems. Members of the organization included Javits, 
Margaret Chase Smith, Henry Cabot Lodge, New York Herald Tribune editorialist 
August Heckscher, McGeorge Bundy, and Congressmen Clifford Case, Kenneth Keating, 
Hugh Scott, and Richard Nixon.71 Advance, like the ADA, opposed communism, but 
while they denounced the tactics of Joseph McCarthy, they were also supporters of 
Truman’s foreign policy. They wanted to limit federal intervention in the economy to 
protect the private sector, and within the party they competed against Taft and his 
supporters in the struggle for reorienting the party’s philosophy. Their overall goal was to 
form a coalition with Democrats based on an anti-statist and anti-communist ideology.72 
Advance would neither last nor make any major changes to the party, but it did add to the 
disdain for northeastern politicians felt by conservatives in the Midwest and West. 
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Liberals were disappointed with Eisenhower when he left office. While Ike had 
focused on healing the rift between the Northeast and Midwest, he did little to reconcile 
the party’s extremes. Margaret Chase Smith wrote a “Declaration of Conscience” 
opposing McCarthyism in 1950 yet Eisenhower appeared on the campaign trail in 
Wisconsin with the polarizing Senator in 1952. Liberals in the Senate, put off by 
McCarthy’s recklessness, signed Chase’s petition. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower worked 
to undermine McCarthy, though, at the time it appeared that he wanted to avoid a 
confrontation.73 Liberals had gravitated towards Nixon’s anticommunism, his 
internationalist ideals, and support for civil rights legislation in 1957 and 1960. They 
stood to gain from Rockefeller’s pre-convention meeting with Nixon to rewrite the party 
platform but they misread the situation.  
Liberal Republicans, like their Democratic counterpart, took conservative support 
within the party for granted. Following Nixon’s defeat, conservatives, who had never 
liked the New Deal and were kept in the margins during the Eisenhower years, were 
emboldened to act. William F. Buckley’s National Review became a mouthpiece for 
conservatives to vent their frustrations during the 1950s. Buckley soon paired his 
syndicated column, On the Right, circulating in over 300 newspapers, with his television 
show, Firing Line.74 Buckley also founded a conservative group known as the Young 
Americans for Freedom (YAF), comprised mostly of early Barry Goldwater supporters, 
which made waves the previous fall when they produced the Sharon Statement, a 
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declaration of conservative principles. Groups like the YAF had their own vision of the 
party that departed from previous attempts to work together with Democrats. This “New 
Right” much like the “New Left” of Tom Hayden and the Students for Democratic 
Society (SDS), wanted to shake off the rust of the establishment and forge a new path. 
Liberal Republicans, in their attempts to modernize the party by adopting major liberal 
Democrat policies, managed to drive voters back into the arms of the Democrats. Though 
it was not their intention, their efforts to bend the Republican Party towards are more 
liberal stance resulted in a loss of votes.  
On the fringes of the party was an anti-communist group known as the John Birch 
Society. Led by Robert Welch, they considered themselves to be the vanguard against the 
communist infiltration of America; Joseph McCarthy had been mostly right, Eisenhower 
had been either “a mere stooge, or… a Communist assigned the specific job of being a 
political front man,” Gen. Douglas MacArthur had been fired by Stalin, and the American 
government had failed to protect middle-class democracy.75 Historians of the era noticed 
a definite correlation between McCarthyism of the 1950s and the John Birch Society. In 
1954, sociologist Martin Trow put his findings in an article entitled, “Small Businessmen, 
Political Tolerance, and   Support for McCarthy.” Trow visited Bennington, Vermont and 
found that less-well-educated, small business owners overwhelmingly supported 
McCarthy. After spending time in Dallas, Texas, sociologist Alan C. Elms found that 
rightists tended to be married to businessmen or high-income salesmen. Over in the 
Pacific Northwest, sociologist Ira Rohter linked a decrease in social prestige with middle-
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class status among groups of right-wing supporters. Trow concluded that the far right 
consisted of men and women who held “a generalized hostility toward a complex of 
symbols and processes bound up with industrial capitalism.” Among their grievances 
were the “growth and concentration of government,” an emphasis on the growth of 
business and production, and “the men, institutions, and ideas that symbolize these 
secular trends of modern society.”76  
Later in the decade, Daniel Bell put forth his theory of the radical right in his 
book, The New American Right, that tied together much of the thinking that pervaded 
intellectual circles. His idea was based on two things: his personal disillusionment with 
liberalism and a disdain for a Marxist reduction of causation. Bell asserted that “the 
social group most threatened by the structural changes in society is the ‘old’ middle class-
the independent physician, farm owner, small-town lawyer, real-estate promoter, 
homebuilder, automobile dealer, gasoline station owner, small businessman, and the 
like.”77 In short, Bell concluded that supporters of the John Birch Society and others on 
the far-right were clinging to values that, through modernization, improvements in 
society, and changing social convictions, were no longer within their grasp. They were 
reactionaries in the sense that they wanted to return society to some previous state, 
unchecked by the pressures affecting post-war America.  
While this line of reasoning has mostly held true, it fails to acknowledge 
additional circumstances overlooked by their author or at least unstated in their writings. 
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Americans during the 1950s were undergoing changes that went beyond how they made 
money. Numerous works of fiction and nonfiction illuminate the dissatisfaction that the 
middle class was feeling, such as Revolutionary Road, The Man in the Grey Flannel Suit, 
and The Organization Man. These books captured the sentiment of a generation, of 
people trying to find themselves in a world unlike anything previous generations had ever 
faced. Later theorists and political pros found that cultural and political beliefs were not 
necessarily tied to any socio-economic base, as evidenced by fundamentalist 
Christianity.78 Also, among many of the changes taking place in the mid-twentieth 
century were a challenge to traditional gender roles. Women increasingly asserted 
themselves in the masculine arena of politics. Wives and mothers were not immune to 
societal changes. They felt the effects of their husbands responding to pressure to achieve 
a certain level of middle class prosperity, and the men in turn responded to that additional 
pressure. As what would become evident to future historians reflecting back on the 
campaigns of 1960 and 1964, women could be independent enough to solicit others to 
join in party activities, organize meetings, and vote in large numbers. Women would have 
their own part to play in Republican politics of the early 1960s.     
Equally important to understanding the Republican field is the distinction between 
conservatives like William F. Buckley versus extremists like Robert Welch. Welch gave 
financial support to get the National Review off the ground in the mid-1950s and both 
men were anti-communists, but Buckley grew increasingly worried about the damage to 
the conservative movement caused by groups like the John Birch Society. Subscribers 
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looked to Buckley for intellectual guidance and if he denounced Welch then it could be a 
financial setback as well as a potential misstep for the direction of the party.79 
Conservatives and the far right had overlapping principles, like opposing communism 
and government overreach, but they were not the same group. On the contrary, 
conservatives were not alienated, maladjusted, or hostile to modern society. Northeastern 
conservatives, like Buckley, were interested in different issues representing different 
social and demographic sources. This brand of conservatism drew from a subsection of 
Americans concerned with economic and social policy not a domestic communist 
conspiracy; they tended to younger, better-educated, and successful to some degree not 
older and less successful. These conservatives were better able to adjust to the 
psychological constraints of modernity that the other exhibited hostility towards.80  
Barry Goldwater’s book, The Conscience of a Conservative, had been a huge hit 
during the previous election cycle, rocketing up the New York Times bestseller list, and 
by the end of 1960, half a million copies had been sold. L. Brent Bozell, Buckley’s 
brother-in-law and a senior editor of the National Review, was the ghostwriter in charge 
of articulating Goldwater’s conservative ideals. His skills were recommended by South 
Carolina Republican, Clarence Manion, a former official in the Eisenhower 
administration who left his position over the failure of the Bricker Amendment, which 
would have restricted presidential powers on foreign policy. Manion first met Goldwater 
in 1957 when he appeared on a radio program attacking Eisenhower’s ‘modern 
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Republicanism’ but not until Goldwater gave a speech in South Carolina, criticizing 
Brown v. Board of Education, was Manion able to convince enough Republicans to 
realize Goldwater’s potential. Manion had previously declared of Goldwater, “I hear 
from millions of people and I conclude that Senator Goldwater is the only hope of the 
party.”81 Manion reached out to key political players like industrialist Roger Milliken, a 
leading member of the South Carolina Republican Party, to raise money and support from 
corporations and small businessmen. He need them to buy into Goldwater’s gospel of 
conservativism that included limiting government interference on issues like civil rights, 
education, and welfare.82 Not all of the resulting pages met Manion’s approval; for 
example, the Senator favored breaking diplomatic ties with Russia, something Goldwater 
insisted be retained.83 Manion capitulated and Conscience of a Conservative became a 
recruiting tool for the conservative movement, positioning Goldwater as Rockefeller’s 
challenger in 1964. However, Goldwater was not entirely sold on the idea that he should 
be the one to get in the race. Conservatives would have to persuade and cajole Goldwater 
to take up the mantle, but for the time being, he was their shining star.      
 Toward the ideological center of the party Advance: A Journal of Political 
Thought, a progressive magazine run by college students, offered an alternative. 
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“America continues in need of a new political philosophy, one that borrows freely from 
the best of ‘conservatism’ and ‘liberalism’ and whose essence is not mere moderation.”84 
Republican leadership, they argued, needed to expand intellectual and policy-generating 
resources, and in the next election they needed to reach out to people in the cities, 
minorities, intellectuals, and young people; groups that had not been supporting the party 
in the past.85 Advance could have been a starting point for liberals to find their balance. 
Its writers were young, enthusiastic, highly educated, and motivated to contribute. 
Moments like these, that produce organic political support for a candidate’s philosophy, 
are rare and cannot be paid for. It thus comes as a surprise that Rockefeller did little more 
than write checks to the editors. This decision would come back to haunt him three years 
later.  
Rockefeller was too preoccupied to realize the error. He raised serious doubts 
about his own qualifications to run the party, not the least of which involved bringing 
conservatives, who were still angry about his conspiring with Nixon before the 1960 
convention, back under the Republican tent. He would need to act with grace and care to 
avoid stepping on the toes of an already seething opposition. Rational observers saw him 
as a responsible choice, one that fit into previous molds of thought about the candidate. If 
Rockefeller could make some meaningful gesture to put the past behind him or, at the 
very least, not do anything to rile up the far-right then it might be possible to get through 
another convention with his name at the top of the ticket. Among the political experts and 
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the press, Rockefeller was the frontrunner for the nomination because the northeastern 
Establishment had controlled the pick for at least two decades. Conservatives were not 
seen as an insurmountable threat, because they were active but not powerful in the early 
sixties.86 Liberals and moderates alike underestimated the groundswell of support and 
determination that conservatives were able to conjure, but their candidate was in position 
to win the nomination in 1964.     
 
1961: Kennedy and Rockefeller Face Setbacks 
When the CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba failed on the beaches in mid-April, 
stranding over a thousand Cuban counterrevolutionaries with no air support, the Kennedy 
administration took a huge blow to their new image of optimism. Detractors painted 
Kennedy’s team as inept, easily manipulated, and lacking in the courage to do whatever it 
took to make sure that the operation was a success. The Bay of Pigs put the whole world 
on notice that the United States, with all of its military might, could not execute an 
invasion of a small island nation just ninety miles from its coast. It was a rude surprise for 
the young president that would lead to even greater danger between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. In a letter to the Soviet Chairman, Nikita Khrushchev, the president 
wrote, “I trust that this does not mean that the Soviet government using the situation in 
Cuba as a pretext, is planning to inflame other areas of the world. I would like to think 
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that your government has too great a sense of responsibility to embark upon any 
enterprise so dangerous to general peace.”87 Time would prove otherwise. 
A week after the invasion, Kennedy agreed to meet with Rockefeller in the hopes 
of maintaining a bipartisan front and taking the Cuban situation out of the domestic 
political arena. Afterwards, the governor released a statement that the situation in Cuba 
put the security of the United States at great risk, adding that all Americans should “stand 
united behind the president in whatever action is necessary to defend freedom.”88 Nixon 
made a similar statement that was met by a harsh denunciation from some quarters of the 
party. Rockefeller’s words seemed to go a step further given that a shooting war with 
Castro’s forces was no longer as likely as originally feared in the early days of the fallout 
from the invasion. Kennedy tried to do political damage control by appealing to 
Republicans sense of patriotism while the administration worked to create a new strategy 
for the region. Conservatives were already angry about Kennedy’s failure to overthrow 
the Castro regime followed by his attempt to cloak the situation in national unity, and 
they saw Rockefeller either a dupe or complicit in Kennedy’s maneuvering. For 
Republicans, this was a political issue that could be used down the road. The majority of 
the party was liberal but that did not mean that they had to help smooth over every 
mistake that the president made.  
As the summer approached, Rockefeller had to be cautious about his actions in 
public. He was already making moves that pleased the party faithful by keeping a 
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somewhat low profile as he made appearances around the country with the occasional 
splash, calculated for national exposure. By presenting himself in this low-key manner 
with precision attacks, Rockefeller was beginning to put some distance between his 
present situation and the anger over his moves at the convention. Meanwhile George 
Hinman, Republican national committeeman and close political advisor to Rockefeller, 
ingratiated himself with Congressmen, state chairmen, and national committeemen. 
Hinman’s smooth persona and charm were of the New York City variety making him the 
perfect choice for gauging interest in the governor.89 With Hinman stirring interest in 
Rockefeller among Establishment members of the party above the surface, below the 
surface something much different was taking place.  Rockefeller would have to choose 
his spots carefully if he wanted to build upon his previous successes. As he would come 
to learn, GOP voters were not just concerned with what lawyers and politicians thought 
of the candidate.   
In June, Martin Luther King flew with Rockefeller on his private plane from New 
York City to Albany to address a rally at the Wilborn Temple of God in Christ.  Despite 
the warnings of his image-conscious staff, Rockefeller introduced the civil rights leader 
to the crowd, telling his staff, “If it’s morally the right thing, it’s the politically right 
thing.”90 During his remarks, Rockefeller applauded King for his dedication and 
motivation, calling him a spiritual leader akin to Ghandi. King would later write to 
Rockefeller, “Your statement in the public meeting gave not only new inspiration and 
                                                          
89 Robert D. Novak, The Agony of the G.O.P. 1964, New York, 1965, 72. 
90 Richard Norton Smith, On His Own Terms, 371. 
45 
 
 
hope to us who work on the front line, but also to many people of color who are burdened 
by racial discrimination.”91  Rockefeller saw the visit as an opportunity to help King and 
show his support for the civil rights movement. To be sure, it was a political risk. The 
governor reasoned that the United States could not hope to maintain its prowess around 
the world as a defender of liberty and equality “until we have honored the citizenship of 
Negroes in Georgia and Alabama.”92 As part of his Cold War agenda, it was imperative 
to use liberal social policies to win the support of African-Americans to advance the 
cause of the free world.93 Considering the other likely candidates in the Republican Party, 
Rockefeller, with his history of support for civil rights and Martin Luther King Jr., 
presented a viable option for what remained of African-American support for the GOP. 
Privately, Rockefeller’s life was suffering. He had been married to Mary 
Todhunter Clark since he was twenty-two years old and fresh out of Dartmouth. Now, at 
the age of fifty-three, he was no longer in love or faithful to the woman he had been with 
for so long. Their marriage, like many of their generation and social status, was a 
formality. Mary was never comfortable being a politician’s wife, and she had never even 
been to Albany. She was not considered an asset on the campaign trail, was 
uncomfortable with voters to the point of embarrassment, and she was bored with the 
other wives of politicians and women’s tea receptions. In contrast, Nelson relished the 
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physical contact with voters and admirers, and enjoyed himself in front of the camera. 
Their divorce was not a surprise to his staff who saw the couple’s relationship up close. 
Nelson was a deeply flawed husband and had fallen madly in love with the wife of a 
microbiologist at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.94 Happy was eighteen 
years younger than Nelson, and was the mother of four children. Carl Spad, an advisor 
and companion, recalled on a plane ride with the governor that Rockefeller had suddenly 
announced that he was going to divorce Mary and wed Happy. Spad went over the 
political ramifications of such a decision with Rockefeller, exacerbated as they were by 
his coming re-election campaign and his ambition for the White House. Rockefeller, 
however, would have none of it, “I’m telling you, Carl, not asking you.”95  Kissinger, 
amid his own marital troubles, remarked that Happy “would be disappointed and 
unhappy if she ever married Nelson; that he was a lonely man, remote and indifferent, for 
all his surface amiability, and that she would find herself excluded from his life as the 
first Mrs. Rockefeller did.”96 Other reactions ranged from subdued to disbelief. 
Goldwater said Rockefeller’s family troubles should not be a factor in 1964, Adlai 
Stevenson recounted his own experience with divorce before an election, and Nikita 
Krushchev was baffled, thinking Rockefeller’s divorce was somehow linked to U.S. 
troops in West Berlin. Kennedy chimed in, “I don’t believe it. No man would ever love 
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love more than he loves politics.”97 Party leaders, not knowing the governor well, were 
surprised by the divorce and reached the conclusion that the divorce would not help 
Rockefeller, but likewise, it was not likely to cause any major political damage.98      
 Then, less than two days after Nelson and Mary’s announcement, an unspeakable 
tragedy befell the Rockefeller family, Michael Rockefeller, Nelson’s son, had 
disappeared off the coast of New Guinea. Michael had gone to New Guinea to study the 
Stone Age Dani natives, collect pieces of primitive art and artifacts, and, in Michael’s 
words, to “do something romantic and adventurous.”99 Governor Rockefeller’s spirits 
were lifted as he was en route to the jungle island from New York when Michael’s 
companion was saved. Upon his arrival, Rockefeller’s pronouncements of optimism 
faded with each passing day, despite the frantic search from the air and the sea, rescuers 
found no traces of Michael that provided conclusive evidence of his whereabouts. 
Heartbroken and exhausted, the governor returned to New York.100      
 As the year came to a close, Rockefeller’s fortune and chances for the nomination 
needed to be recalculated. Nineteen sixty-two was an election year in New York and the 
outcome was seen as a barometer for the future of both parties. Kennedy’s headquarters 
still viewed Rockefeller as a major threat to re-election even with the events of the past 
year. To win his own reelection, Rockefeller emphasized his experience and 
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achievements while downplaying his personal life. His announcement to his divorce 
plans and Michael’s disappearance could hardly be ignored by voters. It was naive to 
think that the public would not be interested in what had happened and it was impossible 
for any politician to keep such sensational personal affairs out of the political discussion. 
This included squelching rumors of cannibals’ role in Michael Rockefeller’s death.101 
Rockefeller maintained the illusion that he was focused on the gubernatorial race but he 
left himself an out. During a news conference in Albany, he asked voters to reelect him 
on the premise that they should vote for him based on his record. His presidential 
ambitions, he believed, should have no bearing on his reelection campaign. Voters 
argued, they should have no objection and even encourage him if he had the opportunity 
to win the presidential nomination. Thus, a pledge to serve a full four-year term would be 
unnecessary to win reelection in 1962.102  He was hedging his bets, counting on a strong 
showing in the gubernatorial race to launch him into the race for the White House. It had 
been a tumultuous year with wild swings of emotion, but he was still standing and 
remained confident. 
 
1962: Rockefeller on the Rise 
 Rockefeller’s time as governor often stretched beyond the Empire State whether 
he was inserting himself into national issues or meeting with officials from D.C. He was 
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a powerful man with grand ambitions. A speech at the start of the year to the New York 
State Legislature shed some light on his conflict with both liberals and conservatives in 
his home state, but also served to show how he approached a situation that called for 
gaining liberal votes while maintaining a decent relationship with conservatives. Political 
observers saw the governor’s chances for re-election hinging on his support among 
liberals. The Liberal Party had contributed in 1960 to the election of several key 
positions. They assisted in electing Republicans for mayor in Buffalo, the U.S. Senate, a 
judgeship on the Court of Appeals, and Speaker of the Assembly. In addition, they had 
strengthened Kennedy’s hold on the electorate in his bid for the presidency. If 
Rockefeller was going to win the governorship in convincing fashion, he was going to 
have to please the Liberal Party, and liberals in the Republican and Democratic Party as 
well. 
 Since its inception in 1944, New York’s Liberal Party was never large but it did 
have the power to provide decisive electoral margins for Republicans by swinging 
supporters away from Democrats. Some Republicans, like Thomas Dewey, thought that 
siding with the Liberal Party was more trouble than it was worth and put a candidate at 
serious risk of alienating conservatives. Rockefeller disagreed, believing that securing 
votes from liberals, whether they be from the Liberal Party or liberals from the two major 
parties, was more important than building a coalition with conservatives.103 This strategy 
had worked before, but now, with Rockefeller facing increasing scrutiny from around the 
country, this ploy could be seen as Rockefeller refusal to cooperate with the interests of 
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the party. Moreover, with the attention on the race for Albany, if Rockefeller’s strategy 
backfired in any way then it could give leadership, lukewarm about his national 
candidacy already, a reason to believe that his power was not as great as once believed. 
At any rate, Rockefeller made up his mind and dismissed Dewey’s argument. He 
had other plans. Inside the Assembly chamber, listeners may have been struck by 
Rockefeller’s words at the conclusion of his speech that sounded more like he was talking 
to voters about his credentials for 1964 than addressing the state legislature, “All of us 
believe that New York can and should lead, by act and example, in giving proof of the 
creativeness, the vigor, the vision and the leadership of free government,” he declared. 
He continued by extending his speech far beyond the state’s borders, “The full meaning 
of this challenge reaches far beyond our boundaries. The world is filled with nations 
either dedicated to the destruction of freedom, or coveting and struggling for the 
blessings of freedom. It is the supreme task – for all Americans, in such positions of trust 
as you and I – to do all in our power to refute and deny those predicting the death of 
freedom and to assure and hearten those craving a life of freedom.”104 Rockefeller’s 
speech and strategy reveal a governor with more on his mind than re-election. Based on 
what had already transpired in 1961, Rockefeller was optimistic that he would win in 
November. Once the party regulars saw him win, then they would throw their support 
behind him, locking up the nomination more than a year in advance. This time honored 
tradition spoke to the importance of New York to the nomination process. Both parties 
viewed the state as a crucial part of their electoral success, but this would not last as the 
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population of Sunbelt states began to expand, draining New York’s importance in the 
electoral math.105  
 Rockefeller was not the only potential candidate with a governor’s race to win; 
there was George Romney in Michigan, Richard Nixon mounting a political comeback in 
California, and William Scranton in Pennsylvania. Among the three, Nixon was seen as 
the best candidate should he win the California governorship while Romney was a 
question mark, and Scranton gave no clear signal that he even wanted to be in the race. 
For Republicans in the West and Midwest, their choice was and had been Goldwater. 
Rockefeller had lost his place as a serious contender. With his pending divorce becoming 
final, the New York governor lost favor with voters outside of the eastern seaboard. Even 
liberal Republicans were speculated to side with either Romney or Nixon depending on 
how their races were decided. Goldwater’s rallies were well attended and drew in excited 
crowds to hear him. Goldwater liked to criticize the Kennedy administration and relate 
his humble beginnings to presidents of the past, “I was born in a log cabin, which I had 
moved to Phoenix and except for some air-conditioning, a swimming pool, a bowling 
alley, a bar, a shooting range and a golf course, remains the same simple log cabin it 
always was.”106 Goldwater’s stock was rising. When the party appeared weakest, 
Goldwater got stronger. When Kennedy appeared strongest, Republican leadership 
moved towards giving conservatives a chance at the nomination.  
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 In the early months of 1962, the political life of Nelson Rockefeller turned grim. 
A fundraising dinner was held in seventeen cities across the U.S. with brief remarks over 
closed-circuit TV by such party leaders as Goldwater, Eisenhower, and National 
Committee Chairman William Miller. When Rockefeller’s face appeared on the screen he 
was booed from Boston to Tulsa.107 In New York, Democratic gubernatorial nominee 
Robert Morgenthau Jr. led a strategy to smash Rockefeller’s image of bipartisanship. 
Four years earlier, New Yorkers viewed Rockefeller as apolitical, commending him for 
getting into politics with no axes to grind, and running to serve the best interests of the 
people rather than those of a particular party.108 After serving as governor and acquiring 
enemies on both sides of the political aisle, Rockefeller was vulnerable to attacks. With 
news of his divorce still filling up columns in the daily newspapers, voters in New York 
and around the country showed signs of being put off by the once bright star from the 
Northeast.  Making matters worse, an overflow crowd of conservatives attended an anti-
communist rally at New York’s Madison Square Garden denouncing liberalism and 
challenging the Kennedy administration. Conservatives from across the nation attended, 
bringing in thousands of dollars of donations and national media attention. Goldwater’s 
voice rang out, “We gather here tonight to celebrate recent advances, and to plot new 
victories…we have come far, and we are going strong.”109 Conservative’s had come into 
Rockefeller’s backyard and made their voices heard; he would have to respond.   
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 To combat his sinking popularity, Rockefeller set out to make amends with 
conservatives. He eased tension in his home state by making fewer and fewer public 
appearances with Democrats and avoiding meetings that made him look like he was 
merely appeasing their interests. In May, he struck out on the national trail, making stops 
in the West and Midwest. At a dinner in Seattle, he received a standing ovation when he 
was introduced by Washington Governor Albert D. Rosellini, a reception far greater than 
that received by Vice-President Lyndon Johnson at the same event. A day later, at the 
Cheyenne airport in Wyoming, State Senate president Al Harding handed Rockefeller a 
cowboy hat saying, “This is either for wearing or throwing in the ring.” Rockefeller then 
mounted a stage coach drawn by two horses, took the reins, and rode down the airport 
runway.110  
 By the first week of June, a Gallup Poll of rank-and-file Republicans found 
Rockefeller with 32%, Goldwater with 23%, Milton Eisenhower with 14%, and George 
Romney with 8%. Nixon was left out because he was insisting that he was not a 
candidate.111 Rockefeller’s efforts to support the party by speaking and raising money 
were paying off. He was intent on mending fences with conservatives who were still 
upset over the 1960 convention. The millionaire governor joked, “I have as much to 
‘conserve’ as anyone.”112 Now it was Goldwater who was losing ground, with the pros 
questioning if a conservative could win a national election or if Goldwater was the right 
person to fill the vacuum left by Eisenhower’s aloofness and with Nixon, busy as ever, 
                                                          
110 Warren Weaver Jr., “Rockefeller Asks Help for Party,” New York Times, May 12, 1962. 
111 “It’s the Right Thing,” Time, June 15, 1962, 27. 
112 Ibid. 
54 
 
 
was holding off an unexpectedly strong far-right resistance within the California 
Republican Party.   
 That summer it appeared that Goldwater and Rockefeller might not clash at all 
quite the opposite, they could run together. “Rockefeller and I are not nearly so far apart 
as you might think,” Goldwater told a staffer in 1960.113 Both were ambitious and 
passionate and if Rockefeller appealed more to the head then Goldwater appealed more to 
the heart. A Rockefeller-Goldwater ticket was not so far-fetched as to be outside the 
realm of possibility. Both would have something to gain, but Rockefeller would benefit 
more. Together they had a common enemies in Nixon and Eisenhower, who could not be 
trusted to follow through lest another opportunity should present itself or if their ideology 
got in the way. When Eisenhower held the All- Republican Conference at his farm in 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, neither Goldwater nor Rockefeller attended out of suspicion of 
the organizers. Goldwater had no tolerance for Eisenhower. His advisor, F. Clifton 
White, warned that a conspiracy was afoot to minimize the growing conservative 
movement and nominate someone else.114 After the conference, Goldwater telephoned 
Rockefeller and Hinman about a link between the formation of a new National 
Republican Citizens Committee and the Nixon and Romney campaigns.115 Both men 
were highly suspicious of treachery from above. Eisenhower’s attempt at uniting the 
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candidates was a disaster. Conservatives were further alienated and Rockefeller was 
spooked by the moderates’ attempts to find a replacement for him.  
 That fall, Rockefeller received an unexpected boost when Goldwater curtailed his 
cross-country speechmaking. Goldwater was tired from visiting rallies, business 
conventions, and college campuses; he wanted to focus more on his Senate duties, and he 
recognized that his support in New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, 
and Ohio was not as strong as a top candidate needed to win. Goldwater was encouraged 
by Rockefeller’s moves towards the right and, if necessary, columnists noted Goldwater 
would be available to serve as vice-president in 1964 when his Senate term ended.116 
Down South, southerners boiled with anger over President Kennedy’s decision to send 
federal troops into Mississippi after segregationists attempted to block James Meredith 
attempted desegregation of the University of Mississippi. Kennedy’s status as a villain of 
the old Confederacy was cemented; locals were already complaining about the rising 
national debt and the presence of communists off the coast of Florida. They liked the 
benefits of federal programs but opposed their costs and requirements to meet such 
federal standards as equal employment for blacks.117 Kennedy’s decision served to drive 
a deeper wedge between Democrats and the South. For a brief moment, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis stymied any talks of the election as people around the world were on edge 
fearing a nuclear strike between the Soviets and the Americans. Mercifully, with the 
minute hand dangerously close to striking midnight on the nuclear clock, the two sides 
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reached an agreement, pulling the world back from the brink of annihilation. Less than a 
month after the events of Mississippi, a television audience witnessed Jackie Robinson 
name Rockefeller “Layman of the Year” at an African-American church for being 
“forthright in his enunciation of social, political, economic, and educational justice for 
the Negro.”118 Segregationists in the South took notice of this and now had one more 
reason to distrust him. 
 Elections that November brought clarity to the race for the nomination: Romney 
and Scranton enjoyed impressive victories, and Rockefeller won but by a thinner margin 
than in years past. Nixon, in contrast, was defeated, seemingly writing his own political 
obituary by announcing his retirement, punctuated with a jibe to reporters that, “You 
won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore.”119 Nixon’s defeat in California was ominous 
for liberals and moderates looking towards 1964. Birchers egged on by Robert Welch 
fused with conservatives populating Southern California proved too much for the former 
vice-president.120 Scranton’s victory in Pennsylvania ended the Democrats’ eight-year 
hold on the governorship, while Romney’s election ended a fourteen-year drought for 
Republicans in Michigan. Rockefeller’s win felt more like a loss in many ways. He 
gained in New York City but lost ground in upstate areas. The election thus reinvigorated 
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the effort of segregationists in the South to jumpstart a draft-Goldwater movement while 
Nixon supporters began singing the praises of Romney.121   
By December, with the excitement of the election returns dissipating, party 
leaders at a meeting of the Republican National Committee concluded that Rockefeller 
was back at the top for the nomination. “Romney is too new and Scranton talks like he 
really doesn’t want it and Goldwater can’t win, so it’s got to be Rockefeller,” reasoned 
one Congressmen.122 For all of his posturing, Rockefeller remained officially out of the 
race and made an effort to stop grassroots support. Hinman sent letters from New York 
silencing supporters’ efforts to hold campaign drives for the governor who was neither 
declaring his candidacy nor seeking delegate commitments. Meanwhile, conservatives 
continued building an army, covertly working to nominate Goldwater. At the end of the 
year, Rockefeller had no sway among the southern-wing of the party, where party 
stalwarts saw Goldwater as the true soul of Republicans, but, in northern industrial states, 
Rockefeller was the stronger candidate and, in the Midwest and Rocky Mountain states, 
Rockefeller’s popularity was on the rise.123 At the end of the year, Rockefeller was the 
candidate with the best chance at winning the nomination. Only a major blunder could 
bring him down.  
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Chapter 3: An End to the Beginning 
1963 – Love and Politics 
  At the beginning of 1963, Rockefeller had two major plans for improving his 
chances of earning the nomination. First, attack Kennedy’s record on Cuba, the economy, 
and civil rights. Second, convince conservatives that he was neither a radical nor an 
enemy of the Republican Party. Rockefeller criticized the president for halting 
underground nuclear tests during negotiations with the Soviets on a nuclear-test ban 
treaty and for being susceptible to the notion “all too popular in high places, that the 
public cannot be told the whole truth about the international situation, because people 
might panic.”124 Kennedy was not only keeping Americans in the dark, but he was also 
showing weakness by not pushing harder to get Soviet troops out of Cuba. Domestically, 
he was failing to reenergize the country through his economic policies.125  On the issue of 
civil rights, Rockefeller chided the president for appointing known segregationists to 
federal judgeships in the South. To the governor, this was an opportunity to remind the 
public of the Democratic Party’s roots in supporting slavery and the current support of 
southern Democrats for Jim Crow segregation.126  
When the topic of conversation turned to him, Rockefeller defended his decision 
to increase the New York state budget and pay for it with liquor taxes and auto 
registration fees. This allowed him to claim that he was liberal in social policy but 
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conservative when it came to economics, much like the modern Republicanism proposed 
by Eisenhower.127 He had chosen the grounds on which to fight Kennedy and was ready 
to stake his claim. All indications were that Rockefeller was not ready to concede the 
White House to Kennedy for another four years, since he knew as well as anyone, how 
quickly fortunes could change. Unable to stand idly by while the governor bad-mouthed 
their party’s leader, Democrats charged that Rockefeller was an “absentee governor” 
roaming the country “on a political sideshow of criticism of the national 
administration.”128  Political sniping aside, Rockefeller stuck to his strategy by touring 
the Midwest and appearing at a Lincoln Day dinner, where he emphasized that the terms 
“liberal” and “conservative” were nonsense yet proceeded to tell the audience of his 
“traditional” political philosophy.129 He was talking out of both sides of mouth, but it was 
working. At each stop, the usual refrain became about jobs, the budget, providing tax 
incentives to industry, NATO, and nuclear weapons with an occasional appeal for civil 
rights legislation and more pressure on Kennedy to take a tougher stand on Cuba. With 
Rockefeller on the road, his staff insisted that it was premature to call the governor a 
candidate. Meanwhile, Romney and Scranton continued to indicate no desire to get into 
the race, and Goldwater was a reluctant as ever to run. New York Times columnist Tom 
Wicker wrote that experts had now concluded that America’s honeymoon with Kennedy 
was over. The burdens of the office were weighing on his administration, that each 
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decision took off a bit more polish, and that he was running on star power rather than as 
the nation’s unchallenged leader. However, Wicker concluded it was far too early to 
declare him finished or even that if some or any of his political troubles would prevent 
him from a resounding victory the following November.130  
 At this point, Rockefeller’s strafing attacks on Kennedy helped to build up 
political capital, but he repeatedly missed opportunities to do something about the 
infighting within his own party. In February, William Rusher penned an influential article 
for National Review titled “Crossroads for the GOP” which called on Republicans to 
work with segregationists and to nominate Goldwater because of his conservatism. This, 
he argued, would finally wrestle the South away from Democrats.131 F. Clifton White had 
long been in the political shark tank, feeding interest in a conservative candidate. 
Goldwater would later comment in his memoir that White was a “pro, much more than a 
mere public relations man or college instructor in political science…a very experienced 
technician.”132 Conservatives like White were a minority within the party with their own 
agenda. Rockefeller first got a taste of conservatives’ strategy during his 1958 
gubernatorial campaign that resulted in a bitter feud between White and State Chairman 
Jud Morhouse over the latter’s rough tactics.  
As early as 1961, White sent confidential memos solidifying the Draft Goldwater 
organization, appearing at Republican National Committee meetings, raising money, 
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strategizing, and counting delegates.133 All the while, Rockefeller’s lieutenants fired off 
remarks to the press like, “When you’re the only candidate you can afford to wait.”134 
Their overconfidence blinded them to a growing threat. Party leadership was as much to 
blame as Rockefeller, having allowed Goldwater to become chairman of the Republican 
Senatorial Campaign Committee, which he subsequently bent to his political will. They 
also applauded Goldwater and I. Lee Porter’s “Operation Dixie” which courted 
segregationist whites.135 In South Carolina, state party chairman Drake Edens remarked, 
“I don’t think it is any secret that the majority of South Carolina Republicans and 
Independents prefer Senator Goldwater.” He added, “a Republican administration headed 
by any of the persons currently mentioned as possible nominees would be far more 
preferable that four more years of rule by the Kennedy clan.”136 Goldwater himself 
commented that because of the lagging national economy, an increase in the jobless rate, 
and the sour mood over the truth of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy was not 
unbeatable.137  
Less than a month after Goldwater’s assessment, Martin Luther King Jr. penned a 
poignant message to extremists and moderates alike on the issue of civil rights in his 
“Letter from a Birmingham Jail.” Fed up with the NAACP’s attempts to achieve equality 
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through the court system, and whites for a failing to properly assess the moral gravity of 
the situation, King wrote “I must confess that over the last few years I have been gravely 
disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion 
that the Negro's great stumbling block in the stride toward freedom is not the White 
Citizens Councillor or the Ku Klux Klanner but the white moderate who is more devoted 
to order than to justice.”138 King lambasted the moderates’ argument that law and order 
should preclude justice; moderates were fond of telling blacks that they agreed with their 
plight but then rejected direct action in favor of stability. At least, according to King, 
racists were honest about their beliefs and clear about their goals. Moderates, however, 
occupied a space that was neither in line with fundamental American values, such as 
equality, nor with Christian notions of brotherhood. Nonviolent protestors were not 
responsible for the tension that existed in the South; rather, they had brought it to the 
forefront for the world to see. If this made moderates or the clergy uncomfortable, that 
was a small price to pay for what was at stake.139 On this point, members of both parties, 
including President Kennedy and vocal civil rights supporters like Rockefeller, would 
have to shoulder some of the blame as well as responsibility for taking action.   
That May, after emerging from political hibernation, Richard Nixon gave an 
interview relating his advice for the Republican field. First, he insisted that the candidates 
should not wait to be nominated, they should seek it out. Second, candidates should start 
right away, and if they did not, then this implied that the candidate had no intention of 
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entering or did not think he would defeat Kennedy. Third, all candidates should enter 
some of the primaries and Nixon would support whoever won in California. Fourth, 
primaries gave voters a chance to see the candidates in action and gave the candidates a 
head start on the national campaign.140 At this stage, Rockefeller and Goldwater were the 
likely candidates, but Nixon did appear to have ulterior motives for his comments. A few 
ideas come to mind on this: Nixon wanted Goldwater and Rockefeller to mutually 
destroy each other in the primaries, in which case a third candidate, possibly himself, 
could take the nomination. A second possibility was that Nixon did not want the 
nomination but did want either Rockefeller or Goldwater to get it and lose to Kennedy so 
that neither would be in position for 1968 if Nixon should run again. A day after Nixon’s 
advice to the candidates appeared in print, he announced that he would seek employment 
as a lawyer in New York, effectively quieting if not altogether ending the speculation that 
he would become a candidate. 
Whatever Nixon’s true intentions, the race for the nomination was irrevocably 
changed when newspapers reported that Nelson Rockefeller wed Happy Murphy on 
Saturday, May 4th. Looking back on the events that transpired in the lead up to the 
wedding and its aftermath, the only thing that is clear is that Rockefeller became a 
different candidate overnight. At first, the reaction from party leaders was rather positive. 
Some even downplayed the marriage as a private matter while others thought that it 
might actually help Rockefeller. New York Senator Jacob Javits, like most of his peers, 
believed that the Rockefeller’s divorce fifteen months earlier had larger political 
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implications, “I believe that it will not have any material effect on his political future. I 
believe any effect there was to be came after his divorce. I don’t think this will affect his 
situation any further,” he said.141 This was not just a kind statement by another liberal; 
Javits had been a key supporter of Rockefeller for years, and while he had met with the 
governor the day before the wedding, he had not been told of it. David Rockefeller, 
Nelson’s brother, ultimately informed Javits, not Nelson. Hinman called other members 
of congress reassuring them that the fervor over the wedding would quiet down while 
also trying to assess their reactions.142 
 Weighing in from counties and hamlets across the map, key members of the party 
issued warnings that the American public was not comfortable with broken homes, 
especially considering that Happy had finalized her divorce only a month earlier. Roman 
Catholics, Fundamentalist Protestants, and Episcopalian clergy around the country took 
the opportunity to express their disapproval and to remind their congregations of the 
sanctimony of marriage.143 Large numbers of women were equally outraged over the 
matter. Happy had effectively given up her children to be with Rockefeller who himself 
had divorced his aging wife for a bride nearly two decades younger than him. After a 
group of women descended on his office to register their outrage over Rockefeller’s 
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conduct, Maryland Republican congressman Charles Mathias, Jr. began to tell friends 
that Rockefeller’s chances were finished.144  
Today, it seems almost absurd that Rockefeller should be punished so severely for 
his marriage; after all, he had the choice of keeping the affair private while she was still 
married or getting a divorce and remarrying so that their love could be public knowledge. 
President John F. Kennedy was a known philanderer among the press and Washington 
regulars, but his escapades did not become front page news while he was in the White 
House or when he was on the campaign trail. For that matter, Happy’s ex-husband 
remarried just as quickly as she did. Since the 1960s, historians have recounted numerous 
tales of the infidelity of presidents, and the public has become far more accepting of 
divorced candidates for office, but the American public of 1963 was not willing to accept 
Nelson and Happy’s marriage. Many felt insecure about their own lives, and others were 
scandalized by a woman leaving her family to be with a billionaire. The average voter 
believed this simply was not something that a proper woman was supposed to do. When 
women got married they were expected to stay married, and women’s lives were tied to 
their husbands in romantic and financial terms. For many women and men alike, divorce 
was intolerable. Nelson and Happy ventured a step too far.  Rockefeller wanted love and 
power, and he was not about to choose.  
If this seems to be an incomplete explanation of Rockefeller’s fall from 
frontrunner status, then there is another explanation. Events of the civil rights movement, 
including recent flare ups in news coverage, combined with Rockefeller’s stance on civil 
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rights added to the climate of racial hostility felt in the South. Furthermore, a desire for a 
conservative candidate to pair with a southern strategy made it possible for disgruntled 
Republicans to justify their support for Goldwater. In other words, Rockefeller’s 
marriage was a convenient out for some conservatives. They wanted Goldwater to be the 
face of conservatism because he was respectable and a true believer. Rockefeller would 
never be that candidate so conservatives used any reason they could to distance 
themselves from him. Rockefeller’s marriage further substantiated their claims that he 
was not the right fit for the Republican Party. In addition, Rockefeller’s own staff may 
have retroactively blamed his marriage for his defeat to avoid any further controversy. 
This is evidenced by an unpublished chapter in Rockefeller’s campaign biography by 
Frank Gervasi, The Real Rockefeller: The Story of the Rise, Decline and Resurgence of 
the Presidential Aspirations of Nelson Rockefeller. Gervasi explicitly states that 
Goldwater “ran a poor second to Rockefeller until Bull Connor catalyzed the counter-
revolution to the Negro Revolution.” This piece of inside information supports Joseph 
Alsop’s reporting in the Washington Post singling out Rockefeller’s liberal stance on race 
as his Achilles heel.145 It is also possible that Rockefeller’s liberalism towards civil rights 
and his remarriage combined, depending on the voter’s region or religious views or 
gender or any number of other factors, to sink the governor’s poll numbers.  
Conservatives leading the Barry-for-President movements in Texas, 
Massachusetts, Alabama, Minnesota, California, Oklahoma, and Arizona were ecstatic 
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over the marriage. Goldwater no longer made an attempt to stop the growing movement 
of support. Political pros were less convinced about the Senator’s chances, Goldwater 
agreed, reasoning that wealthy eastern moderates were still unlikely to support a 
conservative candidate. There was the possibility that Romney would become a 
compromise candidate put forth by the so called “kingmakers” to avoid an either-or 
scenario at the convention.146 Goldwater seemed to be anticipating that the convention 
would be deadlocked or moderates would find a way to block his nomination. Goldwater 
pressed on, motivated either by his desire to see the process through for the sake of the 
conservative movement or by the vanity that accompanies men who pursue power. His 
gruff public persona made him appear as if he was almost put up to all of this by 
supporters. He continued to appear at Republican fundraisers, including a $1,000-a-plate 
dinner in New York where he received another standing ovation while Romney looked 
on. Rockefeller skipped the event to go on his honeymoon in Venezuela.147 When 
Rockefeller returned after gallivanting on the beaches, a Gallup poll showed that 
Goldwater was leading Rockefeller, 35% to 30%.148 Rockefeller was stunned by the 
realization that the lock he had on the nomination was no more.          
Danger crept closer for Rockefeller at the Young Republicans Convention in San 
Francisco. Political observers viewed the event as a prelude to the primaries and an 
indicator of the party’s feelings. At the convention, conservatives routed Rockefeller’s 
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supporters. Neither Rockefeller nor Romney attended it, but Goldwater did, receiving a 
standing ovation before lighting a fire under conservative stalwarts. Amid the banners 
and balloons, conservatives blasted liberals for their detriment to the party and defended 
members of the John Birch Society, dismissing claims that they were extremists.149 It was 
an incredible display of enthusiasm and support for conservatism. It was a wave that had 
been building for some time. A year earlier Rockefeller had been asked to fund the 
Young Republicans, but he had declined.150 Even when letters came in to his New York 
offices offering to help set up Rockefeller-for-President chapters they were sent a polite 
“no” in response.151 Rockefeller tried to convince himself that, despite the events of the 
YR convention, history would stay the course, and he would take the nomination as the 
rational choice for moderation. Only he could draw on the success of the 1962 elections 
and Goldwater’s deficiency outside of pockets of the country. Or so he thought. 
   Rockefeller’s campaign organization was not a helpless group of amateurs, 
though they may in retrospect appear to be. Ideologically, they were liberal Republicans 
with a few renegade Democrats sprinkled in. They were lawyers, academics, 
businessmen, and politicians in their own right. George Hinman was the polite, urbane 
spokesmen tasked with selling the candidate to the party. William J. Ronan handled the 
governor’s state affairs, influenced his views on state government, and consulted with 
him on national politics. John E. Lockwood was Rockefeller’s personal lawyer, and he 
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played a crucial role in gubernatorial campaigns, drafted major speeches, and was a 
trusted advisor during times of crisis. Around the governor were an inner core of six 
influential regulars and outside of them was an outer seven and on and on the circles 
went, feeding information to the candidate whose professional philosophy was to gather 
as many facts as possible before making a decision. Aides and advisors felt that they were 
with a man who was going places. They should do all that they could to get next to him, 
whether it was getting on the same elevator, riding in the same limousine, or sitting next 
to the candidate when election returns started coming in.  
Observers mocked their sycophancy and admonished Rockefeller for not 
assessing blame when the occasion called for a shakeup. Most damaging of all, 
Rockefeller tended to close himself off from outside views. In sum, his circle of advisors 
were too close. Trusting in oneself in limited amounts is a net positive, but Rockefeller’s 
trust in his own abilities and instincts came precariously close to dooming him. When 
asked about his divorce, remarriage, and running for president, he supplied a revealing 
quote, “If I let events flow along, I’ll know when and how I must decide these 
matters.”152 For a man who collected facts and advisors in an almost mechanical way, this 
might seem out of character to the point of recklessness, but that was Rockefeller in a 
nutshell. He could be enigmatic, emotional, arrogant, and undisciplined like one of the 
works of modern art that he cared so much about. 
 Because of or despite these personal qualities, Rockefeller had an allure about 
him. He had the drive and ambition to realize a goal that was so far out of reach for so 
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many that people wanted to be around him. In 1963, Rockefeller had the potential to be a 
fantastic political figure if he could have learned to harness his energy and knowledge, 
and control his ego even if that meant that he would have to put his money into funding 
liberal causes instead of his own presidential campaigns. It is tempting to categorize him 
as a tragic figure. Rockefeller was unable to realize, until it is too late, that he had spent 
so much time collecting facts about politics and government that he missed the biggest 
and most damaging fact of all. His desire for love cost him the affection of voters at his 
moment of victory resulting in his own demise.  
As the days and weeks flew by, a curious development threatened to derail 
Goldwater’s rise. A stop-Goldwater movement organized around favorite-son 
candidacies put forth by liberals, moderates, and a few conservatives. Candidates 
included Congressman Walter Judd in Minnesota, Governor James Rhodes and 
Congressman Robert Taft Jr. in Ohio, and House Republican Policy Committee 
Chairman John Byrnes in Wisconsin. These new names added to a long list that already 
included Scranton in Pennsylvania and Romney in Michigan.153 Rather than attack 
Goldwater directly, so as not to further alienate conservatives, Rockefeller attempted to 
shave off some of Goldwater’s more controversial supporters. For example, he 
characterized the John Birch Society as radicals threatening to subvert the true 
Republican Party. Rockefeller warned against the party’s courtship of segregationists 
stating, “A program based on racism or sectionalism would in and of itself not only 
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defeat the Republican Party in 1964, but would destroy it altogether.”154 His advisors 
were now executing a shift in their strategy, electing to move their attacks on the far right 
up in attempt to stave off Goldwater’s rising poll numbers, and they made an unofficial 
announcement that Rockefeller would enter the New Hampshire and California primaries 
to prove to Republicans that he was a winner.  
Members of congress were not favorable to Hinman’s marketing message. They 
“couldn’t find any friends for this guy Rockefeller,” and his remarriage was “still too hot 
and too sensitive…many of these people don’t like Rockefeller anyway and they are 
using it as an excuse to conceal their feelings about him.” Not only were his views on 
civil rights hurting him but now his attacks on the far right were even worse.155  In 
response, Rockefeller decided against criticizing the Birchers themselves or Goldwater 
for not denouncing them.156 From the Democrats’ point of view, Kennedy took passing 
shots at Goldwater for his conspiratorial remarks on the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and 
Rockefeller for raising taxes after pledging not to. Kennedy focused more on 
segregationist Alabama Governor George C. Wallace, after the governor and the 
president clashed over school integration. That incident concluded with President 
Kennedy federalizing the Alabama National Guard to ensure that the University of 
Alabama was peacefully desegregated.157 A few weeks later, the Soviet Union and the 
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United States ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Conservatives applauded Goldwater 
for having the courage to lead the anti-treaty forces, but for both Kennedy and 
Rockefeller, saw an opportunity to hit Goldwater on the issue down the road.158  
After his remarriage, the Rockefeller had acted like a pilot struggling to level his 
falling aircraft. He vacillated on whether or not to attack the John Birch Society. He 
reached out to conservatives by visiting them in places like Illinois and Wisconsin then 
antagonized them by continuing to speak out on civil rights. He courted Republican 
leadership’s approval but gave no indication that he had squared things with voters. 
When asked if he would support Goldwater if the latter became the nominee, Rockefeller 
responded that he would but only if Goldwater ran on a Republican platform like the one 
in 1960. Of course, there was little reason to believe that Goldwater would accept those 
conditions. After all, Goldwater strongly opposed Rockefeller’s liberal additions to the 
platform made with Nixon on the eve of the convention.159 William E. Miller, Republican 
national chairman of New York, summed up the state of the Republican Party, “Our 
greatest trouble as Republicans is in becoming unified and staying unified for a national 
election.160 Rockefeller was not interested in backing Goldwater. He intended on winning 
on his own, and he would start in New Hampshire. He believed that an intensive 
campaign matched by a folksy style, and backed by huge sums of money would earn him 
a victory in New Hampshire, and from there he would roll inexorably to the nomination. 
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Chapter 4: The Media Acknowledges that Rockefeller is Running 
 Nelson Rockefeller stepped forward to the podium, looked out at the audience, 
and spoke into the microphone, “I am here this morning - and I shall go to New 
Hampshire immediately following this meeting – formally to announce my candidacy for 
the Republican Presidential nomination and my entry, at the proper time, in the New 
Hampshire primary election of March 10, 1964.” No one who had followed Rockefeller’s 
maneuvers for the past three years could have been surprised. Amid a throng of reporters, 
photographers, and television crew members for the Today show inside the Red Room of 
the Capitol building, Rockefeller officially began his candidacy. He continued his speech 
by listing the Kennedy Administration’s shortcomings: failure to reinvigorate the 
economy, failure to strengthen alliances abroad, and failure to confront communism 
around the world. This all seemed like standard procedure for the governor, since he had 
been emphasizing these exact points all over the country. He then offered up a statement 
that raised eyebrows, “[delegates at the party convention] will write a platform and select 
a candidate consistent with the basic principles of the Republican Party and the realities 
of the world in which we live, a platform and a candidate that will have my complete 
support, a platform and a candidate that will lead our party to victory next November.”161 
Rockefeller had announced his own candidacy, offered to support another candidate and 
party platform that had yet to be written, and given the impression that he might fight to 
shape GOP policy like he had in 1960. It was a mixed message. Fielding questions 
immediately after his prepared statement, he reiterated that he would support another 
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candidate but dodged a question on if he would support Goldwater. He then admitted to 
being an underdog going into the New Hampshire primary, but he believed voters there 
would not choose “extremism” over his “midstream” politics.162 After the press 
conference in Albany, Rockefeller boarded a plane to New Hampshire and officially 
began the presidential campaign of 1964.               
 
Polls and Positioning 
 Rockefeller’s route to the nomination was impeded by two significant hurdles. 
His candidacy lacked strong, organized support, and numerous Republican leaders were 
leaning towards nominating Goldwater.163 If he was to swing the momentum he would 
have to perform well in the primaries and raise his poll numbers. He needed to utilize his 
natural campaign ability, take advantage of his abundant resources, maintain his good 
relations with the press, and cultivate any grassroots supporters that might emerge while 
on the campaign trail. To understand the primaries and their importance, it is crucial to 
understand the importance of polling.  
Elmo Roper and George Gallup pioneered scientific polling in 1936 by correctly 
predicting Franklin D. Roosevelt would defeat Alf Landon.  When other pollsters, 
notably one commissioned by the Literary Digest, predicted the opposite, Roper’s and 
Gallup’s status in politics increased. Their work transformed political forecasting into a 
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valued and sought-after resource, bringing it into the modern era. Both Roper and Gallup 
reached their numbers by sampling a cross-section of the voting age population while 
taking into account undecided voters and those likely to shift their opinions. They also 
considered a host of other variables such as when the voter made their decision and how 
they answered follow-up questions. As a result, Roper and Gallup were able to accurately 
predict the outcome of the 1936, 1940, and 1944 presidential elections. In 1948, Roper 
and Gallup missed the mark by not accurately measuring attitude changes before the 
election and not accounting for how undecideds would swing the election in favor of 
Harry Truman. For the following election, Gallup and Roper picked the correct winner, 
but they did not anticipate a landslide victory for Dwight Eisenhower. Again in January 
1960, pollsters across the country had their credibility called into question when the lead 
between Nixon and Kennedy switched back and forth five times prompting Tennessee 
Senator Albert Gore to propose a congressional investigation. Following his narrow 
victory, President Kennedy hired Louis Harris to conduct research as to why he won. 
Likewise, the Rockefeller foundation funded the University of Michigan’s Survey 
Research Center to reinterview the same voters polled in 1956 and 1958. After 
conducting his own research, Republican pollster Claude Robinson concluded, “This 
election showed that there is no essential difference between the merchandizing of 
politics and the merchandizing of products.”164 Robinson was right, though it was 
Eisenhower who hired advertising executive Rosser Reeves to produce the first television 
commercial for a candidate. The decision to create the commercial bypassed the 
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presidential kingmakers to appeal to the American public. This idea became an essential 
element for winning national elections. Kennedy built on this approach by mapping 
concentrations of persuadable voters using computers that might otherwise have gotten 
lost in the shuffle through a broad advertising campaign.165 By 1964, the Gallup 
Organization issued a warning about polls conducted during the primaries and urged 
readers to be cautious. Polls were not be used as predictions, but rather as an assessment 
of the current situation.166  
 With these changes in strategy in mind, candidates could not discount the 
importance of polling. For one thing, polls diminished the power of party leadership. Past 
candidates had to rely on leaders to tell them the opinions and attitudes of voters to know 
how they were doing. With the advent of scientific polling, candidates were able to hire 
pollsters or monitor independent organization’s assessments which were in turn 
substantiated by scientific research.167 Another consequence of polling was the effect it 
had on primaries and vice versa. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy used the primaries to 
demonstrate to party leadership that they had popular support, therefore they were the 
best choice to run against the opposing party. Moreover, when looking at the polls and 
primaries from the view of the candidates in 1964, there were no examples of poll leaders 
winning primaries, yet dropping in the polls. Winning primaries helped poll numbers, but 
it was not always so cut and dried. There was a precedent for a candidate who did not 
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enter the primaries but rose in the polls, liberal Republican Wendel Wilkie in 1940. Also, 
primaries could take a candidate out of the running with a poor showing like Wilkie in 
1944, Vice-President John Nance Garner in 1940, and Senator William Borah in 1936. 
Finally, a loss in a primary had never taken a poll leader out of contention, but a loss had 
eliminated lesser contenders.168        
 Strategists for candidates with questionable appeal were obligated to participate in 
the primaries while managing their poll numbers. State primaries were a microcosm of 
the American electorate and had to be treated as such or a candidate risked losing the 
confidence of the party at large. At the turn of the century, political scholar and President 
of Harvard University, Abbott L. Lowell, argued that parties restrained extremists and 
“distorted” public opinion so as to appeal to voters in the ideological center. This 
“unreality of party lines” derived from overly simplistic public opinion polls that asked 
yes or no questions giving credence to the belief in a majority of voters were 
moderates.169 Many candidates subscribed to this theory and tempered their views and 
strategies accordingly. What Lowell and his adherents misunderstood was that while 
parties are not unbiased filters of public mood, primaries are more likely to draw out a 
large number of extremists not voters occupying the middle.170 Later political scientists 
would observe that moderate candidates would be better served by positioning 
themselves closer to their extremist opponent rather than remaining in the center. This 
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strategy would depend on if there was more than one key issue for voters to decide on 
and the strength of activist support.171 For Republicans in 1964, there were sixteen 
primaries with their own unique dimensions that would bring the candidate one step 
closer to the nomination or defeat.     
 
The Assassination of John F. Kennedy 
 “I will say this,” Gerald Ford started to tell an interviewer, “although we as 
Republicans thought Kennedy’s popularity following the election of ‘60 would make him 
automatically reelected in ‘64, by ‘63 there was a growing anti-Kennedy political view. 
By ‘63, before he was assassinated, there was a feeling among Republicans we had a 
chance to beat him in ‘64. Now maybe we were overly optimistic. But it was a different 
environment from ‘62 and ‘61.”172 Leading up to the day of the assassination, the 
atmosphere around the Kennedy administration had changed. Democrats, like the 
Republicans, were split. Kennedy’s supporters were reluctant to work with Lyndon 
Johnson’s wing of the party on issues like civil rights, and, partisan politics had limited 
domestic legislation. Rockefeller was highly critical of the president on his economic 
policies and with his handling of communism abroad. J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI agents 
received incredible leeway with pursuing suspected communists and infiltrating the civil 
rights movement and wiretapping its leaders. The Cold War was the over-arching theme 
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of the era, contributing to the tension and antagonism that was so prevalent through the 
ranks of government and politics.173 
 When Air Force One touched down at Dallas’ Love Field on Friday morning of 
November 22, 1963, the sun shone, there were no clouds, people were lined up to cheer 
for John and Jackie with Lyndon and Lady Bird trailing behind. They each waved to the 
crowd, more interested in the Kennedys than the Johnsons, before the Johnsons climbed 
into a convertible and the Kennedys got into the presidential limousine joined by Texas 
Governor John Connally.174 When the procession reached the downtown, onlookers 
pushed against the police lines to get a better look at the president and his wife. Members 
of the press were anxious to see the reception for the Kennedys after U.N. Ambassador 
Adlai Stevenson had been assaulted a few weeks earlier, but there were no indications of 
hostility. A reporter would later recall that there were one or two Goldwater signs being 
held up, probably with a “Kennedy for king; Barry for President” slogan, but that was 
commonplace. It was a warm day, men were in their short sleeves, there were pretty girls, 
and people appeared happy. As the cars exited Main Street and turned onto Elm, the 
crowds melted away leaving only a few onlookers scattered about. For those inside the 
limousine, the effect was like leaving the city and coming out into a big open space.175 
Mrs. Kennedy, when asked about the scene, remembered that she thought there would be 
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a moment of coolness when they reached the tunnel ahead. The sound of the shots was 
like a motorcycle backfiring. Then she heard Connally saying, “No, no, no, no, no…”176      
   “My recollection is that they announced his death around one o’clock” journalist 
Dan Rather said in 2003, “But before that, he was dead. And I remember on the radio 
they played the national anthem when they announced it. That sort of cracked through the 
zone.”177 A rapid sequence of events followed: the shooter, Lee Harvey Oswald was 
arrested, and Lyndon Johnson was sworn in as the new president. Then Sunday morning, 
Oswald was shot, and on Monday a funeral was held for the slain president. Millions 
watched on television, and hundreds of thousands of people went to Washington D.C. to 
pay their respects. It was a time of deep anguish and mourning. There was a riderless 
horse symbolizing the fallen leader, and Mrs. Kennedy, dignified and poised, stood with 
her children, “Caroline – she held my hand like a soldier, she’s my helper; she’s mine 
now. But he (John-John) is going to belong to the men now. Caroline asked me, ‘what 
kind of prayer should I say?’ And I told her to say either ‘Please God take care of daddy’ 
or ‘Please God be nice to daddy.’”178 
 A little over a year later in early December 1964, former Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Allen Dulles grappled with the events from that Friday in Dallas: 
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Here was a man, Oswald [Lee Harvey Oswald], who had been a failure at 
everything he had done. He was almost a misfit in the world, and yet he 
carried through successfully the intricate details of this mad act, and as I 
studied all that record I could see literally hundreds of instances where if 
things had just been a little different, if one fact had been known that 
wasn't known but which might have been known just as the fact of his 
earlier attack on General [Edwin A.] Walker… If the employees of the 
Book Depository had eaten their lunch in a little different place, if 
somebody had been at one place where he might easily have been instead 
of another at one particular time; the “ifs” just stand out all over it. And if 
any one of these “ifs” had been changed, it might have been prevented…it 
was so tantalizing to go over that record, as we did, trying to find out 
every fact connected with the assassination, and then to say if any one of 
the chess pieces that were entered into the game had been moved 
differently, at any one time, the whole thing might have been different.179  
 
Barry Goldwater and the South 
 Barry Goldwater had liked John F. Kennedy from their days together in the 
Senate during the 1950s. Goldwater liked his sense of humor and his easy-going manner, 
they debated with each other over partisan issues, and there were times when they agreed 
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on a point or two; though Kennedy was a Democrat through and through. Kennedy got 
along with Goldwater, participated in practical jokes, and, in one instance, went to 
Goldwater when he lost his voice on the Senate floor and the Senator from Arizona 
helped him with a speech. Goldwater was especially impressed with Kennedy’s memory. 
Kennedy had the ability to listen to an aide on a particular subject then proceed to give an 
impassioned speech on a topic that only a short time earlier he knew very little about.180 
They were from different backgrounds, they were from different parties, and they had a 
different set of ideological beliefs, but they respected one another, and both men expected 
to run against each other in 1964. When news of the tragedy reached Goldwater, he was 
as shocked and saddened as anyone. People from across the country sent letters to his 
office accusing him of bringing about the president’s demise. One particularly ugly 
message asked, “Are you happy now?”181 Republicans agreed to a moratorium on 
campaign operations while the nation was in mourning. During that dark period, 
Goldwater not only considered giving up his pursuit of the nomination, he wanted out of 
politics all together.182   
 But, that was not to be. Before the assassination, the New Hampshire polls 
showed Goldwater leading Rockefeller by almost three-to-one. Voters admired 
Goldwater’s sincerity, though, not his support of the radical right.183 Both the far left and 
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the far right would take considerable criticism from the general public in the months to 
come. Richard Nixon’s phone call to FBI Director Hoover after hearing that the president 
was mortally wounded is representative of that dynamic; “What happened? Was it one 
the right-wing nuts?” Nixon asked, “No, it was a communist,” Hoover replied.184 
Goldwater’s prospects before Kennedy’s passing showed that he was ahead in the South. 
With Lyndon Johnson now the likely nominee for the Democrats, the Northeast and the 
Midwest were back in play.185 The New Frontier was over. There was a new president. 
He looked and sounded much different than his predecessor. Goldwater once wrote a 
letter to Johnson in 1960 after the Johnson had told him that he that he would not accept 
the vice-presidency. When Johnson accepted the offer to become vice-president after all, 
Goldwater wrote, “Sitting here trying to think of how I feel about your taking the 
nomination and all I can think of is ‘nauseated’.”186 It became a running joke between the 
two. Goldwater had never trusted or liked the new president, especially after years of 
watching up close how Johnson operated in the Senate. 
  The Young Republicans (YR), a right-wing political group that shared 
Goldwater’s contempt for LBJ, began to write to the senator by the thousands. YR 
leadership urged members to help convince Goldwater to run while the YAF went a 
similar route and rallied supporters to defend the conservative movement.187 Then on 
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December 5 and December 8, conservative leaders met with Goldwater in an apartment 
in Washington D.C. to find out what the Senator was planning to do; they needed to 
know his answer. Senator Norris Cotton of New Hampshire was prepared to lead 
Goldwater’s campaign in the first primary, and former Senator William Knowland of 
California was already organizing support in California come June. Not only was an 
operation already underway, but they expressed concern that conservative grassroots 
supporters might not be around in another four years.188 Most of all, if Goldwater did not 
enter the race then Rockefeller would be the most likely candidate to win, something 
Goldwater detested.189  
Less than a month later, on January 4, 1964, Goldwater declared that he would 
seek the Republican nomination and offer the nation a “clear choice” for conservative 
leadership. He made the announcement from Arizona, wearing a cast on his right foot 
after having a bone spur removed.190 It was an unbecoming look for the candidate, not 
that he cared, he was intent on running a campaign based on principles not personality. 
Not since Taft had a conservative appealed to so many voters within the Republican 
Party, but he faced an uphill battle to win the White House. After reading from his 
prepared remarks he answered questions from reporters. He refused to denounce 
denounce the controversial John Birch Society, and he saw no reason for a debate with 
Nelson Rockefeller. If he lost he would not agree to be the vice-president, and he would 
                                                          
188 White, The Making of the President 1964, 100-101. 
189 Smith, On His Own Terms, 420. 
190 James Reston, “Goldwater Says He’ll Run to Give Nation a ‘Choice’,” New York Times, Jan. 4, 
1964. 
85 
 
 
not “concede anything to anybody,” meaning President Johnson.191 Barry Goldwater, like 
it or not, was running as a conservative candidate for conservatives. After twelve long 
years, the right wing of the party were ready to make its comeback.   
 
Southern Politics and a Second Opinion 
 Primary states are not the only means for assessing a candidate’s strength. They 
give candidates a battleground on which to fight but, to use an imperfect analogy, they 
are sites of a larger war. That war is fought to secure votes, to persuade the media to give 
favorable coverage, to sway delegates to give their support at the convention, encourage 
financial donors to inject funds into a campaign, and to get party leadership to convince 
all the others to work for a candidate. If a party strategist took a step back from looking at 
the New Hampshire primary and turned their attention to the South, they would see a 
battle between Rockefeller and Goldwater, but, more importantly, they would see a battle 
between Republicans and Democrats that had the potential to flip the electorate. In the 
grand scheme of American politics, this was far more important than what was happening 
between the liberals and the conservatives.  
 Since the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, civil rights and states’ 
rights overlapped in the field of education. The case made headlines around the world, 
and made state and local politicians national figures. As of December 1963, in seventeen 
southern and border states, only 9.2% of African-Americans of school age attended 
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desegregated schools. In Alabama, eleven black students out of a total enrollment of 
287,414 blacks went to school with whites; in South Carolina, ten blacks out of a total 
enrollment of 258,955 blacks attended integrated classes.192 Implementing desegregation 
in schools cost Kennedy dearly in the South and threatened to drive away voters while 
segregationists like Alabama governor George Wallace and South Carolina senator Strom 
Thurmond bolstered their careers on the issue. For example, there was a sentiment among 
lawyers in the South that blacks had been “egged on” by the administration, which the 
president denied, and conservative southern lawyers conscientiously believed that 
segregation was the moral and correct basis for race relations. The Kennedy 
administration enlisted the help of lawyers from both the North and South to persuade 
them otherwise. They urged Governor Wallace to “stand aside,” and tried to get the more 
important and sympathetic lawyers to become more involved with their local 
governments.193 It would be a mistake to think that the South’s switch from voting 
Democrat to Republican in 1964 was representative of the entire Republican Party; that 
would be a gross overestimation of the conservatives’ power at the time and would ignore 
pro-civil rights Republicans in the Midwest and the Northeast.194 With that in mind, 
Republican leadership was unequivocally paying attention to the changing position in the 
                                                          
192 Miscellaneous clippings and statements by Marshall and others, 1964, accessed January 8, 
2017, https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/BMPP-014-004.aspx 
193 Oberdorfer file on Southern business: Correspondence and miscellany, June 1963-February 
1964 and undated, accessed January 8, 2017, https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/BMPP-
030-002.aspx 
194 Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin, 104. 
87 
 
 
South and whether or not most voters were set on Goldwater or would entertain another 
candidate.  
 During the first week of November in Charleston, South Carolina, a thirteen state 
convention of southern leaders met to discuss strategy and campaigning for the 1964 
election. This was an important meeting not only for the morale of the conservative 
movement, but also because almost everyone in attendance would go on to become a 
delegate at the 1964 Republican Convention in San Francisco. Winthrop Rockefeller, 
Nelson’s brother and active party member in Arkansas, told the group that he would 
support his brother, though he did not promote him that day. He cited his allegiance to the 
Republican Party over his brother’s political fortune. Attendees at the meeting felt 
confident about their chances in the South. “Republican growth in the South was due 
primarily to Democratic fiscal policies which are going to bankrupt this nation,” South 
Carolina Republican chairman J. Drake Edens Jr. explained. Alabama chairman John 
Grenier and Louisiana national committeeman Tom Stagg elaborated on the Southern 
strategy. “Kennedy’s civil rights proposals were just the straw that broke the camel’s 
back,” Grenier remarked, before adding that Kennedy appeared to be the extremist to the 
man on the street. Stagg saw an opportunity to turn African-American support for 
Kennedy into a political tool for getting the white vote. Observers sent by Rockefeller to 
the meeting later relayed the bad news to the governor.195  
 Before his death, Kennedy became convinced that domestic affairs, such as the 
economy and civil rights, would be the decisive issues in 1964. He ruminated on the 
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dilemma for the Democratic Party during a White House meeting in early November, 
wondering aloud how to convince the average person without much money to vote 
Democrat while the people who did have money opposed him.196 He worried about 
appearing out of touch with the common man and what the Republicans might do in 
response to the March on Washington and civil rights legislation. After Dallas, the 
political situation in the South underwent a period of uncertainty with a host of scenarios 
and moving parts being considered. In Charlotte, North Carolina, support for Goldwater 
cooled after Kennedy’s assassination leading swing voters back into the Johnson camp. 
Goldwater remained popular with conservatives. Scranton triggered some interest, and 
Rockefeller remained as unpopular as ever.197 Farther south in Greenville, South 
Carolina, Goldwater supporters had been revving up to go against Kennedy in 1964. 
Going into the new year, Johnson was expected to receive a higher percentage of the vote 
if he did not overdo it on civil rights. This was in spite of a fierce opposition that 
considered him to be a “turncoat” and a “traitor to the South.”198 Around the southern 
region, a narrative gained traction that the assassination erased the anti-Kennedy appeal 
of the Goldwater movement, businessmen were less concerned with Johnson than they 
had been with Kennedy. However, any other Republican candidate would struggle to 
garner votes, and even Johnson might be preferable because of the perception that he 
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would be firm yet gentle when enacting civil rights legislation.199 Southerners prepared 
themselves to act and reset party alignment in the region. James D. Martin, president of 
Martin Oil Company of Alabama and former Republican Senate nominee, explained at a 
meeting for southern businessmen, “The time has come to disavow a ‘me too’ aping of 
limited socialism and faint-hearted surrender to minority votes. If that attitude prevails, 
the battle of 1964 and, I am afraid, the battle to save America as the last bastion of free 
enterprise, is already lost. Give it to the Democrats now and save the campaign 
expenses.”200 
 Moderates outside of the South were not impressed with Goldwater nor were they 
convinced that a southern strategy would lead the party to victory. A growing intellectual 
movement was in the works to formulate a plan that would avoid carving up the nation 
and settling for an overly simplistic, conservative view of Republicanism. Where 
Advance magazine had once been a publication of note trumpeting the moderates’ views, 
the Ripon Society took its place after the assassination. Despite significant financial 
backing, Advance went out of business after pouring money into a November 1963 issue 
that featured how Republicans would defeat Kennedy in 1964.201 On January 6, Ripon 
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published “A Call to Excellence in Leadership,” that called for a new direction for the 
party. Ripon charged the Democrats with offering “retreads of the New Deal”, and 
denounced extremists who rejected the complexities of the world in which “policies are 
either Communist or anti-Communist, and an “image of ‘negativism’” had too long been 
attached to the Republican Party. Republicans needed to fight for the middle ground. The 
center, it averred, was open for the taking, but that did not mean that the party had to ape 
Kennedy’s tactics in order to succeed. Ripon warned “against a party realignment of the 
small states of the West and South against the urban centers of America – or any similar 
realignment that would pit American against America on the basis of distrust and 
suspicion.” To prevail in these trying times, Republicans needed to nominate a candidate 
with the “vision, intellectual force, humaneness and courage that Americans saw and 
admired in John F. Kennedy.”202         
 Ripon received praise from editorial columns and moderate politicians such as 
Dwight Eisenhower who hailed their work for drawing attention to what he believed was 
the foundation of the Republican Party.203 Ripon’s open letter changed the conversation 
within the party about alternatives to Goldwater and the southern strategy. However, this 
was not a fatal strike against the Goldwater movement. As conservatives liked to point 
out, it was not easy to find a passionate moderate and even those who agreed with society 
questioned how progressive Republicans differed from moderate Democrats.204 The 
significance of “A Call to Excellence” was that it articulated a competing view against 
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conservatives. It presented a general strategy for how the party might move forward into 
the future, and provided leaders and intellectuals a pause to reassess and reconsider their 
choice for the nominee. Conservatism was by no means a foregone conclusion. There 
were other options that were arguably more in line with the party’s tradition, did not 
attract extremes from the right or the left, and gave the Republicans a better chance to 
win.   
 
The Contenders 
 Moderates and liberals were by no means limited to choosing between 
Rockefeller and Goldwater. Alternatives did exist. Each of these other candidates brought 
to the table a set of strengths that uniquely qualified them as a nominee, but they also had 
weaknesses that could torpedo their candidacies before they got started. This is not an 
indictment of the chances that moderates and liberals had to win; they certainly could if 
they chose the right candidate. A poll conducted by The Saturday Evening Post 
demonstrates that most Americans agreed on major issues, regardless of party lines. For 
example, 83% of Americans in 1962 thought the U.S. should stay in the United Nations, 
70% in 1961 thought that Kennedy did the right thing by sending troops into Alabama to 
oppose segregation, and 67% of respondents in 1955 favored an arms reduction if all 
other major nations agreed.205 Moderates and liberals could make a dent on the national 
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electorate by appealing towards the nation on these issues and offering a candidate with 
ideas on how to confront them. 
 A brief look at the contenders for the nomination helps to frame the election in 
broader terms for voters. An early dark horse contender for the nomination was Governor 
George Romney of Michigan. He was not readily identified with any of the party strife 
between Rockefeller and Goldwater, nor was he associated with the party’s defeat in 
1960. He had a reputation as a good salesman from his days as president of American 
Moters, where he sold the world’s first compact car, and his strong personality made him 
a popular candidate in his home state and region. Romney despised raising money from 
large donors; he wanted to raise money through small donations, and he wanted more 
participation from the average person while reining in big business, big government, and 
big labor. His opponents labeled him egotistical, moody, and misguided in the art of 
national politicking. Behind the scenes, he promised Michigan Republicans that he would 
serve out his full term as governor and would not run for president.  
Entering 1964, Richard Nixon was the leading candidate for the nomination. A 
Gallup poll in December showed him at 29% and the number remained the same in 
January.206 Nixon’s stock within the party was trading largely on name recognition and 
his carefully crafted image as an amalgamation of both liberal and conservative interests. 
His attempt at the governorship in California brought negative attention on him from the 
far right, including the John Birch Society. To voters in the Golden State, he appeared 
disinterested in what was happening there and more interested in international relations. 
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Even some of his supporters blamed him for not staying longer in California to restore 
order to the party. Nevertheless, voters were intrigued by the former vice-president. They 
saw him as a strong candidate with the chance to break the deadlock within the party.  
Two lesser known candidates were also under consideration: Harold Stassen and 
Margaret Chase Smith. Stassen was the progressive governor of Minnesota and a 
perennial candidate; 1964 was the fourth time that he ran for president. His gaff during a 
radio debate with Thomas Dewey on the issue of outlawing communism in 1948 had cost 
him his best chance at becoming president.207 Stassen received attention by polling in the 
top five in August 1963, but was considered a longshot to win the nomination, “The 
principle problem of Harold Stassen [is] that someone early on told him that he should be 
President and he believed it.”208 Margaret Chase Smith, Senator from Maine, sought to 
prove that a woman could run for president. Her political career started after filling her 
late husband’s House seat in 1940 before running for the Senate in her own right, and 
became an outspoken anti-communist throughout her time there.209 Smith insisted that the 
United States use counterforce to stop the Soviets advance, warning that President 
Kennedy’s actions would provoke a response from the communists, promote an arms 
race, or increase the likelihood for war. When the press corps asked President Kennedy 
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about Smith’s chances at winning, he told the amused reporters, “She would make a 
formidable candidate.”210     
If Margaret Chase Smith was not to be taken seriously then William Scranton was 
taken seriously by seemingly everyone but himself. As Pennsylvania governor, he was 
concerned with improving the state’s social and business climate developing a reputation 
as a shrewd politician with an eye on the White House. During his time in office, 
Eisenhower employed him as special assistant to the Secretary of State. Afterward, state 
leaders pushed him to run for a seat in the House of Representatives. His standing within 
the party was on the rise following an impressive victory in the 1962 gubernatorial 
race.211 Members of the media labeled him as a Republican Kennedy. He was articulate 
and sophisticated; a progressive with political views on civil rights and foreign policy 
that were far to the left of those of Goldwater. He had opposed Kennedy on only 34% of 
125 roll-call votes, and he had disagreed with the New Frontier only 6% of the time on 
foreign policy questions. During his race for a seat in Congress in 1960, he emphasized 
his friendship with Kennedy. He then ceded prime television time to Kennedy, 
rescheduling his own broadcast to follow immediately afterward so that he could inherit 
Kennedy’s audience.212  Party leaders liked him, and he was considered a progressive 
who conservatives would be willing to accept. He was one of several candidates 
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Eisenhower pushed.213 After fourteen months as governor of a major industrial state, 
Scranton had made huge strides towards improving conditions around the state that 
increased his appeal to industry, labor, African-Americans, and voters in the Northeast.214 
He was highly dubious of Goldwater, and told both him and Rockefeller not to contend 
for Pennsylvania delegates under the guise of party unity. The ploy worked inasmuch as 
it kept Rockefeller out of the state and resulted in the weakening and conversion of 
Goldwater’s forces.215 As his opponents in Pennsylvania already knew, Scranton could be 
a fierce competitor. However, he refused to participate in the primaries, offering instead 
to be the nominee if drafted. 
Another candidate tempting voters was Henry Cabot Lodge. He had lost his 
previous two bids for office: in 1952 he lost his Senate seat in Massachusetts to Kennedy, 
and in 1960 when the Nixon-Lodge ticket lost the White House to Kennedy and Johnson. 
Lodge was in a quandary. Eisenhower pushed him to become an active candidate, but as 
ambassador to South Vietnam, he was barred from promoting himself as a political 
candidate per State Department regulations and the Hatch Act.216 Supporters placed his 
name on the New Hampshire ballot despite repeated declarations that under no 
circumstances would he return to the United States and campaign for the nomination.217 
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Lodge had experience in campaigning, his record as ambassador to the UN was mostly 
good, and his Cold War experience made him a strong candidate to oppose the Russians. 
In his words, he offered something for both wings of the party, “I’m a conservative like 
all of us, in the sense that I want to conserve the good things we have. I’m a liberal, like 
all of us, in the sense that I want to go on to even better things.”218 Conservatives were 
not impressed. They viewed Lodge as another member of the northeast Establishment 
that had let down the party like so many before. His appeal to certain kinds of voters was 
not unlike Scranton, but he lacked the personal charm and fiery political skill that the 
governor possessed. Lodge’s failure to add much of anything to the ticket in 1960 was 
unpardonable to many Republicans, and his refusal to take to the campaign trail, few 
political observers and members of the media thought that he would win. 
   
Let it Begin in New Hampshire 
 One of the more telling images of the New Hampshire primary campaign 
appeared in the New York Times on Saturday, January 25, 1964. At the top of the page 
was a picture of Nelson Rockefeller eating ice cream with a group of young men who 
were too young to vote, and to the right of that picture was another of Mrs. Rockefeller 
reaching across the hood of a car to sign autographs. To the left of Rockefeller was an 
article about Barry Goldwater. Goldwater was described as having received an 
“uproariously enthusiastic welcome” from one thousand Young Republicans in 
Washington, D.C. At the event, he lashed into President Johnson’s relationship with 
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notoriously corrupt Senate aide Bobby Baker, calling Johnson “a highwayman of the 
bureaucratic system trying to buy votes by the most deceptive budget of our time.”219 
These two images and Goldwater’s article are indicative of a sharp contrast between the 
two candidates. Rockefeller had flown into Laconia, New Hampshire on a turboprop 
airliner to be greeted by well-wishers. He then ventured into town on a campaign bus, 
stopping to shake hands outside of a grocery store and barber shop, before delivering a 
speech on doing more for small business and supporting a strong civil rights bill. He and 
his wife received a warm welcome by the voters, eliciting sympathy for the way his 
divorce affected his candidacy. Still, most voters admitted they were uncommitted. 220 
Meanwhile, Goldwater spewed his fire brand conservatism to the faithful, pausing for 
standing ovations, and waving to supporters as they chanted “We Want Barry.” 
Rockefeller could be a tremendous campaigner, drawing people to him with his 
magnetism and style, but Goldwater had something that he could not buy. Goldwater was 
at the helm of an impassioned, dedicated movement that he was redirecting away from its 
previous anti-Kennedy position to an anti-Johnson position. Whether Goldwater could 
transfer his appeal into votes in New Hampshire had yet to be seen. Rockefeller, for his 
part, was counting on person-to-person politicking, backslapping, and glad-handing to 
carry the day. As the Times articles demonstrated, the choice between the two could not 
be clearer.          
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 Goldwater’s style became an issue in New Hampshire.221 He had never publically 
been known as a warm man, and he was not the kind of politician that could light up a 
room when he walked in. He was an ideologue with bit of gruff and tough. His 
appearance might be described as stern or hardened, he was not fashionable but utilitarian 
in dress, and his features were marked by the cutting angles of his face, squared off by 
black glasses below his silver hair. Magazines liked to depict him in blue jeans with a 
cowboy hat, and they sometimes photographed him on horseback to show the rustic 
qualities that politicians in the Northeast did not possess. To voters in the New 
Hampshire, he came across as uncomfortable and awkward. For example, when he made 
a campaign stop at a lunch counter in Laconia, he refused to answer some of the 
questions that the audience posed and invited them to write a letter to his office 
instead.222 If a candidate will not answer a question when you come out to see him in the 
flesh, then there is hardly a reason to mail a letter that a secretary may or may not decide 
to read. On his trips over to Salem and Woodsville, he avoided shaking hands with 
voters. Other times he would greet as many people passing by as he let go without saying 
a word. In the line to shake hands, voters could hear him mumble to them through a slight 
smile without introducing Mrs. Goldwater.223 For those paying attention, the Senator 
looked like he was terribly uncomfortable by the whole ordeal and wanted nothing more 
than to go back to Arizona. His speeches, on the other hand, were polished, accented by 
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sharp attacks on the Democrats. There was no doubt that Goldwater believed in what he 
was saying, but the problem was whether he could get enough people to buy into him so 
that he could follow through on his intentions.  
 Rockefeller set out to prove that there was more to him than style. During a 
speech to the Young Republicans in New Hampshire, he made it clear why he had 
entered the race. He declared that he was not in the state as part of a stop-Goldwater 
movement. That was certainly part of why he was there, but it was not the basis for his 
candidacy. He was running because of deeply held patriotic principles and the belief that 
the Republican Party should be a responsible force for good government. As he told the 
audience, “I’m in this race all the way.”224  Rockefeller shined during his speeches, he 
was animated, poised, confident, and well informed. He liked to use statistics to back up 
his points or historical analogies to underscore how imperative the situation with the 
Soviet Union had become. Footage from the campaign showed him bouncing down the 
sidewalk, smiling, and shaking hands. He displayed an easiness with voters who at first 
were not sure how to act around the millionaire, but they then relaxed as they chatted 
with him.  
No matter how good he was at campaigning there were those in the audience that 
were somewhere between curious to witness his charm and ready to tell a reporter how 
much they disapproved of his remarriage. Instead of hiding Happy, Rockefeller decided 
to make her into an asset by having her attend rallies, appear at photo opportunities, sign 
autographs, and go to fund-raising dinners. Amongst voters, there was much debate about 
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how important their remarriage was for selecting a candidate. Goldwater supporters liked 
to remind people that Nelson cast aside his first wife for a younger woman who 
subsequently abandoned her children.225 Editor and publisher of the Manchester Union 
Leader William Loeb was major political force in the state, and he wrote, “We have 
never had a wife swapper in the White House and…we believe…the people will not 
accept a wife swapper as president.”226 Barbs from an editor like Loeb, no matter how 
cartoonish and untrustworthy he was, hurt Rockefeller around the state. His newspaper 
had a circulation of 50,000 in a state with around 600,000 people, giving him and his 
conservative politics a weighted importance.227 New Hampshire was undergoing a battle 
of its own between conservatives and liberals. Republicans lost the governorship after 
holding it for forty years and Senator Styles Bridges subsequently passed away, leaving a 
power vacuum. Observers suspected that Rockefeller’s remarriage was a cover for his 
opponents. They were willing to exploit the issue for political reasons, not so much 
because of their outrage, which some of them genuinely felt, but because they wanted 
control of the party.   
 New Hampshire voters by and large did not rank the governor’s remarriage as a 
top priority within the state. Sure, it served as juicy gossip, as it was national news, but it 
did not rise to the highest level of voters’ interests. Republicans in the state tended to be 
professional and business people, had a slightly higher income than the national average, 
                                                          
225 “Rockefeller’s Wife Gets a Major Role in His Campaign,” Robert H. Phelps, New York Times, 
Jan. 27, 1964. 
226 Life, Nov. 1, 1963. 
227 Richard Norton Smith, On His Own Terms, 416-417. 
101 
 
 
and they were better educated. Voters in the state tended to be older as well, with just 
under half the total population fifty years old and older compared to just 12% between 
the ages of 21-29.228 Most important for Rockefeller’s candidacy, they wanted a 
candidate who could bring jobs to the state, specifically to the shoe and textile industries. 
As more and more information flowed back to the campaign, it became clear that he 
needed to talk about improving the local economy, which would be bolstered by talking 
about his record while in office. Eisenhower won the state in 1952 against Taft by 
focusing on his knowledge of foreign affairs, an area that the governor knew well.229 
Voters needed to get to know the candidate better, and reversing their ignorance of him 
became a priority.  
 From there, Rockefeller went on a tear trying to improve his image. His 
speechwriters crafted speeches entitled “We Need 20 Million New Jobs” and “How to 
Meet the Communist Challenge.” He also began a regular column called “How 
Rockefeller Sees It” explaining why he was running and how he could breathe life into 
the state. He made speeches at Keene State College, then he flew back to Albany lest the 
voters there grow too accustomed to life without him. Then he went off again to Concord 
to speak at a hotel dinner, then to Laconia to meet with small business owners. Later he 
visited Dover, and Nashua to speak with the local Chamber of Commerce. Members of 
the campaign distributed information packets to locals on how to hold a fundraiser at 
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their home, what issues to discuss, basic background information on the candidate, and 
rebuttals to Goldwater supporters. As Rockefeller’s staff worked to get their candidate in 
the best position before the primary, William Loeb made sure the headlines in his 
newspaper made it clear who voters should elect. The song became incessant: “Barry is 
Runaway Favorite,” “Rising Tide for Goldwater,” “Enthusiasm for Barry Tops Nixon 
in ’60 Lure,” and “Barry Looms as Party Choice”. Some of the columns made their way 
into the back sections of crowded Boston newspapers, casting doubt on the outcome of 
the election. Loeb took it upon himself to take swipes at Margaret Chase Smith, and he 
referred to Eisenhower as “Dopey Dwight.” Before his untimely death, Kennedy often 
got compared to a mental patient; he was, according to Loeb, a “silly rich boy” inviting 
“insanity in the White House.” Goldwater, on the other hand, became a symbol of 
“determination to return to national sanity,” and he was able to free the nation from 
“sleeping under the leadership of left-wing professors impervious to the freedom loving 
demands of Chiang Kai-shek, Francisco Franco, and H.L. Hunt of Texas.230 This was an 
interesting line of attack calculated to resonate with residents of a state with the motto 
“Live Free or Die.”  
 Their campaign styles, along with their supporters, remained decidedly different. 
Goldwater kept an unassuming, reserved attitude while Rockefeller bounced, boasted, 
and rollicked on the campaign trail. Nevertheless, neither candidate was without flaws. 
For every repetitive comment from Rockefeller on the “leadership gap in Washington,” 
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Goldwater rattled off a quote that misconnected with voters making him look indecisive. 
For example, in Portsmouth he railed against the civil rights bill, warning of 
infringements on freedom of religion before commenting, “I am not certain of that 
position yet.” Later, the widow of popular New Hampshire Senator Styles Bridges 
praised him for supporting a “voluntary” Social Security system only to have the 
candidate say that Social Security “may need some looking into about 1970, but I’m not 
for breaking contracts.” On the other side, Rockefeller’s crowds tended to be larger, but 
they were less enthusiastic. He liked to rattle off statistics, deliver adages and terms  
that did not resonate with shivering onlookers in the February cold. Lingering whispers 
about his remarriage continued to be heard, proving that the governor’s ceiling could only 
go so high. By the end of the month, neither side expected a majority of the total vote.231 
In the run-up to the primary election on March 10, both Goldwater and Rockefeller could 
be seen glad-handing potential voters, trying to turn the screws of the local power 
brokers, and promising all that they could to make the state a better place.232  
 To say that the New Hampshire primary was a two man race would not be 
entirely inaccurate, though it would be an incomplete answer to why neither candidate in 
the end carried the state. Both of the aforementioned leading candidates captured 
headlines and produced quite a bit of buzz around the state, but despite their best efforts, 
voters could not commit themselves to either side. Other candidates, among them Richard 
Nixon, George Romney, and William Scranton proved that a candidate did not even have 
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to appear in the state or even have his name on the ballot to be considered. All three 
candidates withdrew their names from the ballot, though each one, especially Nixon 
remained a favorite among party factions. Scranton kept one foot in the race by insisting 
that would only be a candidate if drafted by the people, but his candidacy in the primary 
never gained traction.233 Ostensibly, the three Republicans did not want to be a part of a 
large field of contenders which would potentially hand a fluke victory to Goldwater. 
From another perspective, they wanted Rockefeller to win if not to bolster his chances 
but to increase their own chances should Goldwater lose momentum. A win for 
Goldwater did not sit well with progressives within the party who feared a nuclear 
exchange with the Soviets should he win the general election, Social Security becoming 
optional, and equal rights being demoted from the national agenda.234  
Still, for New Hampshire voters, another option seemed viable, writing in Henry 
Cabot Lodge on their ballots. Few voters had a clear understanding of the ambassador 
and his positions. Compared to Rockefeller and Goldwater he was an unknown. A vote 
for Lodge was a vote for a phantom. His absence from the campaign trail only served to 
propel his campaign that was operating without his public approval on a subterranean 
level. In the election’s postmortem, political observers cited Lodge as a favorite-son 
candidate; after all, many New Hampshire voters lived on the border with Massachusetts 
and worked in Boston. They felt comfortable voting for someone that they knew from 
past experience, regardless of how the situation had changed since his defeat in the 
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Senate to Kennedy years earlier.235 In 1964, Nixon looked like a two time loser after 
loses in 1960 against Kennedy, and in California in 1962. While Goldwater tried 
unsuccessfully to tone down his bellicose rhetoric, Rockefeller satisfied no one with his 
campaign biography, Nelson Rockefeller, a Political Biography which failed to put to rest 
his marital issues. Making matters worse, a week before the election, a prominent Baptist 
minister in Manchester spoke with Rockefeller about his remarriage, and afterwards he 
refused to give his endorsement. With Margaret Chase Smith and Henry Stasson failing 
to seize the opening, Lodge became the choice candidate.236 When the final results came 
in, the numbers showed Rockefeller with 21%, Goldwater with 22%, and Henry Cabot 
Lodge with 35%. A surprise indeed. 
   Following the election, Rockefeller had to lick his wounds and keep moving as 
he was already campaigning in preparation for the Oregon and the all-important 
California primary. In a letter to the governor dated March 23, retired Ford Motor 
Company executive and PR man Charlie Moore laid bare the dilemma facing the 
campaign: the New Hampshire primary resulted in a stalemate. Lodge was in the 
impossible position of being a candidate while serving overseas for a democratic 
administration. Opinion polls before the election failed to accurately take the temperature 
of the electorate, and the press moved against the governor at the exact wrong time. 
Goldwater survived because Rockefeller did not win. This was not because of 
Goldwater’s campaign, although, his numbers in California went up, thus setting the 
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stage for a future showdown between the two sides. Within Rockefeller’s campaign, an 
argument over how the governor should proceed threatened stability moving forward. 
According to Charlie Moore, he needed to make civil rights an issue in Oregon and 
California. Goldwater, he argued, was an extremist who could not win the national 
election, and there was no place for him in the party of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Goldwater 
had the potential to wreck the party, and drive voters into the arms of the Democrats. 
Moore advised the governor that while no other Republican needed to be attacked, 
Goldwater had to be brought down.237 With the first primary in the long winding road to 
the nomination in his rearview mirror, Rockefeller pressed on.  
 
Chapter 5: Primary Season 
A Vacuum in the Republican Presidential Race 
 Presidential primaries can cause immediate changes in national party preference. 
There are a host of factors to consider: whether the candidate won or lost the primary, 
media attention, expectations for the candidate, and where the election took place since 
certain states carry more weight than others. There are many losers in primaries, and each 
contribute to the winner’s gain. Each primary brings a chance for a new direction in the 
polls leading to the next primary.238 Adding to the confusion for the Republican field 
following New Hampshire, Goldwater and Rockefeller combined for less than 50% of the 
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total vote. Nixon finished fourth thanks to a half-hearted write-in campaign, and Scranton 
did not even run a campaign and received a miniscule 77 write-in votes. Essentially, 
Lodge won the primary for being the least unpopular candidate after the Republicans 
failed to move the needle.239 New Hampshire did not decide the likely nominee so much 
as show the candidates that they needed to adjust their campaign strategy before the next 
major primaries or else their supporters might abandon them for another.  
 At this point in the race, three distinct possibilities for the remaining primary 
season seemed plausible. First, the early favorite, in this case Rockefeller since Nixon 
refused to launch a formal campaign, might rally from defeat and regain the lead in the 
polls. This happened twice in the decade prior. In 1948, Thomas Dewey, another former 
New York governor, lost his lead to Harold Stasson in April after dropping the Wisconsin 
and Nebraska primaries. Dewey turned his campaign around by splitting four more 
primaries with his opponent and maintaining an advantage in the popular polls before 
securing the nomination. Four years later, Eisenhower staved off Robert Taft after he 
pulled ahead in the polls with a narrow victory in New Hampshire followed by a strong 
second place showing in Minnesota. Both candidates dominated the public opinion polls, 
and won the final poll before the convention. Goldwater proved in New Hampshire that 
he could not win the nomination on the ground by shaking hands or giving speeches. He 
would have to go another route if he wanted to stand on the podium at the convention in 
California. Winning the public opinion polls was not going to happen for him. 
Rockefeller, on the other hand, enjoyed this kind of politicking. He lived for the polls – 
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some would say he paid too much attention to them – he was the best pure campaigner 
that the party had. Winning the polls would take a series of deft moves, he would need to 
confront Goldwater’s supporters before exposing them as extremists to the rest of the 
Republican Party.240  
 A second scenario involved an eleventh hour challenger. This possibility would 
require a challenger not necessarily winning the primaries or dominating the public 
opinion polls. A candidate rising to the top at a late stage in the primaries had happened 
before, but under unusual circumstances. For example, Wendell Wilkie in 1940 defeated 
Dewey in only the last poll of the race. In another instance, Tennessee Senator Estes 
Kefauver took over the lead position in 1952 after Truman dropped out of the race. He 
then lost the nomination after Democrats drafted Adlai Stevenson as a compromise 
candidate at the convention. An outcome like this was exactly the kind of nightmare that 
conservatives thought might happen. Their candidate had a hardcore base of supporters, 
but his lack of national political prowess might nudge key members of the Republican 
elite to seek someone else. Liberals would most likely have the upper hand in this 
situation as most their support lay in the Northeast, the traditional base of power for the 
party. Rockefeller would not be seen as a compromise candidate at a late stage in the 
campaign. If he wanted the nomination he would have to win it on his own. Moreover, 
while liberal and progressive Republicans could take some comfort in a third candidate, 
conservatives knew another option would spell disaster. Enlisting a third choice for the 
general election would torpedo even the remotest chance of a Republican returning to the 
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White House. Few candidates could be called upon to balance the ticket. Namely, 
Richard Nixon would be asked to fall on his sword for the party making him a three time 
loser with little hope of continuing a once promising political career. Any other nominee 
would risk a similar fate: the party would be ripped in half, and the nominee’s chances of 
success would pale in comparison to the negativity felt among rank-in-file Republicans.  
 A third scenario would be a horse race to the finish line with each candidate 
jockeying for position along the way. This happened only four years earlier when 
Democrats John F. Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson switched leads in the polls five times 
before Kennedy took the lead for good in January 1960. Two months later, the primaries 
began resulting in a sweep for Kennedy in each of the eleven contests that he entered.241 
For the Republicans in 1964, several candidates took the lead at the start of the race 
beginning with Nixon then Rockefeller then Goldwater, and then Lodge after the first 
primary. No one had a steady command of the front position. If this scenario continued at 
its current pace, then it would be hard to predict who would come out on top at the 
convention. 
 Republican moderates and liberals alike had to like their chances should this 
possibility come to fruition. For starters, most of the candidates could be labeled as 
progressive or at least left-leaning raising the odds that one of them would be the winner. 
Rockefeller would have to act fast. His image problem would come up again, a serious 
handicap for a challenger trying to win because of his ideals, his record, and chance at 
winning in November. Other candidates would also have the opportunity to move up in 
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the polls, win a few primaries, and curry favor with the party establishment. At first 
glance, Goldwater’s chances would not be better than even given his aforementioned 
troubles with voters. That of course depended on him following the traditional path to the 
nomination. If he focused not on capturing voter’s support, but gathering delegates, the 
real prize of each primary, then his chances would improve. Understand that under this 
scenario, the horse race, custom and procedure get altered. This is the wildest path for the 
candidates to take precisely because there is so much uncertainty brought with it, by its 
nature, it would be unpredictable. If a candidate could start a genuine movement heading 
into the convention there would be no way to block him by nominating a compromise 
candidate. On this point, the left wing of the party underestimated their competition. They 
did not foresee how much the race would change if Goldwater continued unimpeded.242  
 
Like a Prairie Fire 
 Perhaps Barry Goldwater would not be in the race if not for the activities of South 
Carolinians. At least, he might not be as prominent a figure in the party. Goldwater first 
came to South Carolina as a politician in 1958 thanks in part to National 
Committewoman and member of the Greenville County Republican Party Patricia M. 
Barnes. She headed a last minute fundraiser in Greenville that allowed him to speak to a 
statewide TV audience. Two years later, she worked with Spartanville industrialist Roger 
Milliken at the National Convention in Chicago on what was dubbed “The Historic 
Platform Committee Upon Which the Voice of the South was Clearly Heard.” She also 
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served as a member of a small group at the convention that was instrumental in placing 
the Goldwater’s name in nomination.243 Former Democratic governor James F. Byrnes 
did his part to turn the South towards a conservative candidate by continually supporting 
Republicans in presidential elections. Two months before the 1960 election, he sided with 
the delegation from South Carolina in their rejection of the Democratic platform and 
nomination of Senator Kennedy.244 On a micro level, conservatives sprouted up almost at 
their own will. In Anderson, South Carolina, president of the University of South 
Carolina Young Republicans David W. Rice wrote to James Duffy for guidance on how 
to better organize other high school and college students interested in giving their 
support. Many of them already spoke the language of the conservatives but wanted to be 
a part of a movement.245 These figures, leaders at various levels, played a pivotal role in 
the creation of what would become known as the “southern strategy.” A stratum of 
support built upon layers of passionate and often times disgruntled members of an 
ignored social group, predominantly whites, bent on uniting to voice a common set of 
beliefs that could be heard from the low country to the state capital. A voice that had for 
too long been muted by outsiders, content with issuing directives while taking a key bloc 
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of voters for granted. Goldwater would not have to tap into their support so much as dig 
in and reap the rewards.246  
 Other Republicans carried this message throughout the South. In Alabama, 
president of the Martin Oil Company and G.O.P rising star James D. Martin spoke on this 
issue in late January. He urged southern businessmen to become involved in politics with 
wholehearted support and not look for a “guaranteed winner.” He speculated that the 
main issue in the South in the election would not be the economy or foreign policy; 
instead, he believed that the issue at hand would be the power of the federal government 
to impose its will upon the states and individuals. He stressed the immediacy of action, 
“The time has come to disavow a ‘me too’ aping of limited socialism and faint-hearted 
surrender to minority votes,” he stated. “If that attitude prevails, the battle of 1964 and, I 
am afraid, the battle to save America as the last bastion of free enterprise, is already lost. 
Give it to the Democrats now and save the campaign expenses.” Democrats needed the 
South more than the South needed Democrats. Without the South, the Democratic Party 
would be a minority party made even weaker if border states like Kentucky, Missouri, 
Oklahoma, and West Virginia followed suit. He insisted that his listeners not simply give 
their approval, but participate. He believed that the time for change had arrived. “The 
solid, one-party South is gone; it is, at this very hour, in a state of flux; in a state of 
change. The impressive victory we won on November the 6th, 1962 by shattering the 
fixed idea of Democratic invincibility may not yet have established the two-party system 
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in the South – but the South is ready.”247 Martin’s words expressed a deep sentiment, a 
current running through the region. Democrats no longer held sway at the precinct-levels, 
and these businessmen, lawyers, and politicians were banning together to thwart what 
they saw as government overreach approved by a political party that no longer spoke for 
them. 
 A poll conducted by the Democratic National Committee in late 1963 indicated 
that the Democrats would lose an estimated six of seven Southern states that Kennedy 
carried in the previous election, including Texas, Arkansas, South Carolina, North 
Carolina, Louisiana, and Georgia.248  While the poll represented voters at a particular 
moment, a month before Rockefeller became the first Republican to formally declare his 
candidacy, it is indicative of a looming shift in the habits of the region. Furthermore, 
election returns in 1963 confirmed the steady development of a Republican trend into 
Democrat strongholds, but progress did not only come in Dixie either. A Republican 
candidate in the Philadelphia mayoral race, a city that Kennedy carried by over 300,000 
votes, polled at 47% in a close loss. For the first time in sixteen years, a Republican 
became mayor of Baltimore. Special elections in California and Texas both produced 
Republican victors, while in Indiana the party took control of a majority of its cities 
including a majority of its most populous municipalities. Republican gains also included 
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the Virginia General Assembly and the New York mayoral races. Mississippi had its first 
two-party gubernatorial contest since Reconstruction, and one-third of the voters opted 
for the Republican candidate.249 As conservatives saw it, a backlash had materialized. 
These elections took place before Kennedy’s death, but Lyndon Johnson did not have the 
support of many southerners either.  
At this stage, it would be an overstatement to say that a conservative victory in the 
primaries was inevitable, much less that they would be able to win in the general election. 
It is clear that Republicans were on the upswing, but that does not mean that they could 
be assured of even having their candidate nominated. Cracks in the South became clearer 
as time moved on, which would not have been a surprise to a politician weighing his 
chances in the early to mid-1960s. A better question would be how much did this matter 
to them? Consider that in 1960 the states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi combined for a total of 70 Electoral 
College votes. Compare that to Ohio with 25, Illinois with 27, Pennsylvania and 
California each with 32, and New York’s enormous number of 45. Maintaining 
dominance in the industrial Northeast, along with a few key districts in the Midwest and 
California, had to take precedence for the party at large.250 National Republican 
leadership looked at the electoral map and wanted a candidate who best appealed to those 
states deemed most valuable. For most voters in America that meant a candidate who 
swayed to the left of center on specific issues or so Republican leaders thought. In 1964, 
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Lyndon Johnson was often described as a conservative even though he would go on to 
expand some of the most important “liberal” policies of the 20th century. A far-right 
candidate like Barry Goldwater had an uphill battle to convince the “kingmakers” that he 
could be a viable candidate in a political climate that indicated otherwise. 
 Before 1964, the way to gain delegates depended on courting county and state 
leaders who would then support the candidate. This was exactly the campaign style that 
George Hinman angled for Rockefeller to employ, which he did until his remarriage and 
opening defeat in New Hampshire wrinkled his prospects. Winning in the primaries 
would show the state and county leaders that Rockefeller had public support, thus higher 
ratings in the polls would come, followed by more victories up until the convention. F. 
Clifton White saw another way to the nomination. Goldwater could take advantage of the 
conservative network already taking shape by using their passion to appoint delegates 
outside of the norm, many of whom would not be party regulars loyal to leadership. They 
would not go to San Francisco to vote for anyone else, and no matter what they would 
vote for their candidate. When Phyllis Schlafly, author of A Choice Not an Echo, became 
a delegate for Illinois there could be no doubt that she would vote Goldwater. White’s 
strategy depended on getting conservatives into the lowest levels of party positions. This 
included at the precinct level as well as county and state positions, all of them needed to 
be put in play for conservatives to have a chance. Winning these positions would draw 
little attention from either larger party affiliates or from the public. At the precinct 
caucuses, winning depended on a commitment to see the process through.  
Conservatives had waited in the wings for years to have their opportunity, now 
was the moment to pull together at their opponents weak points. As William Rusher, 
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editor of the National Review, made clear to Goldwater himself, “Our project was 
designed from the outset to build up conservative strength at the 1964 convention, and 
was not centered on a particular candidacy.”251 Conservatives harbored a resentment 
towards party leadership stretching back to at least 1952 after the drama surrounding the 
nomination of Robert Taft. Rockefeller and Dewey, and others on the Council on Foreign 
Relations had earned the reputation of working the levers of power to force Eisenhower 
to the top of the list of candidates. Over a decade later, resentment among members of the 
right wing of the party kept them watching for another coup – especially the nomination 
of Rockefeller or Nixon over their nominee. Conservative newspaper columnists floated 
the idea of starting a new Conservative Party in the event that either of them should rise 
to the top of the ticket.252 Paranoia would not be an apt description for their emotions 
since strong evidence existed that Republican leadership had a history of deploying such 
tactics. In 1964, the prevailing view held that the results of the primaries were by no 
means binding; they could even be supplanted by the will of key members of the party.  
With their eyes locked on the convention from the start, regional directors John 
Grenier in the South and Stephen Shadegg in the West rallied their foot soldiers to get 
into precinct meetings so that delegates favorable to Goldwater could be sent to the 
county conventions.253 Consider the example of Fairfax County, Virginia. Located across 
the Potomac River from Washington, D.C., more a northern than southern city, and not a 
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place that Goldwater might be expected to win. Jack MacDonald, a former member of the 
Republican National Committee’s staff, led the Republican organization and saw the 
threat that Goldwater posed. He wrote and called other Republicans to stop the Goldwater 
forces from taking over the precinct conventions, but no one came to his aid. In fact, in 
Virginia any registered voter could participate, thus even Democrats could vote in the 
Republican election. Still, only about one hundred people participated in each district 
election. At the most crucial election in the Lake Barcroft District, Goldwater supporters 
won by one vote, giving them two Goldwater delegates to send to the convention in San 
Francisco.254 A conservative victory came by a razor thin margin. 
White’s political brilliance lay in the way that he thumbed his nose at the 
traditional methods of winning an election. His strategy did not rely on winning over the 
Jack MacDonald’s of America. Instead, he captured the hearts and minds of a group that 
could not be bought. Goldwater supporters shared his views on pushing a stronger 
laissez-faire economic policy, weakening the power of the federal government to enforce 
broad mandates, and standing up to the rising tide of communism. McCarthyism may 
have been gone, but the after-effects still lingered. It is ironic to note that the tactics that 
the Goldwater people used, such as infiltrating meetings or using voting procedures to 
delay and eventually vote out their opposition, came from the communists . White 
witnessed the communists’ loyalty to their cause, a loyalty that did not begin during the 
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campaign or end on election night.255 Conservatives had to show determination to survive 
when they did not possess the finances or the blessing of party leadership.     
 From out of the countryside, letters streamed into political offices expressing their 
antipathy. From Texas, a hotel owner charged that Democrats no longer stood for the 
ideas of Jefferson and Jackson. Roosevelt’s New Deal put the country on the path to 
socialism by opening the floodgates of peak spending and government intervention. 
Delving further into the conspiratorial, the author accused Truman of giving too much 
money to the rest of the world, then firing a heroic general, while engaging in a war in 
Korea to keep the country from sinking into an economic recession. Kennedy picked up 
the mantle, weakening America with a misadventure in Vietnam, a fiasco in Cuba, and 
rupturing society by pushing an agenda that defended minorities. He ruined the image of 
America abroad in the face foreign affairs that required more resolute leadership.256 This 
particular letter, though highly combative in tone and accusations, should be noted for 
coming from a small business owner in a burgeoning region of the country who 
committed himself to changing his party affiliation.  
Another less aggressive letter, serves to highlight the gap in leadership that many 
rural voters felt. Describing himself as not having much education, a voter from Dillon, 
South Carolina wondered if anyone could make sense of the actions of the government. 
Kennedy’s tragic death shocked and saddened him, but Johnson had to carry on. To his 
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dismay, elected politicians seemed to be giving in to the State Department and Supreme 
Court, preferring to send money abroad to communist countries who wanted to buy guns 
to kill Americans and their allies. He closed his letter by asking Senator Thurmond to 
“tell a God-fearing man who also loves his America as you, what he can do to bring 
America back to us and what our forefathers died for.”257 A woman in Pasadena, 
California wrote to defend Goldwater as a genuine visionary, someone ahead of the 
mainstream. She stressed that conservativism did not mean a return to pre-modernity. On 
the contrary, she stated, Goldwater was modern. Mainstream politicians attacked him 
because he proposed an alternative and he had grassroots support that they did not. 
“That’s why you can’t keep those grass roots from growing high to the sky, spreading 
like a benign prairie fire across our nation,” she stated.258 Consider these letters together, 
and a portrait takes shape. 
Conservatives longed for a candidate that they could get behind in large numbers. 
The John Birch Society and the YAF symbolized the disenchanted, the outsiders 
considered too square to be anything like the kind of outsider that society began to 
embrace by the end of the decade. It cannot be understated the significance these groups 
played on the election, without them White’s plan would likely have come to a halt short 
of completion. They are often described as the radical right or as extremists. The word 
“radical” is Latin for “root,” therefore a radical is someone who takes political ideas to 
their roots. They are committed to changing fundamental political structures, not only 
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superficial ones. Labeling someone a radical suggests that the person is not being 
rational, that they are operating outside of acceptable social standards of either thought or 
action. After the war, industrialization and rapid economic growth occurred within an 
abnormal climate of anti-communism propelled the growth of the radical right. As a 
consequence of changes in the population, Americans spread out to the far corners of the 
country. In places like California, Texas, and Arizona small-town conservatives jelled. A 
new business class began to emerge in the Sun Belt states, drawn to conservativism by 
their distrust for the eastern elite, their animosity towards the hoarding of resources in the 
industrial states, and the use of the federal government to maintain the establishment.259 
Some of these radicals became members of the John Birch Society or the YAF, and at 
least many of them were familiar with their ideas or knew someone who was a member. 
Goldwater’s campaign called forth these iconoclastic voters. They understood their 
alienation could be the spark for burning down tradition and starting something new.       
 
Segregation, Reinvention, and Other Primaries  
 One month after the New Hampshire primary, Rockefeller operatives sent word to 
Albany of a change on the campaign trail. Barry Goldwater was no longer acting like the 
Barry Goldwater from before. After New Hampshire, he reassessed and improved his 
campaign strategy. During the last few weeks of March, each speech that he made 
focused on a single issue whether it was Lyndon Johnson and Bobby Baker or 
Agriculture or Civil Rights. He kept his focus for that particular audience and moved on. 
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He spoke with confidence using catchy phrases, taking difficult themes and packaging 
them into short descriptive words, making it easier for the average person to understand 
his emotionally packed language. He did not talk about isolated ideas or controversies or 
abstractions, he stuck to a script that avoided academic language and hammered home his 
point on important national issues.  
After speeches, a host would allow a few questions, many of which appeared to 
be planted. While in Portland, newsmen travelling with the candidate were not allowed to 
ask questions so that local reporters could be given an “equal opportunity.” Local 
reporters complained that they were made to participate in a Goldwater commercial 
without prior notification or consent. They objected to questions appearing on TV before 
being published in their local papers. They objected to possible editing by a political 
candidate resulting in a distortion or alteration of what actually happened. An entire thirty 
minute conference telecast on a Portland TV station aired in the afternoon, and then was 
repeated again later in the week on a second TV station with a paid political broadcast 
label. The latter time was paid for by the Oregon Goldwater for President Committee. 
Steve Sattig, Goldwater’s Oregon Campaign coordinator, defended the decision by 
claiming that editing was “not planned” for the conference. This did not mean it was not 
done, since newsmen knew it was televised. Sattig admitted he did have some reporters 
ask specific questions, but as he claimed, he wanted to clear up some misunderstandings 
and that others were free to ask whatever they wanted.260  
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After a meeting with Eisenhower, Goldwater began to claim that the former 
president approved of his message on key issues like the Bobby Baker investigation, 
missile defense, extremism, and the need for party unity. To him, anyone who raised the 
issue of the John Birch Society was being “hysterical.” He soft-pedalled his extreme 
positions so as to change the dialogue in the national conversation. Most damaging to 
Rockefeller, Goldwater continually emphasized that he was still married to the same 
woman for over thirty years, that he campaigned with his family, and spoke on the issue 
of family solidarity. He called Rockefeller a “hot-dog eating, blintz-eating, back-slapping 
candidate” who increased New York government expenditures by 67% during his two 
terms, implying he would do the same as president.261 The race had shifted, and 
Rockefeller’s opponent grew stronger. 
Goldwater’s shift in presentation was matched by his shift in tactics, and it gave 
the appearance of a candidate seeking to redefine himself. Unconvinced, Rockefeller’s 
people managed to compile a list of his opponent’s extremist views. They crafted a 
number of issues on which to attack Goldwater on that they believed could help the 
governor’s campaign recover. They did not have to go back too far to find quotes. At a 
press conference in Concord, New Hampshire in January, Goldwater responded to the 
question of whether “He (Supreme Commander of NATO) should be able to fire an 
atomic tactical weapon without reference to the White House,” by saying, “That’s my 
opinion.” When asked on Meet the Press two days earlier, whether he would renounce 
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the nuclear test-ban treaty if the he were President, Goldwater replied, “If it appeared to 
be to our advantage to test in the atmosphere, yes, I would do it.”262 Hanging the 
extremist label on Goldwater like an albatross would not be a problem for Rockefeller 
should he decide to go forward with the idea. For years, Goldwater made speeches, 
published books, and answered questions with the same rhetoric. People either loved him 
or despised him for it. He spoke his mind and he appeared genuine; voters often cited his 
authenticity as one of his most admirable characteristics. If anything, he was consistent. 
He sang the same tune over and over again. In Conscience of a Conservative, he wrote, 
“Accordingly, we should withdraw diplomatic recognition from all Communist 
governments, including that of the Soviet Union.”263 Again in Why Not Victory, “the 
government of the United States should declare that if the United Nations votes to admit 
Red China, our government will, from that moment until the action is revoked, suspend 
its political and financial support of the United Nations.”264 Goldwater might be able to 
deceive someone not privy to the Senator’s career, but for campaign watchers, he could 
not undo his reputation overnight. Of course, he did he intend to do anything so dramatic. 
His campaign staff realized that if he won a few key primaries before winning the 
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nomination, he would need to shift to the center to appeal to a larger base. They insisted 
that was not a regional candidate or simply a candidate of marginal support.265 
Complicating the matter, a bill that would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
reached the Senate floor at the end of March. As part of the bill, discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was prohibited, including in schools, places of 
employment, and public accommodations. Southern politicians such as Georgia 
Democratic Senator Richard Russell lined up to oppose the legislation, “We will resist to 
the bitter end any measure or any movement which would have a tendency to bring about 
social equality and intermingling and amalgamation of the races in our [Southern] 
states.”266 Goldwater agreed with the southern opposition, holding firm to his view that 
the federal government could not remedy the issue of race relations through the passage 
of law. He would go on to equate the passage of the bill and its enforcement to the 
creation of a police state. On this particular issue, Rockefeller continued to refer to the 
Republican Party as the party of Lincoln with a heritage of freedom and equality for all 
men. Under Eisenhower, the first two civil rights bills since Reconstruction had passed 
into law. According to a poll in February, 80% of House Republicans supported the final 
passage of the bill while 61% of House Democrats supported it. Over in the Senate, 71% 
of Republicans gave their approval compared to 54% of Democrats. During the first and 
second attempts to kill the bill when it reached the Judiciary Committee, Goldwater failed 
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to vote with the majority of Republicans.267 It is tempting to say now that he was on the 
wrong side of history, but such phrases are not apt for the situation because the phrase 
implies that history follows a linear path, invoking another term like “progress.” This is a 
slippery slope, for the past is riddled with moments when progress turned on itself, 
leading to a horrific outcome. For example, scientific and technological progress helped 
lead to both World Wars and the slaughter of millions of people. Instead, it can be 
concluded that Goldwater, by opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and assuming the 
argument of protection against the federal government, became, whether by design or by 
consequence, a candidate that bigots and genuine racists saw as their leading man 
amongst the Republican field. To be sure, Goldwater took a principled stance against the 
Civil Rights Act based on the Constitution rather than racism, and he maintained his 
initial stance on the issue throughout his candidacy. As he described it, “The federal 
Constitution does not require the States to maintain racially mixed schools. Despite the 
recent holding of the Supreme Court, I am firmly convinced – not only that integrated 
schools are not required – but that the Constitution does not permit any interference 
whatsoever by the Federal Government in the field of education.”268 In 1957, Goldwater 
voted to kill Part III of the Eisenhower civil rights bill, which would have permitted the 
Attorney General to institute civil suits to protect 14th Amendment civil rights. A short 
time later, he supported nineteen controversial proposed amendments to the Eisenhower 
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1960 Civil Rights bill, voting with the die-hard Southern bloc 67% of the time.269 These 
are only a few examples that speak to the Senator’s public position on race, and there 
would be others in the run up to the nomination.  
After New Hampshire, the next primary came in Wisconsin. For the Republicans, 
this became a minor affair as favorite-son candidate, congressman John Byrnes won over 
99% of the vote. On the Democrat’s side, a curious development took place. Governor 
George C. Wallace of Alabama went into the supposedly liberal and progressive North 
campaigning on a platform of states’ rights and segregation, and found a stunning number 
of sympathetic voters. Wallace won over a quarter of a million votes, about 25% of the 
total in his race with Johnson. This was notable not for the president’s inevitable victory 
but for the timing of the primary and the turnout. The governor believed that his showing 
in Wisconsin indicated that both parties would have to “conservatize” their party 
platforms, and in defiance of stereotypes, a Northern strain of sympathy for the southern 
opposition to the Civil Rights Bill existed. “We have shaken the eyeteeth of every liberal 
in the country,” Wallace boasted. Columnists around the country fretted over the 
emergence of a grassroots campaign aimed at resisting civil rights. Where observers 
thought that civil rights had traction, they found that voters balked at the notion of 
equality. Northerners seemed to be saying that they supported a toned-down version of 
civil rights which did not impede on preexisting social norms. There were even 
disgruntled Republican voters who considered Goldwater to be too liberal and cast their 
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ballots for Wallace. In a survey of voters, they viewed Goldwater as “too soft on the 
Peace Corps,” he needed to “abolish the income taxers,” “abandon the UN-ers,” and 
“drop the bomb on the Communists now.”270 Wallace’s brief outburst on the national 
election scene caused a stir for campaign watchers. His ability to articulate the zeitgeist 
of an unknown number of voters harkened back to the days of Louisiana Governor Huey 
Long in his bid to amass power before his planned run against FDR.  
Attempting to wield control over the white opposition to civil rights would prove 
to be a dangerous affair. With each sit-in, demonstration, and protest march, angry white 
voters became convinced that social change would lead to their decline as the 
government continued to side against them. A backlash may have been inevitable, but 
politicians like Wallace inspired violence. His famous declaration, “Segregation now, 
segregation tomorrow, segregation forever,” gained him an audience with hatemongers 
bent on violent means to reach an uncivil end. Wallace, like Goldwater, opposed a 
powerful central government, exaggerating his opposition to civil rights by warning that 
the bill would mean a loss of personal freedom. Unlike Goldwater, Wallace gained a 
deserved reputation as a bigot. Often times he shielded himself under the argument of 
states’ rights only to retort with a discriminatory remark or downplay the cruelty of a 
church bombing. Over his career, he faced other segregationist opponents, some even 
more hardline than himself. By 1964, he seemed poised to make the leap into presidential 
politics by riding the backlash against civil rights. Time would tell how much strength the 
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segregationist governor possessed, but in the meantime, his performance rattled the 
leadership of both parties.  
 A week after Wisconsin, Goldwater squared off against Margaret Chase Smith in 
Illinois. Rockefeller dared not challenge Goldwater in a Republican primary dominated 
by conservative downstate voters, nor did anyone else of much consequence. Lodge and 
Nixon remained undeclared. Goldwater needed to prove to Republicans that he could 
win, and Illinois, with 26 electoral votes, was a coveted prize. Women’s groups put 
Smith’s name on the ballot, hoping that she could elicit the kind of challenge that made 
her famous when she spoke out against Senator McCarthy. For Goldwater, her campaign 
would bring a level of prestige to the race without risking a defeat. More importantly, a 
write-in victory like the one in New Hampshire would not be possible as the Illinois 
Lodge group soon discovered. Under the Illinois state election code, county officials did 
not need to count write-in votes. In the end, Goldwater won with slightly over 500,000. 
Reporters jumped on the disparity in totals, noting that Smith received 25% against his 
60%. They labeled the contest a “defeat” for Goldwater for not reaching a higher tally. 
Goldwater responded acidly to reporter’s inquires, “I’ll settle for 60 percent any time.” 
As a footnote, the official canvass indicated that he won 49% of the total Republican vote 
meaning that over two hundred thousand ballots did not enter the record. Also 
noteworthy, of the forty-eight delegates at stake, thirty-three could be counted on as 
Goldwater supporters with the remaining few edging towards him in the delegate count. 
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Illinois did not inspire the inevitability of victory nor did it extinguish the hopes of 
dedicated supporters. It simply ensured that the battle was far from won.271  
According to a survey conducted by the Associated Press (AP) beginning in 
April, Republican county chairmen, town leaders, and other party leaders believed that 
Nixon would prevail to become the party nominee at the convention. This was the third 
such poll taken by the AP with Goldwater winning the first poll in October, but the 
second in December after Kennedy’s assassination caused a sharp decline in his position. 
Rockefeller remained as the preferred candidate for county leaders, but they no longer 
held an optimistic view of his chances. Most interesting of all, while most respondents 
believed Nixon would likely win the nomination, Goldwater was the overall preferred 
choice. However, 223 of the 1,006 respondents replied “no opinion” to the question of 
who was most likely to win the nomination. For both sides, the conservatives and the 
liberals, New Hampshire did not mean much to them or so they said, though confidence 
in Goldwater’s campaign abilities varied based on ideology.272 Their concern lay in the 
mega primary state of California, a winner-take-all contest. Till then, they would have to 
wait while the other primaries captured the spotlight.       
 As the candidates hopped from one primary to the next, the lens on the outcome 
of the nomination flared in and out of focus. Lodge won New Jersey on April 21 then 
Massachusetts a week later in which no presidential contenders appeared on the ballot. It 
became a write-in contest with Lodge carrying the day. Goldwater finished second, 
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Nixon third, and Rockefeller fourth proving nothing for any of the leaders. That same day 
in Pennsylvania, another write-in primary, Scranton claimed victory. Goldwater 
supporters in the state wanted to place his name on the ballot, but the pro-Scranton State 
Chairman Craig Truax, with orders from Scranton, bluffed Goldwater supporters from 
trying to rally voters to their side. Clif White dared not risk a duel with them, though the 
final count indicated that Scranton’s support was less than expected, resulting in only 
three out of sixty-four delegates going to Goldwater. This result lent further credibility to 
the idea within the Conservatives’ ranks that opposition to Goldwater from third 
candidate would be futile. With the primary season in full swing, Goldwater continued to 
pick up delegates in non-primary states. Delegates in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and 
Louisiana each pledged their support to him. Delegates in Georgia, Kansas, and North 
Carolina followed suit by committing their votes.273 On May 2, Texans threw their 
support behind Goldwater in his best showing of the primaries. Rockefeller knew that he 
would not come close to contesting in Texas, so he stayed away. Afterwards, the press 
underscored Lodge’s write-in, noting that before the primary, Goldwater’s strength 
should put him close to 100%. When he came up short, it did not look impressive. On 
May 5, Ohio governor James Rhodes won his state as a favorite son in an election all but 
ignored by the press and the other candidates. Goldwater won Iniana with two-thirds of 
the vote, but his victory came only against perennial candidate Harold Stassen. Again, 
Goldwater failed to impress as a vote for Stassen translated to dissent for the 
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conservative’s views despite being considered a stronghold for his movement.274 By now, 
liberal Republicans could see that their main opposition would not stumble on his own. 
Goldwater proved that he could win in various regions of the country, and clearly he had 
a following behind him. Exactly how robust his following could not be determined until a 
later date. With the California primary looming ahead, liberals would need a candidate to 
step forward. 
 
Rockefeller Makes his Move  
 William Rusher once mused, “Every movement needs a villain. For the GOP 
Right, Nelson Rockefeller was it.”275 Even in Rockefeller’s home state of New York, a 
Conservative Party emerged in 1962 to thwart his reelection. Conservative Party 
members opposed his stance on civil rights, among other things. There was no love lost 
between the two sides. Rockefeller was often quoted as expressing his dismay at having 
his party loyalty called into question. He believed that it was the other way around, that 
the Far Right were the ones that did not belong in the G.O.P. After all, liberals believed 
they had more in common with the roots of the Republican Party; namely, Hamilton, 
Clay, Lincoln, and Teddy Roosevelt who in turn inspired Wilkie, Dewey, and 
Eisenhower. Goldwaterites claimed Jeffersonian roots, and they subscribed to a broader 
definition of liberty. It would not be a stretch to call either one an extremist to the degree 
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that both represented almost logical opposites of each other. Javits and the liberals were 
on one side and Goldwater and the conservatives on the other.  
From the outset, Rockefeller misunderstood his status within the Republican 
Party. He did not understand or want to understand that he was the bane of the Far Right. 
His supporters were the Establishment that key elements of the Republican Party wanted 
to move away from. By courting lawyers, businessman, bankers, ethnic minorities, and 
the professional class, he encouraged further scorn upon his campaign. His tactics may 
have worked in the 1940s and 1950s, but by 1964 the path to the nomination no longer 
hinged on winning over state officials. In the past, it made sense to lean towards the New 
Deal, which millions of Americans did. For the Republican Party to survive during the 
1930s and 1940s, it needed to link up with the popular program. Clif White pivoted away 
from this outmoded approach, away from the Eastern Establishment, and understood that 
delegates mattered most. They could not be turned against the Goldwater movement. 
George Hinman charmed the wrong people. He thought he could pull the right strings at 
the appropriate time and balloons would drop on the governor’s head at the convention. 
Worse still, because of the lack of primary victories, various crises going on in New 
York, and sagging enthusiasm there was a perception that their presidential campaign did 
not match the sophisticated nature of their state organization. Rumblings within the inner 
circle placed the blame on the wonkish approach taken to move Rockefeller forward in 
the polls. Too many resources, too many experts, too many opinions, and not enough 
leaders or instinct.276 Rockefeller liked to be seen as a man with ideas, a grand vision for 
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the nation. He moved too far ahead, concerning himself with running against Johnson 
when he needed to start with rest of the Republican field. Considering him in this fashion 
could lead to the conclusion that he was an egotistical playboy pouring money into a 
doomed campaign when he should have spent his time, money, and energy on guiding the 
Republican Party through its own coming of age.277 Rockefeller did not want to do that.  
Only four years earlier in 1960, Robert Kennedy judged Rockefeller as most 
likely to win the White House had he decided to run.278 Rockefeller did possess the 
qualities that someone needs to become president, but he had horrible timing and was 
never able to pull it all together. He exited the 1964 Presidential campaign season a 
changed man, but before the malice in San Francisco, his beliefs, background, and 
funding made him a formidable leader. By May 1964, his chances of winning the 
nomination seemed overly optimistic at best and delusional at worst. For all intents and 
purposes, he no longer had a reasonable chance of getting his name at the top of the 
ticket. Too much time had passed without moving the needle. Only the remotest 
possibility remained for him to lead the Republican Party in November. All was not lost, 
however, even if he along with those closest to him suspected the worst. The finale was 
not cast in stone. Goldwater could have lost. He underwhelmed in his victories in Illinois, 
Texas, and Indiana. Plus, the issue of integration and states’ rights clouded his prospects 
given that one of the main strikes against him was his inability to appeal to the nation at 
large. He could argue that he settled the debate over whether his campaign only had 
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regional appeal, but he most certainly did not show an ability to contribute to the 
expansion of the Republican Party. On the contrary, the extremist label stuck to him so 
easily because of his views, which, in turn, stunted his growth. If Rockefeller or any other 
candidate for that matter wanted to block Goldwater’s way to the nomination, they 
needed to act fast. 
 Nixon took the next shot at the Goldwater campaign in Nebraska. Considered 
home territory for Goldwater, most of the state’s top Republicans backed the candidate, 
trumpeting his political good fortune. Much to his delight, initially no major candidate 
revealed themselves as wanting to contest the primary. That changed after the election in 
Texas proved once again that a write-in candidate could make waves in the press. 
Lodge’s second place finish, matched by his initial success in New Hampshire and strong 
showing in Pennsylvania, gave Nixon pause to consider his own candidacy. Nixon’s 
notoriety among key officials and resonance with Republican voters in the past gave him 
the opportunity to demonstrate his talent for getting votes. Moreover, Nebraskans could 
be relied upon to execute a write-in strategy as evidenced by the 75,000 write-in votes 
Nixon received in 1960, and in 1952 when Taft netted 79,000 and Eisenhower 66,000 
write-in votes to finish ahead of the only candidate on the ballot that year. Under the 
guidance of former Secretary of the Interior and newspaper publisher Fred Seaton, Nixon 
organized a mail campaign to drum up support. Their tactics emulated Lodge’s New 
Hampshire effort by explaining how to implement their plan on Election Day. After 
officials counted the last ballot, they declared Goldwater the winner with 49%, Nixon 
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came in second with 35%, and Lodge rounded out the top three with 16%.279 As before, 
Goldwater disappointed only this time he did not even earn a majority of the votes. 
Political observers expected him to win, but they wanted him to crush his competition. 
Neither Nixon nor Lodge had a formal campaign, but combined they out-producedly the 
supposed mighty conservative in a deep red state.  
 West Virginia also held its primary on that same Tuesday, and it resulted in a 
Rockefeller victory. His people were considering the idea of repackaging his image in an 
effort to distinguish him from the competition without appearing haughty or out of touch. 
Advisors suggested that he position himself as the down-to-earth optimist, someone who 
faced problems realistically, yet knew something could be done about them.280 As the 
policy wonk, he failed. While watching him on a television show, viewers could see a 
strong, confident figure with a sound memory, but during speeches he got too caught up 
in the multitude of facts that his staff presented to him. From the start of his tour of the 
state, he tried to connect with the people. He visited a coal mine in McDowell County, 
gave a non-political speech in Morgantown, and toured with Governor Cecil Underwood 
through the northern part of the state. His venture to the southern part, a heavily 
Democratic coal-mining region, was the first for a Republican presidential candidate 
since the New Deal.281 From there, he zeroed in on creating jobs for small businesses and 
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in the construction industry while trying to dispel the negative aspects of the state’s 
reputation. He declared, “I have seen more pride in West Virginia than I have 
poverty.”282 It worked. Goldwater leaders in the state urged Republicans to boycott the 
primary. Goldwater did make appearances in the state, but his nor anyone else’s name 
was placed on the ballot.  
Rumors began to circulate that Goldwater had suffered a nervous breakdown 
before the primary, causing him to skip campaigning to relax. As documented by his wife 
in an article for Good Housekeeping, her husband suffered a nervous breakdown in 1937 
while working at the family department store, and again later under the same 
conditions.283 Adding to the speculation, Goldwater vastly cut back his campaign 
schedule before taking time off in a West Virginia hotel. Similar stories of him taking 
medication during a 1958 campaign and before major rallies in 1964 hinted that the 
rumors may have some basis in fact.284 Whether or not the rumors were true, and if so, 
how much this affected his later campaign, is unclear.  
During his assessment of Rockefeller, the influential editor of the Beckley Post-
Herald noted that the governor seemed more interested in “slapping Goldwater” than 
winning the nomination. Based on his talks with the Rockefeller’s supporters, he 
concluded that remarriage continued to be an issue with voters and that without that issue 
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he probably would be the nominee.285 Rockefeller’s late arrival into the winner’s circle 
did not create much buzz in the media nor did his resounding tally add much in the way 
of lending credibility to the notion that he could win the nomination. It did however give 
the appearance of momentum heading into the next primary. 
 Oregon mattered. With the most coveted state still to go, Rockefeller needed a 
win. Unlike the other primaries, the Oregon secretary of state placed the names of each 
candidate on the ballot, declared or otherwise meaning Nixon, Lodge, Scranton, and 
Romney all appeared on the ballot. The only way to remove a candidate’s name was to 
sign an affidavit pledging not to become a candidate in November. Romney pulled out of 
the race so that he could keep his promise to the Republican insiders who got him elected 
in Michigan.286 Seeing a potential legal battle ahead if he did decide to run, Scranton 
decided not to sign the pledge, but insisted that his staff not promote him because he 
wanted a legitimate draft campaign. Craig Truax, Scranton’s state party chairman, 
ignored the instructions and began to promote him anyway. When Scranton found out, he 
squashed the effort. Scranton did not want to campaign in Oregon, period. Meanwhile, 
Nixon eyed another write-in opportunity. He reasoned that he would do well based on his 
victory over Kennedy in the state four years earlier and his connections to state leaders. 
He authorized a public relations consultant to gage interest among the locals. 
Unfortunately, Nixon’s supporters could no longer help him: they had divided themselves 
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into the Goldwater and Rockefeller camps.287 After looking like a winner after Nebraska, 
his political heartbeat flatlined.   
 Reporting from the state, Rockefeller’s staff summed up the experience for the 
governor. Oregon voters seemed to be low intensity people who lacked personal 
involvement in politics had little interest in the issues. Interviewers had to prod them to 
even mention any issues during their interviews. They liked Nixon for his strong 
knowledge of foreign countries and international affairs. Voters liked Goldwater, but the 
more he said, the more they began not to like him. Real enthusiasm for him did not exist 
the same way it did in New Hampshire, and his movement did not have the backing of 
the locals in the same way it did in other parts of the country. Researchers noted that after 
New Hampshire, Lodge did not have a bandwagon effect, he was like a “2-D knight in 
shining armor.” People tended to idealize him, but most people did not know anything 
about him, and many did not know where he stood on the issues or cared to learn about 
him. Based on this research, Rockefeller’s slogan in Oregon became “He Cares Enough 
to Come.” Researchers recommended that the campaign should educate the voters on 
Lodge, he was not their knight nor was he all that smart to begin with. Once, after being 
complemented by a fellow ambassador for how he handled himself on a recent trip 
abroad, ambassador Lodge remarked, “Well, I’ve got a shallow mind, but I can usually 
think of a quick answer.” Reading the tea leaves, Rockefeller’s staff foresaw both Lodge 
and Goldwater falling by the wayside. There would be little to gain from criticizing them. 
For Rockefeller, a bit of good news showed up in the report. While his family troubles 
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did hurt his chances, few people saw him as too liberal. Before the election, the majority 
of interview respondents said that the remarriage did not bother them. Where New 
Hampshire voters often referred to Happy as “that woman,” Oregon voters did not.288 
They believed that he could beat Johnson in the general election, but they wanted him to 
show interest in their concerns without coming across a slick politician. Campaign 
advisor George Hatzes told Hugh Morrow, “It would behoove the governor to speak over 
their heads in lofty tones because this is the image which the Rockefeller’s enjoy 
throughout the country. When the governor utters statements and speeches which have 
the professional taint, it removes him from that pedestal and becomes another politician.” 
Goldwater on the other hand, reserved his abuse for Rockefeller in a stately fashion, but 
kept his attention on the administration giving him a more elevated tone than the others. 
By their calculations, the candidate needed to “return to the pedestal enjoyed by the 
Rockefeller legend.”289 This debate within the governor’s campaign gets to the crux of 
his appeal, hence the difficulty of pulling all of the different parts together to vault him 
into a higher echelon. He was a compelling figure with a pedigree unlike any other in 
America; yet, his advisors often times wanted him to straddle the line between being a 
man of the people and a cut above the rest.   
 Less than twenty-four hours before voters went to the polls, Rockefeller told a 
television audience, “The Republican Party faces the danger of being dominated by a 
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radical extremism out of tune with the time and contrary to the very principles upon 
which the party was founded.”290 Another slug to the chin of his opponent, but Goldwater 
was nowhere to be found, having decided that he would not fight back in the state after 
all. His absence left room for guesses on his mental condition, though nothing could be 
confirmed. Rockefeller’s campaign had crisscrossed the state. In the four days leading up 
to the election, he gave twenty-four speeches in nine communities, and his hands had 
become swollen and calloused from shaking so many hands. He looked exhausted, 
thinner, and generally worn-out, but it was not in vain.291 He won with 33%, Lodge 
finished second with 27%, with Goldwater and Nixon earned 18% and 17% respectively.  
In the immediate aftermath, it appeared that Lodge, a longshot to begin with, 
would not be able to get the nomination. Pollsters overvalued his chances: the Harris poll 
missed badly in the weeks before the election by seeing an upswing for Lodge and only a 
minor turn for Rockefeller. Lodge never did have the resources, the money, or the insight 
from political pros that his opponents did. He was a phantom born out of a vague notion 
that he would swoop in and save the day when in actuality, he was nothing of the sort. 
Nixon’s absentee write-in campaign came up lame ending his bid for the nomination 
should a brokered convention take place. Oddly enough, because he did not campaign at 
all and despite finishing with a miniscule 2% of the vote, Scranton, in the weird logic of 
politics, was still alive with a shot at being the nominee as a compromise candidate. 
Goldwater performed fairly well considering his decision to skip the state in favor of 
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keeping his mojo going in California. The problem for him became that he lost badly to 
Rockefeller who he would run against in the next primary. After Oregon, the field 
shrunk, but the enthusiasm on the campaign trail was about to reach a crescendo. 
California would become the battleground for control over the heart of the Republican 
Party. 
 
Chapter 6: California and the Republican National Convention 
 
You Don’t Have a Kingmaker without Someone to Make a King Out Of 
 Rockefeller’s win in Oregon emphasized the fractured nature of the Republican 
Party. As his campaign slogan made clear, he visited the state when no one else would. 
Lodge remained silent on whether or not he would formally join the race. He opted 
instead to stay thousands of miles away in Vietnam to brood over the impending 
American escalation with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. A few weeks before the 
primary, Nixon traveled to Saigon for a picture with Lodge, inspiring one observer to 
comment that Nixon had “a fantastic talent for muscling in.”292 Upon discovering that he 
stood no chance in Oregon, Nixon promptly went on vacation. In Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, Scranton continued to execute his strategy of giving speeches and talking 
about the election with no plans to run without a draft campaign. After recovering from 
his reported mental exhaustion in West Virginia and sensing that Oregon would not aid 
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him in his path to the nomination, Goldwater attended a raucous event at Madison Square 
Garden. Amidst a colorful display of balloons and “Goldwater Girls” dancing in the 
aisles, Goldwater rose to the podium as a crowd of over 18,000 whistled, stomped, and 
cheered. He warned of the threat against states’ rights, offering up the line, “You can’t 
pass a law that will make me like you or you like me. This is a problem of the heart and 
the mind, not the problem of the lawyer, the problem of the Senator, the Congressman or 
the President.” Applause followed with each barb whether against “Yo-Yo McNamara” 
or the Democratic Administration intent on turning the states into “50 pigeonholes in a 
new Washington bureau.” The next day, he made his case against the federal government 
in a half-hour nationwide taped television program. Afterwards, he set off to California to 
take part in a $10-a-person “Cruise with Goldwater” from Los Angeles to Catalina Island, 
twenty-four miles off the coastline.293 Rockefeller may have won in Oregon, but 
Goldwater was literally cruising into the California primary. 
 California in 1964 was a case study in how America grew and transformed 
following World War II. In the post war period, the state’s population almost doubled. 
Since 1929, it more than tripled in growth. During the war, broad-scale industrialization 
revolutionized the state thus providing a basis for its expansion. Huge aircraft and other 
defense plants and their suppliers changed the state’s prerogative from light consumer 
goods to heavy products. This accounted for the rise in steel and chemical markets along 
with an increased focus on consumer durable and nondurable products. Any decline in 
defense or space activity would wound the local economy. In 1962, defense became the 
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nation’s largest business, and between 1946 and 1965, 62% of the federal budget went 
towards defense.294 Federal government contracts were the bread and butter of the 
economy. National defense and government spending became major components of 
prosperity.295 It is ironic to note that these industries, which built the communities, came 
out of the New Deal, and yet received unbridled criticism from conservatives. They 
adhered to an anti-communist, libertarian ethos that railed against some the institutions 
that made their ascent possible. This is not to imply that conservatives did not have allies 
in government as there were always sympathizers and instigators who championed their 
cause within Washington D.C. For example, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover’s book 
Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It influenced 
likeminded conservatives who also enjoyed reading Robert Welch. To their credit, the 
Far Right brought together various strands of people ranging from the ordinary to the 
elite, and from the conspiracy driven to government structuralists. Their ideology bound 
them as America underwent change on a large scale; changes in international status, 
changes in societal relations, and changes in demographics. California became a political 
setting for all of this to take place.  
 Three days after Oregon, a memo came across the Rockefeller’s desk with a 
strategy. The author called for Rockefeller to not only win California to have a chance at 
the nomination, but Rockefeller needed to make a play for other delegates outside the 
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state. This would include reaching out to delegations in favorite son states like Wisconsin 
and Ohio. He also needed to make frequent contact with uncommitted delegates. During 
the remaining weeks, he should push for maximum television and magazine coverage 
with an eye on raising his national position in the polls. Furthermore, supporters should 
be instructed how to carry out off-the-floor activities at the convention such as voting on 
the party platform. As a model for success, they should follow Wilkie’s 1940 
experience.296 Campaign advisor Roswell Perkins pressed the governor to make civil 
rights a critical issue in the state. Civil rights presented an opportunity to end 
discrimination and promote equality as part of the American dream that the nation’s 
founders, and Republican forefathers, set out to achieve. Opponents like Goldwater 
created fear instead of understanding, and Democrats were more divided than many 
realized on this issue.297  
With that in mind, the overarching issue during the campaign needed to be about 
the power of the federal government. Rockefeller represented a vision of America that 
placed its faith in institutions. A notion that the government could be trusted to do the 
right thing for the people. This idea won considerable praise in the aftermath of the war. 
America proved its leadership to the world by being the best organized, most disciplined 
nation, and by avoiding the devastation of its rivals as each one of them destroyed the 
others economy. Rockefeller’s fundamental beliefs in the power of the government 
through spending and enacting social change cut to the heart of the dilemma that 
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Americans faced during the Cold War. As he often said, the problem was not a social 
issue. The cultural conformity of the 1950s had made way for the slow and steady 
progress that emerged during the early 1960s. The problem lay on the economic side. 
Democrats spent money, but they did not spend money well. They put their faith in 
institutions, as evidenced later by such public works as the Civilian Conservation Corps 
during the Great Depression and later still by the Great Society. Only Rockefeller 
believed that Democrats were not up to the task of continuing the financial boom of the 
post-war era. 
 To articulate his message and improve his standing among voters, Rockefeller 
hired a Los Angeles firm called Spencer-Roberts & Associates. William Roberts and 
Stuart Spencer ran the firm and made their business by managing political campaigns. 
Started in 1960, a string of success brought the firm national attention. Liberal 
Republican Senator Thomas Kuchel hired Spencer-Roberts for his campaign in 1962. A 
year later, the firm helped elect a Republican congressman in a heavily Democratic 
district of Los Angeles. On election day, they located and brought registered Republicans 
to the polls who had not voted by midafternoon.298 Drawn to their success, George 
Hinman visited Spencer-Roberts during the summer of 1963 to ask for their help. They 
had a gift for turning a politician’s negatives into positives. Hinman desperately wanted 
them to do the same for the governor. The problem was that the firm only wanted to work 
for candidates that they believed could win. When Hinman asked, they refused. That 
October, Rockefeller flew out to their offices and presented them with a $2 million 
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operating budget if they would work for him. They agreed. Right away, they snatched up 
key advertising space for billboards and posters. From there, Hinman took up residency 
in L.A.’s Ambassador Hotel, and got to work convincing the power structure of the need 
to stop the Goldwater campaign. He warned them that they could be witnessing the end 
of the Republican Party, the two-party system, and the economic strides made during the 
post-war era. Californians would go to the polls to elect a slate of delegates pledged to a 
candidate, not a candidate directly, so the delegates had to be convinced first. Hinman 
targeted San Francisco mayor George Christopher, Hollywood tycoon Jack Warner, and 
owners of the Los Angeles Times and Firestone tires.299 Rockefeller’s campaign strategy 
wanted to work the powerbrokers, not the voters themselves, a strategy at odds with the 
kind that Clif White envisioned for his candidate. The idea was not to ignore voters all 
together, but it was a two pronged strategy aimed first at the delegates and then at the 
voters.        
 In a survey from the middle two weeks in April conducted by his staff, 
Californians laid bare the obstacles that Rockefeller would have to overcome. Goldwater 
rated highest with southern Californians, men, and older voters. Rockefeller rated highest 
with northern Californians and lower income voters. Voters most strongly in support of 
Goldwater liked his conservative views on states’ rights, his idea of a decentralized 
federal government, and his promise to have less government control over businesses. 
Those on the opposite side referenced him as being too extreme or too conservative. One 
respondent said, “He’s too biased and opinionated – a Republican version of Harry 
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Truman. I think he’d get us in war too fast.” Another, “Because I think, as far as foreign 
policy (is concerned), our President has more power in using the nuclear bomb. He is too 
much for using it to suit me.” Close to 40% of respondents showed strong disapproval of 
Goldwater’s campaign. They responded that he was too critical, too negative, he talked 
too much, and said the wrong thing. Southern Californian Republicans, his biggest 
supporters, did not like the way he carried himself on the campaign trail. 
On the opposite side, respondents liked Rockefeller’s experience and ability, but 
detractors thought him too liberal. They frequently mentioned his personal life, his wealth 
or ties to big business, and considered him too ambitious. Most discouraging, 
Californians approved of Goldwater’s conservative positions and disapproved of 
Rockefeller’s liberal stance more so than voters in Oregon. Overall, Rockefeller’s liberal 
views received more negative attention than his personal life. On the issue of 
Rockefeller’s remarriage, almost two-thirds of respondents said they considered it his 
personal business and it would not concern them when deciding how to vote. However, 
his divorce would be a factor among women, middle-age voters, and among Republicans 
in southern California.300 It is clear that the subject would be unavoidable come election 
time. Too often it remained on the minds of voters. Right or wrong, it came to define how 
Rockefeller would be viewed in 1964, both as a politician and as a person. His image 
became like the Duke of Windsor, Edward VIII, who set off a constitutional crisis in the 
United Kingdom upon announcing that he wished to marry Wallis Simpson. As head of 
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the Church of England, he could not marry the twice divorced Ms. Simpson because of 
disapproval from the Church. Seeing the conflict ahead, the Duke of Windsor abdicated 
the throne after less than a year as king. He chose love over power. Rockefeller did not. 
Within his campaign, there continued to be nervous chatter over how the governor’s 
personal life would affect the election. He needed to stay out of the headlines. Though, 
unlike in New Hampshire, Happy was noticeably pregnant. By this point, she no longer 
campaigned with the governor and to stay within the confines of New York. His 
candidacy depended on everything going according to plan. There could be no let up, no 
disruptions. Little did he know, his nomination would not be for his campaign to decide.         
 
 They’re Already Here 
Southern California, particularly Orange County, proved to be a stronghold for 
Goldwater. Since the early 1960s, conservatives had opened numerous right-wing 
bookstores, and worked within their churches, schools, and communities as a 
countermeasure to liberal policies sweeping the country.301 Robert Welch’s far right ideas 
on the dark side of the government turned heads. Conservatives, already partial to 
distrusting either party’s administration in the post-war era, converted to a more cynical 
and paranoid brand of right-wing politics. Women played an integral role in the early 
days of John Birch Society in California by mobilizing within their communities and 
volunteering. A “ladies auxiliary” organized at the beginning of the decade to recall a 
“known communist” from the school board, which inspired the formation of the first 
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Anaheim chapter of the John Birch Society.302 Before then, many of the activists led a 
quiet suburban life. It was not until the heady days of the early 1960s that many of them 
became involved in preventing subversion. With each new layer piled on, the 
organization grew in size. Housewives were known to join the organization first and then 
bring their husbands into the group.303 In keeping with the times, they wanted more 
political participation. Other members of the John Birch Society included retired military 
officers, business executives, young people, and a smattering of haters and race baiters. 
They held regular meetings, expanded national membership, and had a continuing action 
program. Not all of the chapters preferred Goldwater. Some liked Strom Thurmond and 
others liked General Edwin Walker, a staunch conservative known for being the only 
U.S. general to resign in the 20th Century after angering both Republican and Democrat 
administrations.304 
By 1963, the John Birch Society had grown to between 20,000 and 100,000 
members. In addition, the society boasted 124 full-time paid employees, 40 full-time paid 
organizers, and 200 section leaders while also publishing a monthly magazine named 
American Opinion.305 Membership tended to include middle and upper middle class 
Protestants who were financially secure, educated, and had families and children. Large 
numbers of Catholics could be counted on as well. They were drawn to the organization’s 
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stance on fighting communism in Eastern Europe articulated by Catholic journals in Los 
Angeles and New York. Cardinal Richard Cushing endorsed the John Birch Society 
bringing credibility and support to the organization. Cushing had been a close friend of 
the Kennedy family and had shared the stage with the late president at his 
inauguration.306 Welch’s opposition to the civil rights movement kept African-Americans 
a minority within the group as black leaders such as Martin Luther King would later be 
labeled as a “troublemaker” and “favorite of the communists”.307 Birchers believed 
themselves to be the true defenders of patriotism, opponents were either conscious or 
unconscious agents of an international communist conspiracy.308 Their society demanded 
their time, energy, and dedication to educating Americans on the dangers of communism. 
Birchers equated the United States with ancient Rome adopting a pessimistic attitude that 
warned of the death of civilization if the lessons of history were not heeded. Communism 
was seen as the worst evil in the world while capitalism was championed as the greatest 
system civilization had ever produced. As a result, communism and capitalism were 
destined for a showdown. It was the job of the Birchers to use their political leverage to 
stop the advances of communism. They perceived communism as the central conflict of 
their age. If someone was not fully in agreement with the John Birch Society, then they 
were either a “dupe” or a communist agent.309 Welch created a permanently organized 
movement at the grassroots level focused on righting social turmoil brought on by 
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communists. A crucial element of the movement was the use of mass propaganda. Not 
only were Welch’s books made available to the general public through the organization, 
but Birchers also had an approved reading list that included Barry Goldwater’s 
Conscience of a Conservative as well as American Opinion and Review of the News 
which shaped the perspective of members.310 Pamphlets and reprints of magazine articles 
were distributed on subjects ranging from communism to race relations. Members 
appeared on television talk shows, discussion panels, and radio shows to propagate their 
opinions before a larger audience. Birchers spoke at college campuses, local civic 
associations, service clubs, veterans’ organizations, and state and county fairs.311 
Goldwater appealed to Southern California conservatives and far-right 
organizations with his stance on economic and social issues as well as his hardened views 
on communism. His campaign drew on preexisting mobilization and advanced it, thus 
expanding conservative grassroots influence.312 In June 1963, the 12th annual report of 
the California Senate Fact-Finding Subcommittee on Un-American Activities found that 
the John Birch Society was influential on American culture but not subversive. Based on 
its investigation, the subcommittee concluded that the society was not secret, fascist, 
subversive, un-American or anti-Semitic. Also noted in the report were reasons for 
joining the organization, “it simply appeared to (new members) to be the most effective, 
indeed the only, organization through which they could join in a national movement to 
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learn the truth about the Communist menace and then take some concerted action to 
prevent its spread.”313 Goldwater reached the same verdict. He wanted their support and 
they fit in naturally with his firebrand conservatism. Best of all, they were organized, 
committed, and connected enough to have a real impact on the outcome of the election. 
Without them, he would likely lose.  
Meanwhile, Republican leadership showed ambivalence or hostility towards the 
organization. Former president, Dwight Eisenhower feigned interest in the group, 
commenting, “I have no interest in the Birch Society. I know nothing about its 
organization. In my experience, I have handled other such movements as the Birch 
Society and I ignored them. I think that's the best policy."314 Richard Nixon went in a 
different direction from his former running mate by repeatedly condemning the group 
despite his loss of political alliances.315 Influential conservative and intellectual William 
F. Buckley locked himself in a bitter ideological dispute with the extremist wings of the 
Republican Party, specifically Robert Welch, and continued his criticism in newspaper 
columns and in the National Review. Buckley pleaded with Goldwater to distance himself 
from the group to no avail. Goldwater reasoned that there were too many influential 
members in Phoenix. An outright denunciation of the group would put his presidential 
campaign and Senatorial seat at risk.316 These early bouts between entrenched leadership 
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and the Birchers are emblematic of the struggle that conservatives and the far-right faced. 
While some top Republicans like Rockefeller and Javitis pushed back hard against the 
group, others like Eisenhower wavered on their opposition. Buckley, while supportive of 
Goldwater, could not stand Welch or his theories. Nixon’s loss in California in 1962, 
proved the power of the Far Right in the state. They could not single-handedly beat him, 
but they could tip the scales.  
In late January 1964, Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb premiered in theaters. After a delayed release because 
of Kennedy’s assassination, the film’s satirical take on geopolitical events poked fun at 
conspiratorial elements of American politics.  In the film, a cabal of crazed generals work 
to prevent a nuclear doomsday with the Soviet Union as an ultra-nationalist Air Force 
general sets in motion a chain of events culminating in the destruction of both nations. A 
Russian ambassador is depicted working closely with the top echelon of the American 
government. Mad bombers follow their orders without question, and a general discusses 
fluoridation as a communist plot. All while Dr. Strangelove comments on the brilliance 
and simplicity of the end of the world, applauding the government for its rationalism. 
Events are shown as being triggered automatically and impossible to undo. Paranoia and 
commitment mixed with madness and the perversion of ideals bring about the 
apocalypse. At the end of the film Vera Lynn sings “We’ll Meet Again” over footage of 
nuclear explosions flashing on screen. Critics of the John Birch Society saw traces of the 
organization in the events on screen. Audiences were presented with a movie that spoke 
to the fear that the nation was feeling. Sixteen months earlier, the Cuban Missile Crisis 
had proven how close the world was to a collision between capitalism and communism. 
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Extremists working within the John Birch Society saw the conflict as inevitable. Their 
message attracted more members to the group who saw a communist conspiracy at work 
either in their schools or offices or in a broader context relating to the civil rights 
movement and the Cold War. 
During the election cycle, Goldwater supporters used the slogan “Do You Want a 
Leader or Lover in the White House?” to remind voters about Nelson and Happy’s 
marriage. Rockefeller’s supporters countered with, “Do You Want a Leader or Loner?” in 
an attempt to cast the governor as part of the mainstream and Goldwater as an extremist. 
This latest division within the Republican Party did not begin in 1964. Nixon’s campaign 
for governor in 1962 and the fallout that divided the two sides heavily influenced the 
political climate for the California Primary. In 1962, Nixon refused to endorse any 
congressmen or congressional candidates, including liberal Republican Senator Thomas 
Kuchel. Neither one of them wanted much to do with each other because each believed 
the other would hurt his campaign. Instead of uniting the Republican Party, factions 
appeared. Furthermore, Nixon’s hostility towards former governor Goodwin Knight 
coupled with a liberal-conservative split that conservative leader Joseph Shell did not try 
to fix created a standoff.317 Nixon did not win the governor’s race in part because he 
never convinced voters that he wanted the job badly enough. He failed to court middle of 
the road voters, and bite back at his opponents. Democrats organized themselves more 
efficiently than in years past knocking Nixon off of his pedestal. Angry and bitter over 
his loss, Nixon headed off to New York leaving newly elected governor Pat Brown and 
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the Democrats in charge of California. At the time, Democrats outnumbered Republicans 
in California three to two. With the Republican Party in disarray, someone needed to 
come into the state to fill the void.  
At the statewide convention of the California Republican Assembly (CRA) in 
March, moderate Republicans clashed with conservatives. Both Rockefeller and 
Goldwater saw the assembly as a key moment in the primaries. Victory for either 
candidate would all but guarantee the Republican nomination. The CRA met in Fresno to 
choose a slate of leaders for the coming year and endorse a candidate for election. For 
some time, the CRA had been under moderate Republican control. After spreading 
grassroots fears of liberalism, the conservative wing of the party was able funnel in an 
incredible amount of support for their cause. Following a hard fought and bitter debate, 
the conservatives outmaneuvered Rockefeller’s supporters in parliamentary procedure 
winning the CRA’s endorsement of Goldwater as well as the election of conservative 
candidates. It was an important and influential decision for the Goldwater campaign and 
for the right-wing of the party. An organized voice of the right-wing had spoken. Such a 
decisive victory shaped the nation’s politics by helping to bring conservatism onto the 
national political stage.318 President of the CRA, William Nelligan, responded acidly, 
saying that the debate had been “a fight with extremist guerrillas sniping at our flanks. 
The fanatics of the Birch variety have fastened their fangs on the Republican Party’s 
flank and are hanging on like grim death.”319 Alarmed by the result, moderate 
                                                          
318 McGirr, Suburban Warriors, 124. 
319 Kurt Schuparra, Triumph of the Right: The Rise of the California Conservative Movement, 1945-
1966, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, 86. 
156 
 
 
Republicans around the country started a “stop Goldwater” movement. In the South, 
moderates attempts to paint Goldwater as an extremist failed because his opinions were 
either not seen as radical by the vast majority of Republicans or were deemed necessary 
to remedy the ills of and threats to the nation.320  
Leading up to the California primary, the power struggle within the Republican 
Party continued as the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) and the John Birch Society 
competed for influence. Members of the YAF had worked closely with Republican 
strategist William Rusher to gain support for conservative candidates in the Senate but 
they were met with stiff competition. A membership drive led by local Birchers in the 
state topped off by the opening of a six-state headquarters in San Marino put the John 
Birch Society in a strong position. In addition, several positions within the California 
Young Republican organization were also captured by Birchers.321 Volunteers for the 
Goldwater campaign were asked point blank if they were members of the John Birch 
Society in an effort to dislodge the most hardened supporters. F. Clifton White reasoned 
that the society’s influence with its rising membership, strong representation in 
California, and litany of voter information could be weakened if it could be merged with 
his own organization. This idea failed as Birchers continued to establish maverick clubs, 
shift volunteers, and increase cash flow.322  
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 Conservatives working within the Goldwater campaign perceived Birchers as 
loyal and patriotic while liberal Republicans and liberal Democrats characterized the 
movement as extreme. Still, it would be a mischaracterization to equate the John Birch 
Society with the larger Republican ideology. Many conservatives did find that their 
interests at times overlapped with Birchers. They were however put off by the 
movements leadership and unsubstantiated accusations. It would have been harmful to 
Goldwater’s image if he endorsed the John Birch Society, but the organization 
campaigned for him anyway. Welch made clear that the purpose of the society was to 
“supply information from which our members can decide for themselves. There are 
places where Goldwater’s philosophy coincides with mine and others where it does not,” 
but the organization maintained that they would not endorse any candidate.323
 Attacks from both the liberals and the Far Right on their opponents made a 
reconciliation at the convention less and less likely. Conservative radio host Fulton Lewis 
Jr. circulated a smear sheet titled, “The Nelson Rockefeller Story,” painting the governor 
as associating with communists in New York. In it, an African-American lawyer serving 
as chairman of New York’s temporary state commission on low incoming housing was 
tied to the “communist front” and “subversive” groups. Lewis charged that “the only 
possible conclusion that can be reached is that governor Rockefeller doesn’t care about 
these communist and communist front connections and is not disturbed about them.” 
Lewis’s remarks fell under the umbrella of extremists lending their support to Goldwater. 
The fear amongst liberal Republicans became that if Goldwater became the head of the 
Republican Party that the Birchers would follow behind him. Attacks on liberal 
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Republicans did not only come from the fringes. Goldwater spoke in Fresno on how 
Senator Kuchel policies did not fit into “the mainstream of the whole Party.” An odd 
accusation when considering Kuchel overwhelmingly voted with Republican Party 
leadership. Goldwater himself wanted to end Republican National Platforms seemingly 
because he was a minority within the G.O.P.324  
Meanwhile, the Rockefeller campaign produced a short film entitled “The 
Extremists” to be aired one week before the primary. In the film, a narrator explained that 
the extremists were pushing a communist conspiracy. Their appeal was melodramatic, 
they were neither reasonable nor realistic, and they presented an oversimplified world 
from the fringes of the political scene. After this expository, three witnesses to the tactics 
of the extremists were brought in front of the camera. Reverend John Simmons relayed 
how he received hate mail and threatening phone calls after he said he supported the U.N. 
He then recounted the night he and another speaker had their homes bombed. Next, a 
local Republican described how thirty members of the John Birch Society disturbed a 
meeting of over 400 Republicans, and took control of Young Republican clubs in the 
south bay area. Last, a former school teacher told how Birchers infiltrated the local 
assembly by voting themselves in as members.325 Before the film could be aired, 
Rockefeller halted its distribution, seeing the film as McCarthyism in reverse.  
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His decision to not air the film speaks to the inner conflict that plagued his 
campaign. In September of 1964, months after the primaries, Lyndon Johnson’s 
campaign aired the famous “Daisy” television advertisement. In the ad, a young girl is 
shown in a field picking up daisies, then counting as she plucks them one by one. When 
she counts to nine, another voice from an intercom begins to count down from ten, it is a 
missile countdown. She turns to look off screen and the image freezes. The camera then 
zooms into the little girl’s eye as the countdown reaches zero, then a bright flash along 
with the sound a nuclear explosion can be seen as a mushroom cloud rises to the heavens. 
A narrators comes on, "These are the stakes. To make a world in which all of God's 
children can live, or to go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die." 
At the end of the ad a voice reads the words on the screen, "Vote for President Johnson 
on November 3rd. The stakes are too high for you to stay home." This is perhaps the most 
famous political advertisement ever. Johnson essentially used the campaign that 
Rockefeller crafted in California, but to a much larger effect. A primary is different than 
running a national election. The value of the election is smaller and what is important in 
one primary may not be important in the next. Also, because there are fewer voters and 
they are predominantly from one party, unless it is a closed primary, then the message 
may not resonate the same way as it would in a national election where more people can 
participate and may be swayed. California Republicans were predisposed to supporting 
the military and the use of nuclear weapons. Some of Goldwater’s supports and those to 
the right of him wanted him to use nuclear weapons immediately or at the very least use 
them as a means to force the communists to capitulate. National voters would not see it 
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that way. They saw Dr. Strangelove and the “Daisy” ad, when the Goldwater people saw 
a tough, no nonsense approach to a threat to national security.326  
Rockefeller’s people grappled with this view. Early on in his campaign he pushed 
the extremist issue, then he backed off once he faced criticism for dividing the 
Republican Party into further divisions which would hurt his chances in the primaries. He 
then reversed course late in his campaign by attacking conservatives and extremists with 
ferocity. Rockefeller believed that their position within the Republican Party represented 
a major obstacle to the healing process. Republican leaders had a choice. They could 
either allow the extremists along with the conservatives to have their candidate, thus 
avoiding further fracturing of the Republican Party or have a vicious feud, possibly 
ending in the creation of a Conservative Party only to have the Republican candidate lose 
in November as had been expected all along. Extremists were taking over the Republican 
Party, both Birch and pro-Birch forces. They captured full or partial control of the Young 
Republicans, the United Republicans of California, the California Central Committee, 
and the Republican Assembly. Birchers in San Francisco and other areas used the 
Citizens’ Committee of California as a front for members wanting to work behind the 
scenes for Goldwater. At numerous Goldwater headquarters, enthusiasts could walk in 
and receive John Birch Society literature or reactionary materials.327 This kind of tactic 
could be seen in other parts of the country not only among members of the John Birch 
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Society, but also among would be Goldwater supporters looking for other outlets for their 
views. A delegate to the Maryland Republican convention pledged to Goldwater arranged 
a rally for Governor Wallace in Rockeville for him to spread his message of states’ rights 
and segregation.328 While Goldwater could not be expected to control all of the people 
supporting him. Nevertheless, it became another example of the kinds of people voting 
for him.  
Goldwater’s supporters were the most enthusiastic of the campaign, not only in 
California, but throughout the primaries and before. Goldwater gave speeches to 
thousands of admirers in New York and around the country. His advisors gave a 
passionate effort to get him to run in the primaries after Kennedy’s assassination when he 
considered getting out of the national spotlight altogether. There were also the small 
district elections decided by a single determined voter in some cases. In California, 
organizers gathered over three times the number of signatures needed to get their 
candidate on the ballot in a single morning while Rockefeller employed pay-per-signature 
professionals to get the necessary number only one week before the deadline.329 This 
momentum kept building and building throughout the primaries. It was not a smooth 
process. His candidacy was part of a larger social movement that chose him, not the other 
way around. Kennedy’s death brought serious doubts to whether or not Goldwater would 
run and under what circumstances. He lost several primaries, and underperformed and 
underwhelmed in the ones he was supposed to win. Along the way to the nomination, the 
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civil rights bill and Governor Wallace’s campaign threatened his standing in the 
Republican Party. This raised a fundamental issue of whether or not he even belonged in 
the party considering its historical roots and the support of civil rights by the majority of 
Republicans. On top of that, his nervous breakdown before the West Virginia and 
Nebraska primaries called into question his ability to finish the campaign. Had this 
happened in a different era, it could have destroyed him. Thomas Eagleton in 1972 lost 
his spot on the Democrat ticket with George McGovern after it was discovered that he 
underwent electric shock therapy. Members of the press in 1964 had a reverence for the 
office of the presidency and the men vying for their place in it that did not exist in later 
campaigns.  
In the final days of the election, the California primary was too close to call. With 
one last push, Goldwater’s campaign supporters managed to get their candidate over the 
top. It was a culmination of factors. Goldwater’s preaching about clamping down on 
“lawlessness” elements of society, in reference to the civil rights and student movements, 
resonated with Californians. Not to be confused with a white backlash necessarily, if that 
were true then he would have won more votes than he did, but it did strike a chord with a 
number of voters. Likewise, his campaign drew on the mobilization of supporters at 
various rallies and events that brought in movie stars John Wayne and Ronald Reagan. 
Even religious conservatives joined along with the local press to spread his message. This 
was not a bottom up movement either. Powerful businessman already supporting regional 
anticommunist candidates added financial support. After earning their wealth in the post-
war boom, they wanted to have a say in presidential politics. Their money and leadership 
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was a major contribution to the campaign.330 Then, a political gift dropped into their laps. 
Mrs. Rockefeller gave birth on the Saturday before the election. On Sunday, baby 
Nelson’s picture appeared in the Los Angeles Times next to full-page pictures of 
Goldwater and his family. There was a deluge of paid advertisements in the press that 
day. Asked a week prior how the birth might affect the outcome, Spencer-Roberts told 
Rockefeller’s staff to muffle the announcement until after the election. Stu Spencer 
recounted the event saying, “The New York people thought that this was going to be a 
plus – that he become a father and the whole thing.”331 On Tuesday, the results told the 
story: Goldwater 51% and Rockefeller 48% respectively. Californians had made their 
choice. They preferred the hard-talking, extremist courting Arizonian to the millionaire 
divorcee from New York.  
 
Laughing and Crying at the Same Thing 
 Rockefeller campaign advisor Lloyd Free sent a message to the governor giving 
him the California post mortem. Free believed that the companies hired to do the polling, 
Opinion Research of California and Merv Field’s California Poll had been correct in 
predicting that Rockefeller was ahead going into the election. Only, he was ahead at that 
moment. After re-interviewing most of the participants, Opinion Research of California 
concluded that most of the undecideds did vote in the end, and voted 2 to 1 in favor of 
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Goldwater. In Los Angeles and Orange County, Goldwater won 3 to 1. Goldwater’s 
campaign reached out to the undecideds in the final days before the election which 
flipped their vote. Rockefeller’s campaign, perhaps the most expensive primary campaign 
ever, fell silent in those final days. They did not want to rock the boat. Volunteer work 
along with a barrage of T.V. and newspaper advertisements resonated with undecideds. 
They claimed that because of those ads, they knew where Goldwater stood on the issues. 
Amazingly, voters claimed that they did not know much about Rockefeller until the end 
of the campaign. Free believed that the media blitz and personal contact, not the birth of 
Nelson Jr., accounted for the loss.332 Whether or not that is in fact the case may never be 
known for sure, given that people tend to bend the truth when speaking to pollsters or 
may not necessarily know or understand their own reasons for pulling the lever for a 
candidate.  
There can be no doubt that the birth of Rockefeller’s son impacted the election. 
However, Free believed that it did not have as a great an impact as other elements of the 
Goldwater campaign. Possibly he wrote that report to make his boss feel better, but it is 
clear that Rockefeller got the wrong advice right up to the end. He should never have 
allowed his team to relax or give the impression that they were going to win and did not 
need to fight for the election. Rockefeller should have known that his remarriage was still 
an issue for voters, he should have made a speech about the issue, however 
uncomfortable it might have been for him, and he should have known that the birth of his 
son would create waves before election day. Stu Spencer strongly believed that the birth 
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of Nelson Jr. caused the loss in California, but he also believed that Rockefeller could not 
have won the nomination even if he had won the state.333 Both Free and Spencer were 
probably right, Goldwater simply was the man of the hour. His supporters were an 
entrenched opposition. They had the motivation and the wherewithal to know that they 
needed to battle until the last vote was counted. Moreover, the power structure within the 
campaign knew the right notes to play to bring out anyone left on the fence.      
On June 6th, the Republican governors met in Cleveland for the annual 
Governor’s Conference in what would become yet another battle for the nomination. 
There were only sixteen Republican governors that year. They governed over 58 million 
Americans, but they showed no signs of unity. With Lodge and Rockefeller out of the 
race for the nomination, and Nixon no longer thought of as a possibility aside from a few 
outliers believing he could get in on a second or third ballot, Scranton became the choice 
to stop Goldwater. Mrs. Scranton, along with friends and staff, began to put pressure on 
him after seeing Goldwater gain more of a following during the election cycle. Scranton 
even met with Eisenhower in Gettysburg in what was interpreted by the press as the old 
general giving his blessing for his candidacy. In reality, Eisenhower did nothing of the 
sort. He pushed Scranton to accept a nomination if a majority of the delegates wanted 
him to run. Sensing a double cross, Clif White met with Scranton upon his return to 
Cleveland to gage his interest in being the Vice-Presidential nominee. Within the 
conservative block, he would be an acceptable nominee. They needed an alternative 
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choice in case of an open convention.334 Scranton would then be in position to heal the 
Party before making a run in 1968 with the backing of a realigned base of support 
stemming from the conservatives.335 White thought he could stop the Pennsylvanian 
before he got started except Scranton did not want the second slot, he wanted to be top 
billing.  
That Sunday, Scranton took a call in his Sheraton hotel room from Eisenhower. 
He told Scranton that did he not support a cloak and dagger assault on Goldwater. Press 
reports of his meeting with Scranton had the story wrong. He did not want or want to 
appear as if he was masterminding an eleventh hour stop-Goldwater movement. Scranton 
hung up. He then decided not to tell his staff about the Eisenhower’s message and went 
downstairs for a breakfast meeting with the other governors. Much to everyone’s surprise 
Romney entered the meeting, declaring that he would lead the stop-Goldwater 
movement. The other Republican governors did not have an affinity for Romney. He 
irritated them on a host of issues ranging from his sanctimonious attitude to his decisions 
to not attend other functions involving the governors in years past. If anyone was waiting 
for a white knight, George Romney was not it. After he announced his intentions, 
declaring that the fight was not over, the liberal governor of Mark Hatfield asked 
Romney, “Where were you George when Nelson here was trying to stop Goldwater? 
Were you helping him then?” At his seat, Rockefeller sat in silence with his hands 
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masking the smile on his face.336 Hatfield continued, “George, you’re six months too late. 
If you can’t add, I’ll add it for you.” Scranton chimed in to support Romney thus 
prompting Hatfield to retort, “Rockefeller has been working his head off day and night 
for the past six months, while both of you have remained gloriously silent. Any stop-
Goldwater movement now by you eleventh-hour warriors is an exercise in futility.”337  
Around midnight, Nixon arrived in Cleveland. On the way to the hotel, he learned 
that Ohio governor Jim Rhodes, Romney, Rockefeller, and Scranton aimed to stop 
Goldwater. Bleary eyed from his travels, Nixon listened to Rhode’s staff as they 
recounted the events of the weekend until two o’clock Monday morning. After a brief 
rest, he attended a breakfast for the governors to discuss the campaign against Lyndon 
Johnson. Nixon told the crowd that he wanted to hammer Johnson on the Bobby Baker 
scandal. Rockefeller sat unmoved by his oratory. He knew, based on his own researchers’ 
investigation, that if the Republicans opened the file the Bobby Baker case then a number 
of Republican senators would become collateral damage. It would not work. An opening 
to attack Democrats did appear, but few saw the opportunity. Democrats were divided on 
the upcoming civil rights vote, and when two reconnaissance planes were shot down over 
Vietnam, a Walt Rostow of the State Department told the New York Times that the 
American military should be prepared for all options, “up to and including all-out nuclear 
war.”338 On both of these points, Republicans could have positioned themselves to make 
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a united stand on civil rights as they pacified concern over the extremist wing of the Party 
and their support of the nuclear option. Instead, they busied themselves with blaming 
each other for the outcome of the primaries and posturing for control. After the breakfast, 
confusion reigned. 
 A series of meetings held in hotel suites with and without key players, including 
one in which Rockefeller refused Nixon entry, took place. Newsmen crowded the 
hallways trying to make sense of the story. Meanwhile, Nixon informed his aide that he 
wanted the next plane out of Cleveland. Before he could bolt, he met with Romney. 
Accounts differ on what happened. Romney claimed afterward that Nixon urged him to 
become an open candidate. Nixon claimed that he merely wanted Romney to barnstorm 
the country for moderate principles, and that he, Nixon, would remain neutral. After 
leaving the suite, Romney announced to the press that Nixon had urged him to run. Nixon 
then got into a car heading to the airport. Unbeknownst to him at that moment, his 
chances in 1964 ended there. From Goldwater’s vantage point, it looked like Nixon was 
attempting to orchestrate a hostile takeover by using Romney as his pawn. If Nixon 
wanted to deadlock the convention, then the conservatives would give him no quarter. 
Any hopes of him healing the Republican Party ceased. A day later, he boarded a plane to 
London leaving the mess behind.339 
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At the Convention 
When Republicans gathered at the Cow Palace in San Francisco for their 
convention beginning June 13, it soon became a convention unlike any other in 
presidential politics. From a historical perspective, it changed the direction of the 
Republican Party. Only eight years earlier, Republicans met at the Cow Palace to reelect 
Dwight Eisenhower, a center-right representative of the power structure. Now, that 
branch of the party would be laid to rest by the conservatives and the extremists bent on 
seizing control. Their struggle, between the Northeastern elites and the Midwest 
conservatives, had raged for years. Candidates like Wilkie and Dewey had reluctantly 
taken the nomination in years past and time and time again they lost. Even Eisenhower’s 
unpopularity within the party was muffled by the fact that he won the White House. He 
had been able to do what no other candidates could do since the onset of the Depression. 
The convention in San Francisco represented a gateway to a new era, an opportunity to 
right the wrongs of the past. This was the moment when, after all the begging and 
pleading, the discipline and unbending devotion paid off. For once, conservatives would 
have their moment underneath the glow of the television lights from the major networks, 
and the country would see the new face of the Republican Party.  
 Television coverage of the national conventions began in 1952, since then, the 
commitment from the networks mushroomed into a spectacular display to be beamed out 
to the tens of millions of Americans watching around the country. Estimates suggest that 
the three major news networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS, would go on to spend between 25 
and 30 million dollars on covering the 1964 presidential election. On the California 
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Primary alone, they spent 1.25 million dollars, followed by another 15 million dollars 
spent on both conventions. The Republican convention became the basis for modern 
television convention coverage. Nearly 5,500 credentials were issued to over 1,000 news 
organizations with the networks doubling the size of their staffs from 1960. They packed 
hotels, transportation terminals, and the streets of San Francisco with close to 200 tons of 
equipment, twice as much tonnage as before, but with advancements in technology, this 
represented a far greater amount of equipment. To make sure that they covered every 
angle, the networks used wireless cameras and microphones, along with mobile units in 
cars and trucks capable of almost instantaneous broadcasting.340   
Inside the Cow Palace, thirteen radio and television booths sat high above the 
convention floor to preserve floor space for the 14,500 in attendance. A forty foot high 
pool camera platform faced the speaker’s rostrum, itself blocking the view of hundreds of 
delegates, forcing them to watch the proceedings on strategically placed monitors. As 
part of the network build up to the nomination, newsmen conducted hundreds of 
interviews to be recorded, edited, and broadcast for mass consumption. They pieced 
together montages of the history of the party, backed by expert analysis, predictions, 
debate, and hype. After the bitterness of the California Primary, producers expected the 
convention to be of considerable interest to the audience. To bring the action to their 
living rooms, each network assembled a broadcasting team of stars: Walter Cronkite, 
Robert Trout, and Roger Mudd for CBS, David Brinkley and Chet Huntley for NBC, and 
Edward P. Morgan and Howard K. Smith for ABC. Helping them sort through the 
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confusion, networks enlisted the help of Theodore White, Louis Harris, and computers 
from IBM. Each night, they competed for ratings, getting feedback on audience size and 
distribution, but viewership was not their only goal. In fact, fewer viewers watched the 
Republican Convention than would for a regularly scheduled summer broadcast. 
Networks competed for prestige and an indirect return on their investment. “It’s an 
intangible,” NBC News Chief William McAndrew commented, “but sales people say that 
our news image definitely makes sales for the whole network schedule.”341 Money and 
politics could not be separated. With television cameras peering over their shoulders, 
politicians entered into a new arena where they would be scrutinized and observed in 
ways unlike anything else before.   
On the eve of the convention, networks got a preview of the mayhem that would 
become synonymous with the next week of activity. Forty thousand protestors marched 
towards City Hall Plaza carrying signs reading “DEFOLIATE MISSISSIPPI,” 
“GOLDWATER FOR PRESIDENT – JEFFERSON DAVIS FOR VICE-PRESIDENT.” 
Other signs read “GOLDWATER ’64, BREAD ’65, HOT WATER ’66.” Organized by 
church and labor groups to challenge the conservative’s on civil rights, the march 
absorbed other interest groups such Women’s Rights protestors and peaceniks calling for 
a halt to the arms race. Only a few short weeks had passed since three civil rights workers 
in Mississippi disappeared. They would later be found executed by the Ku Klux Klan 
after being assisted as to their whereabouts by the local police force. Rockefeller 
appeared before a rally with baseball superstar Jackie Robinson, attempting to speak to 
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the masses about the Republican Party’s pro-civil rights past only to be met by jeers and 
sarcastic laughs.342 Conservatives moved past the crowds, flocking towards their own 
heroes like Phyliss Schlafley, William Buckley, and Ronald Reagan. They did not come 
so far to be deterred by the opposition, even if it was the largest protest since the March 
on Washington.   
New York Senator Jacob Javits published his book, Order of Battle: A 
Republican’s Call to Reason, pleading with party members, “I would fervently hope that 
[conservatives] would slam the door shut against the Trojan Horse of nihilism which the 
Radical Right, in the name of conservatism, has been trying to introduce into the inner 
citadel of the Republican Party. I would hope that they would do so in unmistakingly 
clear terms.”343 Scranton’s ran his brief five-week campaign with this sentiment in mind. 
He loved the Republican Party, but the events in Cleveland humiliated him. In spite of 
this, he felt a conviction to run against Goldwater for opposing the Civil Rights Bill. 
Scranton along with the other moderates and liberals feared that Goldwater’s upcoming 
vote on civil rights would bring in the white backlash voters that Wallace appealed to on 
the Democratic side. They feared that Goldwater would become a surprise winner like 
Harry Truman in 1948. When Rockefeller ended his run for the presidency on June 15, he 
donated his entire nationwide professional organization to Scranton. A week later, Lodge 
resigned as ambassador to South Vietnam to join in on the campaign. Then on June 28, a 
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Gallup Poll pairing Scranton and Goldwater head to head showed a 55 to 34 advantage 
for Scranton. On the weekend before the opening proceedings of the convention, 
Scranton met with Rockefeller, Javits, Kenneth Keating, Hugh Scott, and Lodge. 
Together, they thought and plotted for a way to stop Goldwater. Scranton wavered 
between an attack on his record on civil rights to his threats of using nuclear weapons. 
Rockefeller pitched the idea that they should follow his lead in the primaries by 
denouncing Goldwater as an extremist thus forcing him to admit his true feelings on the 
John Birch Society. Upon his arrival, Eisenhower was presented with a resolution signed 
by former seven of his former cabinet members by Scranton rebuking Goldwater’s 
nuclear policy. After weighing the desperate act to force a convention fight, the ex-
President declined citing the secrets of national defense as unfit for a former commander-
in-chief to discuss in public.  
By Monday conservatives had closed their ranks after learning of another attempt 
to bring down their candidate coupled with a scathing letter from the Pennsylvania 
governor describing delegates as “little more than a flock of chickens whose necks will 
be wrung at will.”344 Scranton would not be able to alter the convention. Barry Goldwater 
would be their nominee. Conservatives had been down this road before. They recounted 
stories to each other about Robert Taft going to the convention in 1952 with enough 
delegates to win on the first ballot only to have Eisenhower’s picture spread across 
newspapers and magazines before he took the nomination and the White House. Writers 
called Taft “a sure loser” much like the press in 1964 called Goldwater. Lodge was in 
                                                          
344 White, Making of the President 1964, 205-208. 
174 
 
 
Chicago that year stretching banners across hotel lobbies with Taft’s initials, gloating that 
they spelled “RAT.”345 They believed that the national media blanketed their candidate 
and the truth, portraying him as a foot-in-the-mouth politician in order to save the 
“international-socialist Establishment,” and their monopoly on control. California voted 
to revive the two-party system, the primary preserved democracy.346 An Associated Press 
survey revealed that 694 delegates intended to cast their vote for Goldwater, 39 more 
than necessary for the nomination. Meanwhile, Scranton carried 138 votes or 303 if he 
gained all the Rockefeller, Lodge, and Smith votes, well short of the required number. 
Syndicated Liberal Republican columnist Joseph Alsop wrote, “The reading is grim at the 
moment. The trouble is that there are just too many hot-eyed fanatics in the uncommitted 
delegations that ought to stand up for Scranton. If the Republicans give the nomination to 
Goldwater the most grisly fate threatens the Party in these delegates’ states; but their 
emotions rule them and they could not care less.”347 Remarks like that only strengthened 
the resolve of the opposition. Conservatives warned that the Establishment wanted liberal 
domination, they warned that liberals threatened to dominate both parties; that was why 
they did not want Goldwater. 
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Soviet officials observing the election took a different view of the outcome. The 
Soviets viewed the struggle between the two sides of the Republican Party as a struggle 
between the Wall Street financiers leading the internationalist wing of the party and the 
Chicago and Cleveland financial groups leading the isolationist wing of the party. The 
Soviets believed that profound economic and political currents had altered the character 
of the Republican Party. The nouveau rich Southerners and Midwesterners had aligned 
themselves against the old patrician families. This reactionary, militant, and racist 
coalition adopted Goldwater because he lined their pockets and they preferred his “small 
town, bourgeois, locker-room personality.” Goldwater’s nomination would further 
increase the need for an arms race. This would in turn make his financial donors 
wealthier, particularly those in southern California who had a vested interest in the 
growth of the military-industrial complex. His connection to pro-fascist ultra-groups 
concerned the Soviets so much that a Soviet news article called Goldwater’s 
“understanding of international affairs frighteningly primitive.” According to their 
sentiments expressed in both Russian and American media outlets, the Soviets preferred a 
Democratic candidate because they preferred the Democrats rhetoric on freedom from 
action to Goldwater’s extreme reaction.348 In their eyes, Goldwater posed the greater 
threat to global stability. The choice in November should have been obvious for voters.     
On Tuesday, the final battles for control of the Republican Party commenced. 
That day, the platform committee produced the most conservative party platform in 
decades. Opponents, led by Scranton, proposed an amendment that would condemn the 
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extremism of Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, and the communists. Also, they 
called for a stronger civil rights plank and a plank that would allow only the president to 
authorize the use of nuclear missiles, a highly contested point that the Goldwater forces 
opposed. For the liberals and moderates, time was running out. There would be little 
chance of getting the amendment approved, they simply did not have the votes to do it. 
That night, Eisenhower gave his speech to the convention. He highlighted the internecine 
struggle within the party and asked each side to reflect, “This means that only for a 
moment I must ask you to bank the fires of personally competitive intra‐party politics and 
contemplate with me the whole of this big party.” He continued by appealing to the 
conservative’s rhetorical defense of freedom, “We have ever sought to create an 
atmosphere of liberty and to sustain its substance.” Then, he recalled the history of the 
Republican Party dating back to Lincoln and the sweeping changes made to America 
under Republican leadership. He began to speak about the outsiders threatening the 
Republican Party, “So let us particularly scorn the divisive efforts of those outside our 
family, including sensation seeking columnists and commentators, because, my friends, I 
assure you that these are people who couldn't care less about the good of our party.” 
From there, he took a turn, aiming his remarks at the fear brought on by the far-right, 
“Let us not be guilty of maudlin sympathy for the criminal, who roaming the streets with 
switchblade knife and illegal firearms seeking a helpless prey, suddenly becomes upon 
apprehension, a poor, underprivileged person who counts upon the compassion of our 
society and the laxness or weaknesses of too many courts to forgive his offense.” 
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Audience members groaned, they did not want to hear the former president lecture them 
on their nightmares.349   
Afterwards, convention officials muscled to have the party platform read, giving 
the convention ninety minutes to cool off. By 9:00 San Francisco time, it was 11:00 in 
New York late enough that the majority of Americans would not bear witness to the most 
dramatic of the Republican war amongst themselves. First, Hugh Scott came to the 
podium to propose the extremist amendment, which was applauded by the delegates from 
the East. Then he introduced Nelson Rockefeller. An applause went up from parts of the 
crowd. Camera bulbs flashed as Rockefeller raised his arm in acknowledgement. At once, 
a mixture of clapping and boos competed followed by jeering and horns. The governor 
pointed and grinned at his cheering section. When the chairman banged his gavel for 
order, a chant of “We want Barry” came down from the rafters. From his trailer outside 
the hall where he could see and communicate with his staff positioned inside, Clif White 
pushed a button to radio his men on the convention floor, demanding that they quiet their 
delegates. White radioed that they should not boo or appear unseemly, but the delegates 
were not making the noise. The chanting came from the people in the stands. Rockefeller 
began his speech by supporting the extremist amendment with everyone in the building at 
full attention to see what would happen next. “The time has come for the Republican 
Party to face this issue realistically and take decisive action.” After each sentence, a hail 
of cheers and jeers rained down on him. Each time he spoke, Rockefeller paused and 
looked out into the crow before making his move, “It is essential that this Convention 
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repudiate here and now any doctrinaire, militant minority, whether Communist, Ku Klux 
Klan or Bircher which would subvert this party to purposes alien to the very basic tenets 
which gave this party birth.” The crowd screeched in anger and discontent, but he 
continued by warning that “the Republican Party is in real danger of subversion by a 
radical, well-financed and highly disciplined minority.” Rockefeller and the other 
moderates were trying to embarrass Goldwater. There were at least ten delegates who 
were members of the John Birch Society there in the hall. If Goldwater agreed to the 
amendment, then he would have to reject them. If he disagreed, then it might look like he 
supported communists or the Ku Klux Klan. A smile ran across Rockefeller’s face.350  
Rockefeller continued to poke and jab at the hostile audience, using words like 
“liberalism,” “middle course,” and “mainstream” to describe the kind of party that he 
believed Republicans represented. Members of the audience begged to differ. “During 
this year, I have crisscrossed this nation fighting for those principles, fighting to keep the 
Republican party of all the people - and warning of the extremist threat, its danger to the 
party.” At this moment the chants of “we want Barry” became so overwhelming that he 
stopped his speech. Again, the chairman banged his gavel to bring order. Anyone 
watching on television could hear the two men at the microphone bickering about 
quieting the crowd and keeping the remarks to five minutes in length. After order was 
restored, Rockefeller began again. With each comment, he riled up the crowd further, 
goading them into behaving as exactly the kind of extremist reactionaries that the liberals 
believed them to be. As they yelled in defiance, he unmasked the ugly truth to the 
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cameras, “This is still a free country, ladies and gentlemen. These things have no place in 
America. But I can personally testify to their existence,” his voice firm and steady, “and 
so can countless others who have also experienced anonymous midnight and early 
morning telephone calls, unsigned threatening letters, smear and hate literature, strong-
arm and goon tactics, bomb threats and bombings, infiltration and take-over of 
established political organizations by communist and Nazi methods. Some of you don’t 
like to hear it, ladies and gentlemen, but it’s the truth.” He stood before them with moxie 
and poise determined to make his point. If it looked self-serving, that would be all right 
with him if it also meant exposing the opposition in front of the cameras. Rockefeller 
appeared like a man calling for civility when the audience wanted to wander in the 
darkness. It was a career defining moment for him.351  
Towards the end of his brief speech Rockefeller gathered momentum for a final 
attack, “There is no place in this Republican Party for those who would infiltrate its 
ranks, distort its aims, and convert it into a cloak of apparent respectability for a 
dangerous extremism.” The crowd rocked in their seats hardly able to control their 
emotions. Then with an emphatic denunciation, “And make no mistake about it - the 
hidden members of the John Birch Society and others like them are out to do just that!” 
Audience members yelled and screamed with great fury. Hammering away, he pummeled 
them again, “These people have nothing in common with Republicanism. These people 
have nothing in common with Americans.” With one final wallop he struck his last blow, 
“The Republican Party must repudiate these people!” The crowd had booed and catcalled 
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mercilessly throughout, but he withstood their indignation and vitriol. It was a 
magnificent performance captured on every major network. When he walked down the 
stairs from the platform, he walked away having given his all to roll back the tide of 
extremism.352  
On Wednesday, Goldwater watched the roll call vote from his suite at the Mark 
Hopkins hotel. One by one, his loyal delegates and those who saw the writing on the wall 
did as they came to do and nominated him for the presidency of the United States. 
Goldwater sat in his chair, contemplating his fate as his advisors shook hands and 
congratulated one another. “I couldn’t have done it without you,” he told them. When one 
of his aides informed him that Rockefeller was on the line to offer his congratulations, 
Goldwater barked, “Hell, I don’t want to talk to that son of a bitch.”353  
On the following night, Nixon gave a short speech describing himself as a “simple 
soldier in the ranks” before introducing the nominee. It was Goldwater’s turn to address 
the convention. New York Congressman William E. Miller would be his running mate, 
the first Catholic nominated to the Republican presidential ticket. Goldwater strode to the 
rostrum in a hail of applause. Under the lights he looked out on a patchwork of 
Republican supporters, tense with excitement. He stoked the flames of their passion by 
declaring, “It is the cause of Republicanism to remind ourselves, and the world, that only 
the strong can remain free – that only the strong can keep the peace!” He buoyed his 
remarks with words like “freedom,” “balance,” and “destiny.” His supports roared in 
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agreement as his vision materialized. Then he turned his speech to echo the divisions 
within the party, further alienating conservatives from the liberals, “Anyone who joins us 
in all sincerity we welcome. Though those who don’t care for our cause, we don’t expect 
to enter our ranks in any case.” Half of the audience cheered as the other half sat in 
stunned silence. Goldwater could have used his nomination speech to change his image; 
instead he lifted his voice to the rafters proclaiming, “Extremism in the defense of liberty 
is no vice! Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!” With that, the crowd broke 
into a thunderous applause.354  
 As delegates, reporters, admirers, fanatics, and the vanquished emptied out of the 
Cow Palace, they were left to ponder the maverick now representing the Republican 
Party. His speech writers had composed a bouquet of words to justify the inescapable 
drama of the past year, but they had failed to account for the lack of unity that followed. 
There would be no way to put the party back together where the pieces had become 
jagged and crumbled. There would be too much bitterness and too much anguish for 
many to join again. The initial reaction became that the conservative movement 
represented a deviation from the norm, the puzzle would realign itself, and return to some 
recognizable form. In time, that theory would fall by the way side. Thus, on that warm 
July night, an era of Republican Liberalism began to fade further into the darkness, 
returning in sporadic intervals, but never again in the 20th century to reclaim its former 
glory. Such is the ebb and flow of politics in America, not to be held up as divine when 
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they are in power and not to be mourned too deeply when they pass from it. Their end 
signaled the beginning of another.  
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